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1. On September 12, 2013, Dell Inc.’s (“Dell”) stockholders approved a proposal in which 
Michael Dell, Dell’s Founder, Chairman, and CEO, acquired Dell in partnership with 
global technology investment firm Silver Lake Partners (“Silver Lake”). I have been 
retained by counsel for Dell to determine the fair value, on a per share basis, of Dell’s 
common equity as of October 29, 2013, the closing date of the transaction (“the 
Merger”). My valuation is guided by the language of the Delaware appraisal statute, 
which references the “fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising 
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation.”1 
B. Qualifications 
2. I hold the Russell L. Carson Professorship in Finance and Economics in the Graduate 
School of Business of Columbia University, where I am also the Dean. In addition, I am a 
Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics of the Faculty of Arts and 
Sciences. At the National Bureau of Economic Research, I am a research associate in 
programs on corporate finance, public economics, industrial organization, monetary 
economics, and economic fluctuations and growth. Prior to joining the Columbia faculty 
as Professor of Economics and Finance in 1988, I taught in the Department of Economics 
at Northwestern University. I have also served as Visiting Professor of Business 
Administration at Harvard Business School, John M. Olin Visiting Professor at the 
University of Chicago, Visiting Professor and Research Fellow of the Energy and 
Environmental Policy Center at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, and John M. 
Olin Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. I hold A.M. and Ph.D. 
Degrees in economics from Harvard University, and B.A. and B.S. degrees from the 
University of Central Florida, summa cum laude. 
                                                     
 
1  8 Del. C. §262(h). 
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3. I am an advisor to the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. From 2001 to 
2003, I served as Chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers; over that 
period, I also served as Chairman of the Economic Policy Committee for the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris. From 1991 
to 1993, I served as Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Analysis) of the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, where I was responsible for economic analysis of tax policy, the 
administration’s revenue estimates, and health care policy issues. I have also been an 
advisor or consultant to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Social 
Security Administration, Congressional Budget Office, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, Internal Revenue Service, International Trade Commission, National Science 
Foundation, U.S. Department of Energy, and U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
4. My professional work has centered on problems in finance, public economics, industrial 
organization, monetary economics, and natural resource economics. As an economist, I 
have examined the evolution and behavior of a wide range of firms and industries. I have 
authored more than 100 research articles, edited a number of books, and authored leading 
textbooks on money and financial markets, intermediate macroeconomics, and principles 
of economics.  
5. I have worked on a wide variety of valuation matters over my career and regularly teach 
and apply the techniques I have used in my analysis. I have appeared as an expert before 
the Delaware Courts on multiple occasions, including providing testimony on valuation 
matters. I have not previously been retained by Dell for any matter. A detailed list of my 
experience, research publications, and prior expert work, is included in my curriculum 
vitae, which is attached as Appendix A to this report. 
C. Compensation 
6. I bill on a time and materials basis for my work in connection with this assignment. My 
hourly rate is $1,200 and payment for my services does not depend in any way on the 
opinions I form or the outcomes in this matter. In addition, I receive compensation based 
on the professional fees of Analysis Group, Inc., a financial and economic consulting 
firm, which has provided research support under my direction and supervision. 
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D. Information Considered 
7. In preparation of this expert report, staff working under my direction and I have reviewed 
a large number of documents and data sources. These include Dell’s financial statements 
and Proxy Statements filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); 
presentations to Dell’s board and special committee; Dell management reports; various 
financial projections of Dell’s financial performance; data and reports from industry 
sources; deposition transcripts; equity analysts’ reports; and news coverage. In addition, 
I, or staff working at my direction, have had discussions with Dell management and 
Boston Consulting Group (BCG) employees. A full list of all documents and sources I 
have relied upon is included as Appendix B. 
E. Summary of Conclusions 
8. I have used a number of standard valuation techniques to determine the fair value of 
Dell’s equity on October 29, 2013, which I describe in more detail in this report. I 
developed a point estimate of $12.68 per share derived from a standard discounted cash 
flow (DCF) analysis. I also performed some sensitivity analyses using alternative 
discount rates and both higher and lower terminal growth rates. These analyses generated 
results that range from $11.64 to $13.17 per share. Analysis based on projections that 
were presented to lenders of Dell as a private company, and thus not strictly comparable 
to the public company framework, results in a corroborating value of $14.33. Additional 
analysis based on public company financial multiples generates per-share values ranging 
from $10.06 to $11.31 per share. 
9. Because of the many uncertainties associated with the changing industry outlook and 
company strategy, I also believe that one should carefully consider the stock price, 
analysts’ price projections, and the price derived from the robust and well publicized deal 
process. These represent the best view of how individuals and institutions who were 
actually putting real money to use valued Dell. It is for this reason that I consider $13.75, 
the Merger price, to be the ceiling for a fair value estimate. 
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F. Relevant Parties 
10. Michael Dell founded a company called PC’s Limited in 1984 in his dorm room as a 
freshman at the University of Texas.2 That company became Dell Computer Corporation 
and began trading as a public company in 1988.3 In 2003, Dell changed its name to Dell 
Inc. from Dell Computer Corporation.4 Michael Dell served as Chief Executive Officer of 
Dell until 2004, then returned to that role in 2007.5 
11. Dell is a global information technology (IT)6 company based in Round Rock, Texas. 
Among other things, Dell sells personal computers, servers, IT and business services, 
network and data storage devices, software and peripherals, and other electronics.7 Dell is 
one of the largest IT companies in the world with global revenues of $56.9 billion in its 
fiscal year ending February 1, 2013.8,9 Its customers include a wide range of education 
institutions, government, health care, law enforcement agencies, large corporate 
enterprises, small and medium businesses, and the individual consumer market.  
12. On October 29, 2013, Dell again became a privately owned company following the 
Merger, in which Michael Dell and Silver Lake Partners became the primary 
stockholders, with Michael Dell and related entities owning approximately 75 percent of 
                                                     
 
2  “The Birth of a Company,” Dell Inc., <http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/uscorp1/birth-of-
company?c=us&l=en&s=corp&cs=uscorp1>, accessed April 10, 2015. 
3  “Going Public and Going Global,” Dell Inc., <http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/uscorp1/going-public-
and-global?c=us&l=en&s=corp&cs=uscorp1>, accessed April 10, 2015. 
4  Dell Inc., Form 10-Q for period ending August 1, 2003, filed September 15, 2003, p. 15. 
5  Dell Inc., 2007 Form 8-K, filed February 5, 2007. 
6  In sections of this report, the information technology (IT) industry and computer industry are broadly-
defined to encompass companies that have hardware, software, or cloud-related products that service 
consumers or businesses. In other sections of the report, the definition is narrowly focused. For 
example, I sometimes examine only those companies that belong to a particular range of the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code. In those cases in which I focus on a narrow set of companies, I 
provide a note of clarification. 
7  Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013, pp. 5-7. 
8  Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013, pp. 4 and 26. Exhibits 1 and 2 provide income 
statements and balance sheets for Dell. 
9  When I discuss Dell’s financial performance throughout this report, I generally refer to Dell’s fiscal 
year and fiscal quarters. Dell’s fiscal year, unlike most companies, ends in late January or early 
February of each year. Thus, fiscal year 2013 (FY2013) refers to the fiscal year ended February 1, 
2013, 11 months of which occurred during calendar year 2012. The Merger occurred on October 29, 
2013, just a few days prior to the end of Dell’s third quarter of fiscal year 2014. 
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the shares of the new private company.10 Throughout this report I use the term Merger 
and Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO) to refer to the transaction that resulted in Dell changing 
from being a publicly traded company to a privately held company. 
13. Silver Lake Partners is a private equity investment firm established in Menlo Park, 
California in 1999.11 The company focuses on investing in private technology companies 
and technology-enabled businesses.12 As of 2014, Silver Lake was the fifteenth largest 
private equity firm in the world, with $26 billion in assets under management and 
committed capital.13 Examples of Silver Lake’s past investments include Skype, Seagate 
Technology, Alibaba, and Go Daddy.14  
G. Valuation Approaches 
14. In this report, I apply standard financial valuation techniques in my consideration of the 
fair value of Dell’s equity. I provide more detail on each approach, the inputs used in the 
calculations, and my findings in the remainder of this report. Very briefly, I have 
considered five valuation approaches. 
15. Stock Market Price – Dell’s equity traded in an efficient public stock market for more 
than two decades prior to the Merger. Finance academics and professionals such as 
myself generally believe that a well functioning public equity market will provide an 
accurate assessment of the value of the equity of a company. I reviewed Dell’s stock 
                                                     
 
10  SLP_DELLAP00069188-296 (“Project Denali,” Silver Lake Partners, September 2013), at 196. SLP 
Equity is $1.4 billion out of a total of $5.569 billion, or 25.1 percent. The remainder are Michael Dell 
and MSD Capital (MSD). 
11  “Overview,” SilverLake – The Global Leader in Technology 
Investing,<http://www.silverlake.com/secondary.asp?pageID=1>, accessed April 10, 2015. 
12  “Overview,” SilverLake – The Global Leader in Technology 
Investing,<http://www.silverlake.com/secondary.asp?pageID=1>, accessed April 10, 2015. 
13  “Ranking of the Largest Private Equity Firms by PE Capital Raised, 2014,” Private Equity 
International, May 2014, p. 48, 
<https://www.privateequityinternational.com/uploadedFiles/Private_Equity_International/PEI/Non-
Pagebuilder/Aliased/News_And_Analysis/2014/May/News/PEI 300 2014.pdf>, accessed April 14, 
2015. 
14  “Portfolio: All Portfolio Companies,” SilverLake – The Global Leader in Technology 
Investing,<http://www.silverlake.com/secondary.asp?pageID=6>, accessed April 22, 2015. 
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market price, trends, and analysts’ coverage as part of my overall approach to 
determining the Company’s fair value per share. 
16. Deal Process – In connection with the sale process, Dell’s Board of Directors (“Board”) 
established an independent Special Committee that solicited offers from qualified 
bidders, negotiated the Merger price, and made the final recommendation to the larger 
Board. Michael Dell agreed to a variety of measures to neutralize his role in the process. 
Finance academics and professionals understand that a broad and well run company sale 
process is much like an auction and should elicit a fair price for the equity of a company. 
I considered the deal process and resulting price as part of my overall approach to 
determining the Company’s fair value per share. 
17. Discounted Cash Flow – Finance academics and professionals believe that the value of a 
company’s operating assets is the discounted stream of its expected future free cash 
flows. The discounted cash flow analysis is a standard finance valuation technique used 
to model potential cash flows, and I have used this technique in this case. 
18. Comparable Companies – Another valuation approach used by finance professionals, 
and to a somewhat lesser extent by finance academics, is the comparable companies 
analysis. This approach involves developing an appropriate financial multiple or metric 
for companies that are similar to the subject company, and then applying that metric to 
observed values for the subject company to calculate a value. Identifying truly 
comparable companies is often a significant challenge and impediment to using this 
methodology. I have considered the comparable companies technique in my analysis, but 
given Dell’s size, scope and operating configuration, I use it for validation rather than as 
a primary valuation methodology. 
19. Comparable Transactions – Another valuation approach that is sometimes used is the 
comparable transactions analysis. In theory, a comparable transactions analysis may be 
preferable to a comparable companies analysis, because it attempts to mirror a situation 
nearly identical in every respect, including the additional information developed from a 
transaction process. In some industries—such as residential real estate or the purchase of 
a standardized business or franchise—this can be a useful valuation technique as there 
may be many transactions that are otherwise quite comparable to the one being 
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considered. In this circumstance, I reviewed the large LBO transactions of the previous 
36 months prior to the transaction and concluded that none was comparable to Dell.15 
None of the four companies that engaged in LBO transactions was in the computer 
hardware business and none had revenue growth and profit margins that were similar to 
Dell. Thus, I do not use this approach in my analysis. 
II. OUTLOOK FOR DELL AS OF THE MERGER DATE 
20. In connection with my assessment of the valuation of Dell as of October 29, 2013, it is 
important to understand the domestic and global economic outlook, as well as the outlook 
for the IT industry and Dell. I address each of these issues in this section.  
A. U.S. and Global Economic Outlook as of October 29, 2013 
21. I begin by evaluating the overall economic situation in the United States and the rest of 
the world at the time of the transaction. The period leading up to the transaction was one 
of slow recovery from a serious financial downturn beginning with the 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis. While the global economic outlook certainly improved from its low point, 
it was still modest as of the Merger date, with continued uncertainty about the future.16 As 
the figure below shows, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States and the 
rest of the world suffered from negative growth during the recession, with post-recession 
growth continuing to be moderate. 
                                                     
 
15  Exhibit 3. 
16  “What Accounts for the Slow Growth of the Economy After the Recession?” Congressional Budget 
Office, November 2012, <https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/43707-SlowRecovery.pdf>, viewed 
May 14, 2015. 
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Figure 1. GDP Growth in the United States, European Union, India, China, and the 
Rest of the World – Q1 2000 to Q3 2013  
 
22. In the United States, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the economy 
had not yet returned to full performance as of the Merger date. Real GDP in the fourth 
quarter of 2012 was 5.5 percent below the maximum sustainable annual level of output of 
the economy, known as potential GDP, a modest improvement from the 7.5 percent 
shortfall as of mid-2009.17 The CBO further estimated that real GDP would not return to 
its potential level in the United States until 2017.18 In Europe, the financial crisis had also 
become a sovereign debt crisis, with many countries undertaking austerity programs. Of 
                                                     
 
17  Potential GDP is the CBO’s estimate of the maximum sustainable level of output of the economy. See 
“The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023,” Congressional Budget Office, 
February 2013, p. 35.  
18   “The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023,” Congressional Budget Office, 







Q1-2000 Q3-2001 Q1-2003 Q3-2004 Q1-2006 Q3-2007 Q1-2009 Q3-2010 Q1-2012 Q3-2013
Sources:
[A] "Quarterly Growth Rates of real GDP, change over previous quarter," OECD, <http://stats.oecd.org/.>, accessed May 11, 2015.
[B] "GDP growth (annual %)," World Development Indicators (WDI), <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx>, accessed May 11, 2015.
Notes:
[1] % Growth is the OECD reported GDP growth rate compared to the same quarter of previous year, seasonally adjusted. Yearly data from WDI are 
used for China prior to Q1 2011.
[2] In the plot, Q1 2000 for China uses China's 1999 annual growth rate.
[3] Rest of World is unweighted average of GDP growth rates for Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel,
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the seven largest countries in the world by GDP, China was the only one to have a quick 
“growth correction” to prevent it from entering a recession.19  
23. As of October 2013, the month of the Merger, the World Economic Outlook report by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicated that “recovery from the crisis continues” 
and that economic activity in the major advanced economies had finally “started to 
accelerate from subdued levels.”20 The prospect of a positive turn for the advanced 
economies was, however, counterbalanced by the slowing growth of emerging countries 
such as China and other countries in Asia and Latin America. The same IMF report 
projected low global growth over the next few years—forecasts of annual GDP growth 
through 2018 were 3.1 percent in the United States, about 1.1 percent in Japan, 1.6 
percent in the Eurozone, and 6.7 percent developing Asian markets.21 As stated by the 
IMF: “[G]lobal growth is still weak, its underlying dynamics are changing, and the risks 
to the forecasts remain to the downside.”22 
24. On the consumer side, unemployment was still relatively high and household incomes 
were still relatively weak leading up to the date of the transaction. The September 2013 
employment report by the U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics showed a 7.2 percent U.S. 
jobless rate, slightly improved from 7.8 percent in September 2012,23 but well above the 
roughly five to six percent level considered by many economists to be full employment.24 
                                                     
 
19  Wen, Yi and Jing Wu, “Withstanding Great Recession like China,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, Working Paper, <https://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2014/2014-007.pdf>, accessed April 14, 
2015.  
20  “World Economic Outlook, Transitions and Tensions,” International Monetary Fund, October 2013, 
p. xiv. 
21  “World Economic Outlook, Transitions and Tensions,” International Monetary Fund, October 2013, 
p. xiv. 
22  “World Economic Outlook, Transitions and Tensions,” International Monetary Fund, October 2013, 
p. 17. 
23  “Employment News Release: The Employment Situation—September 2013," U.S. Bureau of Labor 
and Statistics, October 22, 2013, <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_10222013.htm>, 
accessed April 14, 2015. 
24  “Monetary Policy Report: Part 3, Summary of Economic Projects,” Federal Open Market Committee, 
February 26, 2013, pp. 43 and 47. 
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In the Eurozone, unemployment reached a record high of 11.6 percent in 2012.25 
Similarly, the Pew Research Center reported that household income had “hardly 
recovered at all” from the recession for a majority of Americans (54 percent).26  
B. IT Industry Outlook as of October 29, 2013  
25. In addition to the overall economic difficulties during the years preceding the transaction, 
the IT industry—and particularly demand for personal computers (PCs) and servers—was 
also undergoing significant changes in the years leading up to the Merger, many of which 
presented challenges for Dell. Very broadly, these changes included: 
• Rise in the demand for tablet computing and smartphones; 
• Decline in the demand for desktop and notebook personal computers and shift 
within desktop and notebook personal computers market from more expensive, 
higher-end machines to less expensive machines; 
• Change in the demand for business servers away from on-site servers to lower-
cost servers for “cloud-based” services; and 
• Collapse in corporate IT investment in the aftermath of the financial crisis and 
questions about the path of future IT spending on PCs. 
26. In this section, I briefly discuss each of these trends and Dell’s strategic options and 
responses. 
1. Increase In Demand for Tablet Computers and Smartphones 
27. By 2013, there had been a significant change in the types of devices that individuals and 
firms were purchasing and using for their computing. In particular, tablet computers and 
smartphones were becoming ubiquitous, with unit sales of these devices far surpassing 
unit sales of desktop and notebook computers. Equity analysts commonly referred to this 
                                                     
 
25  Sparkes, Matthew, “Eurozone Unemployment Rises to Record 11.6pc,” The Telegraph, October 31, 
2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9645085/Eurozone-unemployment-rises-
to-record-11.6pc.html>, accessed April 10, 2015. 
26  “Five Years after Market Crash, U.S. Economy Seen as ‘No More Secure,’” Pew Research Center, 
September 12, 2013, <http://www.people-press.org/2013/09/12/five-years-after-market-crash-u-s-
economy-seen-as-no-more-secure/>, accessed April 7, 2015. 
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trend as “tablet cannibalization” of the PC market.27 As the figure below shows, as of 
September 2013, IDC, a leading technology industry data source, was forecasting that 
tablets and smartphones would represent 80 percent of “smart” device (those connected 
to the internet) purchases in 2013, and would increase to 87 percent of such purchases by 
2017. 
Figure 2. Forecasted Worldwide Unit Market Share of Various ‘Smart’ Devices – 
2013 and 2017 
 
28. Dell lagged its competitors in the market for tablets and smartphones as of October 2013. 
Apple started the tablet phenomenon with the introduction of the iPad in 2010.28 Since 
that point, tablets from companies other than Apple had become more common, though 
Dell was not among the more successful companies in this market. In fact, by Q3 2013, 
IDC estimated that Dell had less than 3.0 percent of the tablet market , and had never 
                                                     
 
27  “Digging into the PC Data and Lowering Our Forecast,” Goldman Sachs Equity Research, August 10, 
2012, p. 1. 
28  “Apple Launches iPad,” Apple Inc., January 27, 2010, 
<https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2010/01/27Apple-Launches-iPad.html>, accessed April 11, 2015. 
Desktop PC 9% 5% -2%
Portable PC 12% 8% 2%
Tablet 15% 17% 16%
Smartphone 65% 70% 14%
  Total 100% 100% 12%








[2] Market Share and Annual Unit Growth are calculated based on unit shipments in 2013 
and 2017.
Source: 
[A] “Tablet Shipments Forecast to Top Total PC Shipments in the Fourth Quarter of 2013 
and Annually by 2015, According to IDC”, IDC, September 11, 2013.
Notes: 
[1] Sum of product category shares may not add to 100 percent for Market Share columns 
because of rounding errors.
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been in the top five vendors for tablets.29 The figure below shows the IDC breakdown of 
tablet share by vendor for calendar Q3 2013, the period that ended almost 
contemporaneously with the valuation date.  
Figure 3. Largest Tablet Vendors (by Unit Shipments) – Q2 2012 to Q2 2013  
  
29. In the smartphone market, Dell had fared even worse. Its first smartphone appeared in 
2010, though sales were quite modest. In March of 2012, Dell stopped selling 
smartphones,30 and on September 13, 2013, approximately six weeks before the Merger, 
Michael Dell confirmed that Dell would not be re-entering the mobile phone business.31 
                                                     
 
29  “Global Market Share Held by Tablet Vendors from 2nd Quarter 2011 to 4th Quarter 2014,” Statista, 
2015, <http://www.statista.com/graphic/1/276635/market-share-held-by-tablet-vendors.jpg>, 
accessed April 11, 2015. 
30  Shah, Agam, “Dell Ends Smartphone Sales in the US,” TechHive, March 29, 2012, 
<http://www.techhive.com/article/252824/dell_ends_smartphone_sales_in_the_us.html>, accessed 
April 29, 2015. 
31  McLaughlin, Kevin, “Michael Dell Says He Has No Intention of Getting Back into Smartphones,” 
CRN, September 13, 2013, <http://www.crn.com/news/mobility/240161293/michael-dell-says-he-
has-no-intention-of-getting-back-into-smartphones.htm>, accessed April 14, 2015. 
Apple 60% 32% -14%
Samsung 8% 18% 277%
Asus 3% 5% 120%
Lenovo 1% 3% 314%
Acer 1% 3% 248%
Others 26% 39% 137%
Total 100% 100% 60%
Notes:
Source: 
[A] “Apple's Once-Dominant Tablet Market Share Has Collapsed,” BGR, citing IDC 
Worldwide Tablet Tracker, August 5, 2013, <http://bgr.com/2013/08/05/ios-android-tablet-
market-share-2/>.
[1] IDC only reports shipments and market share for the top 5 tablet vendors. 







2012 - 2013 
Unit Growth
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30. In summary, Dell appears to have missed the shift to tablets and smartphones in the 
period leading up to the transaction. While it had not exited the tablet business, tablets 
represented only $141 million, or less than half of one percent of Dell’s revenues for 
FY2013.32 An October 2013 Wall Street Journal article noted:  
Tech companies that catered to CIOs rather than users tended to thrive. 
That’s why—whether you liked it or not—your office computer was made 
by Dell, it ran Windows and Office, and why your company-issued phone 
was a BlackBerry.  
Then, more or less overnight, a series of technological and marketing 
revolutions—like ubiquitous broadband Internet and the lure of consumer 
devices such as the iPhone—completely upended the market for 
technology. Over the past few years, for the first time, we “end users” 
have been allowed to choose the tech we want to use at home, on our 
wireless networks, and, crucially, at the office.  
Just a few years ago, BlackBerry Ltd.’s executives were promising that 
their gadgets would win out over rivals because the BlackBerry was “way 
ahead” on “CIO friendliness.” But the beleaguered execs hadn’t 
considered that CIOs themselves might lose their power. As employees 
began demanding the ability to use the phones, tablets, and apps that we 
had at home, the most forward-thinking corporations found ways to allow 
a whole new class of technology onto their networks. 
Now you could use an iPhone instead of a BlackBerry, an iPad instead of 
a Dell computer, and Google Docs instead of Word. In the end, CIO 
friendliness couldn’t help BlackBerry one bit. 
BlackBerry’s downfall and the struggles of Dell Inc. and Microsoft Corp. 
offer an object lesson for any firm trying to crack the “enterprise” tech 
market. It suggests that even if you want to sell technology to CIOs, you 
can’t forget employees, the people who will actually have to use your 
stuff.33 
2. Decline in Demand for Desktop and Notebook Computers 
31. Dell’s traditional hardware strength had been in desktop PCs, notebook PCs, and servers. 
As tablets and smartphones had been rising, PC sales had been stagnant or even 
declining, particularly those for more expensive desktop and notebook PCs. This shift 
                                                     
 
32  BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”), at ‘Tablets – base’ sheet; Exhibit 2. 
33  Manjoo, Farhad, “The Most Destructive, Unpredictable Force in Tech,” Wall Street Journal, October 
2, 2013, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303643304579109631903387204>, 
accessed April 27, 2015 (emphasis added). 
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among consumers to lower-cost PCs and tablets was noted by many industry 
commentators. For example, Mikako Kitagawa, the lead PC analyst at Gartner, another 
leading technology industry data source, noted in August of 2013 that low-cost tablets 
were: “eating into the sales of low-end PCs in mature market. In economically 
disadvantaged markets, a cheaper tablet is the first computing device many people buy.”34 
The following chart from July of 2013 shows how the trend of PC sales and tablet sales 
was such that the total unit sales would be nearly equal by 2015. 
Figure 4. Trends in Worldwide Sales of PCs and Tablets – 2003 to 2017 (Est.) 
 
32. Even within the PC market, competition was becoming more difficult for traditionally 
higher-end PC makers like Dell and Hewlett-Packard (HP) as competitors based in Asia 
such as Lenovo increased their market share, particularly with low-cost PCs. As the 
figure below illustrates, Dell and HP had both experienced flat or declining market share 
in the years leading up to the Merger. Some of this loss was driven by the change in the 
                                                     
 
34  Chen, Brian X., “Dell’s Profit Declines 72% on Sluggish Sales of PCs,” New York Times, August 15, 
2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/16/technology/dells-profit-falls-on-slowing-pc-



























[A] Gartner January 2005, January 2006, January 2007, January 2008, January 2009, January 2010, January 2011,  September 2011, January 2012,  
April 2012, January 2013, April 2013.
Notes:
[1] Years on the x-axis are calendar years.
[2] 2015 and 2016 shipments are interpolated from 2014 and 2017 forecasted shipments.
[3] Actual values reflect realized end-of-period shipment figures.
PC (April 2013 projection)
Tablet (April 2013 projection)
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market from higher-end PCs, where Dell was stronger, to lower-end PCs, where Dell was 
not as strong. For example, BCG forecasted that the share of computers priced above 
$800 per unit would decline from 23 percent of total PC sales in FY2012 to less than 16 
percent of total PC sales by FY2017, with the average price of a PC dropping 20 percent, 
from $686 per unit to $551 per unit.35 
Figure 5. PC Market Share by Company – Q2 2011 to Q3 2013 
 
33. As a result of the changing dynamics of computing and the shifts in the market, the 
worldwide PC market faced both tremendous uncertainty and declining unit shipments 
during the period from 2011 to 2013. One of the most dramatic illustrations of this 
uncertainty in the PC market is the change in the future forecast of PC sales from IDC. 
As the figure below illustrates, as of August 2011, about two years prior to the Merger, 
worldwide PC sales were forecasted to increase by 54 percent over five years. One year 
later, the five-year forecast was lowered to 33 percent. By August 2013, just two months 
                                                     
 
















2Q 2011 3Q 2011 4Q 2011 1Q 2012 2Q 2012 3Q 2012 4Q 2012 1Q 2013 2Q 2013 3Q 2013
% Market Share
Source: 
[A] Gartner, Worldwide PC Vendor Unit Shipment Estimates data, 2Q 2011 - 3Q 2013.
JX 896A - p. 18 of 205
  Highly Confidential 
Page 16/156 
 
before the Merger, the forecast had actually dropped to a negative eight percent change 
for the 2012 to 2017 period (and negative 12 percent for the 2011 to 2016 period).  
Figure 6. IDC Forecasts of Worldwide PC Unit Shipments – 2010 to 2019 
 
34. This dramatic decline in anticipated worldwide demand for PCs—Dell’s historical 
strength—shows the uncertainly over future demand surrounding the PC industry. While 
there may be some who felt future PC growth would be strong, that was not the general 
view of major industry participants at the time. Equity analysts highlighted the 
uncertainty in their reports on Dell.36 For example, Goldman Sachs wrote in January 
2013: 
While some may believe that the recent pressures on PC units are 
temporary, we believe tablets may have a persistent cannibalistic impact 
on PCs for many years to come. This is based on the following key 
factors: [1] There may be more consumption-oriented PC users than most 
believe… [2] Tablets are even showing promise in business use cases… 
(3) The tablet application model has advantages over that of PCs. As a 
result of these factors, we assume cannibalization rates of 40% for 
                                                     
 








2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PC units shipped 
(Mil.)
August 2011 +54%   2010 - 2015
August 2012 +33%   2011 - 2016
August 2013 -8%   2012 - 2017
Larger markers indicate actual values
Sources: 
[A] IDC Worldwide Quarterly PC Tracker, August 2011, August 2012, August 2013, and February 2015.
Note:
[1] Actual values reflect realized end-of-period shipment figures.
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2H2012-2014.  See Exhibit 21. Our assumed cannibalization rate implies 
that 42.9 million notebooks will be lost in 2012, 67.1 million will be lost 
in 2013, and 81.1 million will be lost in 2014.37  
 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch wrote in November 2012: 
While we are positive on Dell’s strategy to shift to more enterprise-
focused businesses, macro and competitive pressure in PCs will likely 
keep the stock range-bound near-term.38 
 
Bernstein Research wrote in January 2013:  
We believe the weakness is attributable to challenging economic 
conditions, strong competition for spending dollars from tablets and 
smartphones, and limited uptake of Windows 8, especially given the 
myriad of offerings (regular laptops, touch laptops, Windows 8 tablets). 
… 
Given that PC unit growth was lower than we expected in Q4 (we were 
forecasting a 2% YoY decline in CY12 vs. 3% actual decline), we are 
reducing our forecast for CY13 unit growth to 0% from +2%.39 
 
35. In addition to the uncertainty at the time, the post-merger period has continued to be a 
period of pessimistic long-term forecasts. As an example, IDC’s most recent forecast was 
released in March 2015, approximately 17 months after the Merger date. This forecast 
showed an expected six percent decline in PC unit shipments between 2015 and 2019. 
This trend continues the flat or declining PC sales projections that IDC had identified 
during the months leading up to the transition.40 
                                                     
 
37  “Americas: Technology: Hardware: IT Hardware Industry Primer,” Goldman Sachs Equity Research, 
January 10, 2013, p. 25.  
38  “Dell Inc. Macro, PC share loss continue to weigh on stock near-term,” Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch, November 15, 2012, p. 1. 
39  “AAPL, Dell, HP: Q412 PC Data – Sluggish Demand, as Expected: HP Fares Relatively Better,” 
Bernstein Research, January 11, 2013, p. 1. 
40  “IDC Lowers PC Outlook for 2015, While the Long-Term Outlook Improves Slightly,” IDC 
Worldwide Quarterly PC Tracker, March 12, 2015, 
<http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS25483715>, accessed April 1, 2015. 
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36. Notably, Egon Durban of Silver Lake testified: “This is as dynamic an industry as—I 
think technology industry has ever experienced right now.”41 He further testified about 
the tremendous difficulty in forecasting in this fast changing environment: 
Q. Did Silver Lake come to have a view about the probability of the PC 
business growing going forward? 
A. No. I will give you -- here’s why. You saw that Microsoft invested in 
our transaction initially at the time this chief financial officer of the 
company was Peter Klein. I had a conversation relatively early on with 
him in our due diligence process. Gee, Peter, you know, how do you think 
about industry growth for the personal computing industry?  
The forecast by the two big analyst firms, IDC and Gartner were kind of 
moving all over the place, but unfortunately moving mostly down. “Like 
how do you sort of process this volatility.” And “If it were you -- you 
know, obviously we would love for you to invest in our deal -- how would 
you go about trying to understand how to forecast the EUC business?” 
And it became very clear in my talking to him, the guy who was the -- 
effectively the market, which is Microsoft, everyone sells windows 
computers, didn’t really have a point of view yet on how to forecast the 
PC business. So by definition we couldn’t either.42 
3. Changes in the Server Market 
37. In addition to desktop and notebook PCs, sales of servers and related services were also 
an important source of revenue for Dell. Like PCs, the server market also was undergoing 
changes during the period from 2011 to 2013. One of the major changes was a shift from 
configurations in which individual businesses would have most technology infrastructure 
and servers on-site to one where significant data storage and computing was being done 
“in the cloud” via businesses purchasing server and computer capacity from third parties, 
such as Amazon Web Services.43 
                                                     
 
41  Deposition of Egon Durban, May 20, 2015 (“Durban Deposition”), p. 55. 
42  Durban Deposition, pp. 65-66. 
43  “IDC Forecasts Worldwide Public IT Cloud Services Spending to Reach Nearly $108 Billion by 2017 
as Focus Shifts from Savings to Innovation,” IDC, September 3, 2013.  
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38. The adoption of cloud services shifted the demand away from fully functional industry 
standard servers to low-cost servers, also known as “white-box” servers.44 Companies 
such as Google and Facebook have indirectly propelled the low-cost server market by 
adopting these low-cost servers in an effort to reduce costs associated with dedicated 
business centers.45 While Dell was well positioned relative to its competitors in the server 
market, many industry analysts had concerns about the underlying long-term direction of 
that business. For example a January 2013 Goldman Sachs report noted that: “cloud-
centric customers may increasingly source server hardware from low-priced, white-box 
manufacturers, boosting unit growth at the expense of ASPs [Average Selling Price] and 
margins.”46 As a combined server market, Gartner forecasted an annual revenue growth 
of 3.2 percent through 2017, while Goldman Sachs forecasted an annual decline of 0.2 
percent through 2019.47 The slow growth or stagnation of the overall market could 
present challenges to companies like Dell seeking to increase server revenues. In 
addition, intense competitive pressures among server companies also results in pressures 
to cut prices, in which case margins become under increasing pressure. 
4. Collapse in Corporate IT Investment in the Aftermath of the 
Financial Crisis 
39. Demand by U.S. companies for computer and peripheral equipment and information and 
communication technology (ICT) equipment also slowed in response to the financial 
crisis. As I show in Figure 7 below, using data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
total U.S. expenditures in these two areas in 2009 fell 20.7 percent from 2008 levels, after 
having grown 10.3 percent annually during 2007 and 2008. Expenditures on computers 
                                                     
 
44  “Server Update and Our Take on Key News Events This Week,” Goldman Sachs Equity Research, 
June 18, 2012, p. 3. 
45  Spring, Tom, “Server Market Showdown: Here’s Why Smaller Players Are Taking Big-Time Share,” 
CRN, October 7, 2013, <http://www.crn.com/news/data-center/240162241/server-market-showdown-
heres-why-smaller-players-are-taking-big-time-share.htm>, accessed April 9, 2015. 
46  “Americas: Technology: Hardware: IT Hardware Industry Primer,” Goldman Sachs Equity Research, 
January 10, 2013, p. 45. 
47  “Forecast Analysis: Servers, Worldwide, 2013-2017, 1Q13 Update,” Gartner, April 8, 2013; 
“Americas: Technology: Hardware: IT Hardware Industry Primer,” Goldman Sachs Equity Research, 
January 10, 2013, p. 45.   
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and peripherals did not reach pre-crisis levels until five years later, in 2013, and the level 
of expenditures for information and communication technology equipment still remained 
below the pre-crisis amount. The compound annual growth rate in total expenditures in 
these two areas for the decade ending in 2013 was only 2.4 percent. 
Figure 7. U.S. Annual Computer and IT Expenditures – 2005 to 2013 
 
40. This slowdown in corporate IT spending created discussion among industry observers as 
to whether the slowdown had changed the “refresh cycle,” meaning the frequency with 
which companies replaced desktop or notebook PCs for employees. The refresh cycle is 
important for Dell because if the modest demand for PCs was also being influenced by an 
uptick from delayed spending during the recession, with the possibility that refresh cycles 
would be getting longer and longer, that could further reduce the outlook for future PC 
sales. In its consideration of the investment, Silver Lake noted that, “the average 
Total
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Source:
[A] U.S. Department of Commerce.
Note:  
[1] The 2012 survey was suspended because of budgetary constraints.  2012 Expenditures are linear interpolated based on 2011 and 2013 values. 
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replacement cycle for desktops and laptops is approximately 3.5 years, and has been 
trending upward in recent years.”48 An article in January 2013 noted: 
[I]t seems the market for PC desktop refreshes in the enterprise is being 
eroded on two fronts. First, people are buying low-cost tablets to consume 
content. Second, IT departments are contemplating deploying desktop 
virtualisation instead of refreshing desktop hardware. Given that people 
are also bringing their own devices to work it would seem that now may 
well be the time for CIOs to reboot their desktop hardware strategy.49 
41. Looking forward at the time of the Merger, Dell’s position in corporate IT spending also 
appeared to be at risk. For example, in its 2013 “IT Spending Survey,” Goldman Sachs 
asked over 100 IT executives from Global 2000 companies which vendors were gaining 
or losing share of their IT spending in categories such as “PC/laptop,” “enterprise 
servers/systems,” and “storage providers.”50 In all three categories, Dell had slipped in 
position relative to other vendors compared to previous surveys.  
5. Dell’s Strategy and Financial Performance 
42. Dell clearly understood that its traditional markets were changing, and that it needed to 
make changes in an effort to adapt, especially after having largely missed the tablet and 
smartphone trends. In fact, in 2009, Dell began changing its strategy in order to become 
more focused on businesses relative to consumers and broadening its sales from PCs and 
servers to include higher-margin services and software businesses.51 Much of this strategy 
involved making acquisitions in order to position itself for future growth in higher-
margin businesses, focusing more on enterprise customers than consumers.52 The 
Company noted in its 10-K for the year ending February 3, 2012:  
                                                     
 
48  SLP_DELLAP00101859-942 (“Project Dagger - IC Discussion,” Silver Lake Partners, November 19, 
2012), at 915. 
49  “Gartner Predicts the Demise of the Desktop PC Refresh Cycle,” Computer Weekly, January 16, 
2013, <http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240176063/Gartner-predicts-the-demise-of-the-
desktop-PC-refresh-cycle>, accessed May 5, 2015. 
50  “IT Indexes Lower, Trimming 2013 Spending Forecast to 2%,” Goldman Sachs Equity Research, 
September 4, 2013. 
51  Dell Inc., 2010 Form 10-K, filed March 18, 2010, pp. 1-2; DELLE00126570-632 (“Denali Acquirer 
Inc. Rating Agency Presentation” with slide notes, Dell Inc., August 2013), at 576. 
52  Deposition of Brian T. Gladden, March 13, 2015 (“Gladden Deposition”), pp. 85-86 and 93-98. 
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We supplement organic growth with a disciplined acquisition program 
targeting businesses that will expand our portfolio of higher-margin 
enterprise solutions offerings. . . . Since the beginning of Fiscal 2011, we 
acquired more than ten businesses that extended our core capabilities in a 
variety of enterprise solutions offerings, including storage, networking, 
systems management appliance, virtualized server and data center 
solutions, and software-as-a-service application integration, as well as 
enabled expansion of our customer financing activities.53  
43. In implementing this strategy, Dell has spent over $14 billion in acquisitions since 2007, 
including $7.5 billion on acquisitions during 2011 and 2012.54 Many of these acquisitions 
were of companies that were expected to expand Dell’s enterprise services.55 See Exhibit 
5 for a listing of these acquisitions. 
44. One of the challenges with a strategy of acquisitions is integrating the new companies 
with the existing businesses in order to achieve the anticipated financial results. Dell also 
faced a need for additional acquisitions in order to complete the strategy. A Goldman 
Sachs report dated December 2012 described these risks:  
[T]he company continues to have work ahead of it in its enterprise 
transformation, which will necessitate still sizeable amounts of 
investments. . . . Although the company may be taking a brief period to 
integrate its flurry of acquisitions ($7.5 billion in acquisitions in the last 
two years) and focus on execution in an increasingly difficult macro 
environment, Dell still likely has billions more in acquisitions ahead of it 
if it plans on fully executing on its mission to become an enterprise 
solutions company.56  
A report by Maxim Equity Research in February 2013 echoed this theme: 
Dell’s transition to a more enterprise focused company will have to be 
facilitated by more acquisitions which will keep its leverage ratios high 
post LBO.57 
                                                     
 
53  Dell Inc., 2012 Form 10-K, filed March 13, 2012, p. 26. 
54  Exhibit 5. 
55  “Dell Announces Agreement to Acquire Quest Software,” Goldman Sachs Equity Research, July 2, 
2012, p. 3; “Dell, Inc. - Mergers and Acquisitions, Partnerships and Alliances, and Investments,” 
Marketline, September, 27, 2013, pp. 24, 28, and 30. 
56  “Dell Inc.: Finding Deep Value Amid the Pessimism: Upgrade to Buy from Sell,” Goldman Sachs 
Equity Research, December 2, 2012, pp. 15-16. 
57  “Dell Inc.: Fundamentals Remain Challenged,” Maxim Equity Research, February 19, 2013, p. 1. 
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Similarly, Barclays Equity Research noted as early as January 2013 that: 
Over the last few years, Dell has been highly acquisitive in areas that offer 
more positive growth and margin prospects, while PCs have declined 
faster than expected. We believe the option for larger acquisitions needs to 
be on the table in the future. With no acquisitions, we believe that Dell 
must get much more aggressive in cutting costs in PCs and curbing its 
lower profit business lines like consumer PCs and branded printers.58 
45. While the process of integrating the acquisitions was still ongoing as of October 2013, 
there was concern that the acquisitions were, given the prices paid, not resulting in the 
expected returns. Brian Gladden, CFO of Dell during this period, testified that the analyst 
community had various impressions about Dell, including the success of its acquisition 
strategy: 
I think [the investor perceptions are] laid out as the header of each chart, 
which is -- we have a solid balance sheet, strong cash flow and customer 
base. We have highly knowledgeable investors who understand our 
strategy. The PC exposure is an issue. They knew that.  
We had a perception that there were acquisitions -- we were overpaying 
for acquisitions. We didn’t have enough R&D spend. We weren’t 
executing well, and our management team was not credible.59 
46. While the strategy was ongoing, Dell noted some concerns about the financial 
performance of certain acquisitions, including the fact that revenues were below 
expectations for many acquisitions.60 In his deposition, Michael Dell was asked about the 
performance of recent acquisitions and whether they had gained or lost value: 
Q. And in the aggregate, are those companies worth more or less than 
what [they were acquired] for? 
. . . . 
A. Sure. I think the -- if we look at the entire group here, I would say 
they’re probably worth less than we acquired them for. 
Q. And why is that? 
                                                     
 
58  “Dell Inc.: Michael Dell Seems to be Seeking a Private Future,” Barclays Equity Research, January 
16, 2012, p. 3. 
59  Gladden Deposition, p. 67 (emphasis added). 
60  BCG00038637-694 (“Dell board presentation, June 12, 2013), at 647-648. 
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A. Well, I think difficulties in integrating the acquisitions, and when we 
look at the aspirational plans that we had for each of the acquisitions, in 
many cases -- or I would even say in most cases, we did not achieve those 
aspirational goals. In addition there were costs added to these units to 
somehow connect them to Dell, which did not deliver the expected 
returns.61 
47. Prior to the speculation surrounding the Merger, analysts’ perspectives about Dell’s 
acquisition strategy were generally positive, although they were reasonably cautious 
about the long-term transformation and shareholders’ patience as Dell completed that 
transformation. For example: 
• We have been somewhat optimistic regarding the potential of Dell's enterprise 
business. The company’s technology has improved markedly through 
acquisitions, and the idea of offering lower-cost, more agile solutions than IBM 
and HP for [Small and Medium Businesses] then scaling into larger enterprises is 
a reasonable strategy. The problem is that (1) enterprise hitting, say, 60% of 
operating profit may be two years away, too far to interest investors, and (2) there 
is significant risk that Dell can’t overcome its historical lack of enterprise 
presence. Beyond Dell’s offerings, user perception needs to change and Dell’s 
sales force must learn new skills. Moreover, competitors IBM, HP, and EMC 
among others are not easy pickings. Consequently, even if Dell has some success 
long term, it might not be evident short term.62 (UBS, September 2012)  
• We continue to believe Dell is pursuing the best course it has, working to migrate 
from commodity Wintel reseller into higher-value enterprise solutions vendor, 
including a steady stream of acquisitions to buy the IP it never developed itself 
(e.g., Perot, EqualLogic, Compellent, Force10, SonicWALL, Wyse, etc.). 
Nevertheless, we see this: a) proving a lengthy process, b) raising the risk profile 
as Dell still needs to execute on each post acquisition, typically vs. more 
established competitors, and 3) strategically keeping use of Dell’s meaningful 
cash for continued acquisitions not just likely but necessary.63 (Evercore Partners, 
July 2012) 
• With half of Dell’s sales still exposed to the PC market, the continuing 
degradation remains a worry. Recent software acquisitions provide tailwinds but 
in terms of size are unlikely as a whole to be big enough to completely move the 
needle.64 (Jefferies, May 2012) 
                                                     
 
61  Deposition of Michael Dell, May 14-15, 2015 (“Michael Dell Deposition”), pp. 143-145. 
62  “Dell Inc.: Lowering PT, Still Searching for the Bottom,” UBS, September 26, 2012, p. 3. 
63  “Quest Software Acquisition Raises Risk/Reward Potential,” Evercore Partners, July 2, 2012, p. 2. 
64  “Computer Hardware: HP and Dell January Quarter Preview,” Jefferies, May 11, 2012, p. 1. 
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48. Dell also appeared to be in the midst of a change in its strategy for PC pricing. In the 
years leading up to the Merger, investors perceived Dell as focusing on preserving profit 
margins, even if that meant losing market share.65 In early 2013, management noted that 
it was moving to a more aggressive position on market share, even if that meant the profit 
margin on each sale might be lower.66 
49. As might be expected given the uncertainty in its key markets, Dell’s financial 
performance was uneven in the years leading up to the Merger, and generally declining 
between 2011 and 2013. Dell also was generally underperforming the expectations of 
equity analysts leading up to the Merger, particularly in operating profits. In Figure 8, I 
show Dell’s actual revenues and the expectations of equity market analysts, as measured 
by Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) as of the month before each quarter 
end, for each quarter from FY2010 through the quarter ending just after the Merger. 
While revenues do not translate directly to cash flows, equity analysts do watch revenues 
as a guide to the overall robustness of the business. To measure analysts’ expectations, I 
considered the lowest, highest, and average expectation of the analysts. I use a green 
marker to identify quarters in which Dell’s revenues exceeded the average expectation 
and red for quarters in which Dell’s performance was lower than the average expectation. 
In general, Dell’s quarterly revenues were flat to declining during the period from 2009 
through 2013, with some recovery after the recession, followed by recent declines. For 
                                                     
 
65  For example, Goldman Sachs noted on June 14, 2012: “With Acer and Dell both clearly focusing on 
preserving profit margins at the potential expense of market share, there is a clear sense in the food 
chain that more share-focused vendors like Lenovo can successfully capture significant share going 
forward. This seems to be a reasonable assumption, though Hewlett-Packard remains a wild card. 
While HP is focused on preserving margins today, we suspect the company may focus more on share 
as its PC strategy takes shape in coming quarters. Either way, we believe overall PC pricing is at risk 
of becoming increasingly aggressive in 2H and into 2013.” See “Americas: Technology - Asia Trip: 
Key takeaways for the technology supply chain,” Goldman Sachs Equity Research, June 24, 2012, p. 
2 (emphasis added). 
66  For example, the Board presentation from March 6 and 7, 2013 referenced a $3.0 billion 
improvement in revenue with no increase in operating income, which Brian Gladden described as 
“getting more aggressive on market share, therefore reflecting higher revenue and lower 
profitability.” See Gladden Deposition, p. 212 and Exhibit 26 (DELL00331228-253, at 236). See also 
Michael Dell Deposition, pp. 276-277.  
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example, revenue in each of the six quarters leading up to the Merger was below that in 
any of the nine previous quarters beginning in Q4 of FY2010. 
Figure 8. Dell’s Quarterly Revenues Versus Analysts’ Forecasts – Q1 FY2010 to Q4 
FY2014 
 
50. From a valuation perspective, Dell’s operating income is even more important than 
revenue. As I noted earlier, part of Dell’s strategy had been to try to preserve market 
share and revenue even as the PC and server markets were moving toward lower cost—
and typically lower profit devices. The figure below uses the same format as the revenue 
chart, but measures non-GAAP operating income, showing both the Company’s actual 
performance and expectations by equity analysts. After growing somewhat during 2009 
and into 2011 and exceeding the average of analysts’ expectations, Dell’s operating 
income began to decline beginning in late 2011. In fact, the seven quarters leading up to 
the transaction all had operating income below that in any of the prior five quarters, and 
in five of the seven operating income was below the average expectation of equity 
analysts. Operating income in the final two quarters leading up to the transaction was the 
















Q1 FY2010 - Q4 FY2011
Sources:
[A] Equity analysts’ expectations about quarterly revenue are from S&P Capital IQ. 
[B] Dell quarterly actuals are from quarterly filings and annual filings. 
Notes:
[1] Quarterly analysts' expectations are measured one month prior to end of the corresponding fiscal quarter. 
[2] Green data points represent actuals that exceed mean expectations. Red data points represent actuals that fall below mean
expectations.
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Figure 9. Dell’s Quarterly Operating Income Versus Analysts’ Forecasts – Q1 
FY2010 to Q4 FY2014 
 
III. THE STOCK MARKET’S ASSESSMENT OF DELL’S VALUE 
51. Finance academics and finance professionals understand that a well functioning stock 
market incorporates all publicly available information in order to determine a per-share 
value for the equity. That equity value may fluctuate day to day or even minute to minute 
as shares are traded and the market price adjusts to reflect investors’ willingness to buy 
and sell equity shares in a company in light of the then-available information. Hence, in 
an efficient market, the stock price represents the consensus view of investors (willing 
buyers and willing sellers) as to the value of the equity in the company.  
52. I conducted standard finance tests, demonstrated in Exhibit 6, and determined that Dell’s 
stock market trading exceeds the thresholds for efficient markets. Dell’s market 
capitalization of more than $20 billion was large, placing it in the upper third of the S&P 
500 index, which is comprised of relatively large capitalization firms. Dell’s stock was 


















[A] Equity analysts’ expectations about quarterly operating income are from S&P Capital IQ. 
[B] Dell quarterly actuals are from quarterly filings, annual filings, and press releases. All actual values represent non-GAAP figures.
Notes:
[1] Quarterly analysts' expectations are measured one month prior to end of the corresponding fiscal quarter. 
[2] Green data points represent actuals that exceed mean expectations. Red data points represent actuals that fall below mean
expectations.
Actuals
Q1 FY2010 - Q4 FY2011 Q1 FY2012 - Q3 FY2014
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percent of its shares, which was higher than the two percent threshold that I understand 
provides a strong presumption that the market for the security is efficient.67 The 
Company’s stock bid-ask spread of approximately 0.08 percent also satisfied the 
thresholds for market efficiency accepted by courts.68 Dell’s short interest ratio, another 
indication for market efficiency, suggests that, on average, the short sellers would be able 
to cover their short positions in less than two days for the year leading up to the deal 
closing date, which was faster than almost 89 percent of other firms in the S&P.69 
Furthermore, Dell was covered by a significant number of equity analysts and had 
numerous market makers/brokers. These indicators are consistent with a finding that the 
Company’s common stock traded in an efficient market. 
53. For publicly traded companies like Dell, the stock market price provides a natural starting 
point for a financial economist or market professional performing an equity valuation. To 
the extent that fair value estimates using other methods are materially different from 
stock market prices, it is important to consider why. In some cases, the market may not 
be aware of important information. In other cases, trading frictions might prevent 
arbitrageurs from trading in a way that would move the market price to fair value. Neither 
of those explanations appears to apply to Dell. Some financial professionals indicate that 
the fair value of a stock may modestly exceed the market price due to a minority 
                                                     
 
67  “Turnover measured by average weekly trading of two percent or more of the outstanding shares 
would justify a strong presumption that the market for the security is an efficient one; one percent 
would justify a substantial presumption.” See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, p. 23. 
68  The bid-ask spread is the difference between the price that a buyer is willing to pay for the stock (ask) 
and the price that a seller is willing to accept (bid), often measured as a percentage of the bid and ask 
midpoint. A wide bid-ask spread is an indication of an inefficient market. Courts have accepted bid-
ask spreads as evidence of market efficiency. See, for example, Cheney v. CyberGuard Corp., 213 
F.R.D. 484, p. 27 (finding that a bid-ask spread of 2.44 percent “weighs in favor of market 
efficiency”; finding that a bid-ask spread “of 5.6% was extremely high, suggesting market 
inefficiency”); Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, pp. 10-11. 
69  In Polymedica, the court found that a short interest ratio of ten days or more indicated difficulty in 
finding shares to short.  See In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass. 2006), 
pp. 23-24. 
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shareholder discount, though such a discount is likely so small as to be effectively zero 
for large, well governed companies like Dell.70 
54. As I discuss throughout this report, the critical fact that no bid topping $13.75 emerged 
during the deal process for the sale of Dell’s equity, which was otherwise trading for 
several dollars per share less than this price, supports the conclusion that the Merger price 
reflects a ceiling for the fair value of Dell’s equity. 
55. Similarly, while any number and variety of analyses can be done that show a range of 
possible prices, the market price is typically the final arbiter of people willing to actually 
put their own money on their beliefs. An example of this skepticism about significant 
deviations from the market price is reflected in the deposition testimony of Alex Mandl, a 
Dell board member since 1997 and chair of the Special Committee.71 In his deposition, 
Mr. Mandl was asked about previous analyses that company management and advisors 
had done concerning the Company’s intrinsic value that indicated value well above the 
then-current trading price: 
Q So is it fair to say that you personally didn’t agree with the numbers of 
Dell management and the special committee advisors who were telling 
you, hey, the market doesn’t get Dell, and its real value isn’t reflected in 
the marketplace? 
. . . 
THE WITNESS:  I’ve heard so many times described – I’ve seen so many 
times for management to describe a situation where, “the market doesn’t 
understand us,” that I am somewhat skeptical of that yes.72 
                                                     
 
70  See, for example, Nath, Eric W., “Best Practices Regarding Control Premiums: Comments Regarding 
the Appraisal Foundation’s Proposed White Paper on Control Premiums,” Business Valuation Review 
30, 2011, pp. 140-143; Shishido, Zenichi, “Fair Value of Minority Stock in Closely Held 
Corporations,” Fordham Law Review 62, 1993, p. 77; Coates, John C., IV, “Fair Value as an 
Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions,” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 147, 1999, p. 1262. See also Hamermesh, Lawrence A. and Michael L. 
Wachter, “The Short and Puzzling Life of the ‘Implicit Minority Discount’ in Delaware Appraisal 
Law,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 156, 2007, p. 2. 
71  Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, September 24, 2013, pp. 16 and 24. 
72  Deposition of Alex Mandl, April 2, 2015 (“Mandl Deposition”), pp. 184-185. 
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A. Stock Market Valuation of Mature Companies 
1. Anticipating Future Cash Flows 
56. Before discussing the specifics of the data and estimates I include in my various valuation 
analyses, I consider how investors value mature companies like Dell, what factors lie 
behind those valuations, and what these factors imply about future cash flows. One basic 
valuation principle is that no company is going to be dominant forever, and the average 
performance of most companies, over time, will eventually revert to industry norms. As a 
simple example, consider the top five companies by market capitalization on either the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the NASDAQ stock market 40 years ago: IBM, 
AT&T, Exxon, Sears, and General Electric. Of those companies, only Exxon (now 
Exxon-Mobil) is still in the top five today.73 New technology is developed, additional 
competitors may enter, consumer wants and needs change, and companies make 
management decisions that can have short- and long-term consequences for their abilities 
to adapt. Companies that are able to reinvent themselves and continue performing like 
newer growth companies are the rare exceptions. A common company life cycle has been 
outlined by Aswath Damodaran, a professor at New York University who has written 
extensively on company valuation. As he illustrates in the figure below, companies 
typically have several stages, including early stages with significant growth in revenue 
and earnings, and later stages with flat and declining revenue and earnings. 
                                                     
 
73  The five largest firms by market capitalization on March 1, 2015 were Apple, Google, Exxon-Mobil, 
Berkshire Hathaway, and Microsoft. See S&P Capital IQ. 
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Figure 10. Revenues and Earnings Across the Life Cycle of a Company  
 
Source: Damodaran, Aswath, The Dark Side of Valuation: Valuing Young, Distressed, and 
Complex Businesses, 2nd ed., FT Press, 2012, p. 8.  
57. Technology companies are particularly vulnerable to these life-cycle forces, as consumer 
and business needs change and new technologies emerge. Indeed, there are a number of 
once-thriving technology companies that lost their leading role fairly quickly, including 
Sun Microsystems (maker of servers and some software), Research In Motion (maker of 
the Blackberry), Silicon Graphics (maker of high end graphics chips), Nortel (maker of 
networking equipment), AOL (one of the original internet-focused companies), and many 
others. 
58. While there is no absolute test for determining where a company is in the life cycle, 
Dell’s age (30+ years) and its pattern of revenues and earnings suggest that it has passed 
the rapid expansion and high growth stage. For instance, Dell’s revenues grew at a 43 
percent compound annual growth rate (CAGR) during the decade ending FY2003 but 
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only six percent for the decade ending in FY2013, with much of the revenue growth in 
the latter decade coming from acquisitions.74 In the most recent years, revenue had been 
flat or declining. This shift is notable in part because starting in 2009, Dell spent billions 
of dollars on acquisitions, yet its revenues and operating income changed very little or 
even declined.75 The figure below provides a 25-year history of quarterly revenue and 
earnings.  
Figure 11. Dell’s Quarterly Revenues and Operating Income – 1988 to 2013 
  
59. Dell’s pattern of flattening or even declining revenue in its later years is not particularly 
unusual among technology companies. For example, I examined the 673 companies 
classified as being in the computer-related industry using Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes 3570-3579 that were publically traded between 1968 and 
                                                     
 
74  Dell’s annual revenue was $56,940 million in FY2013, $35,404 million in FY2003, and $2,014 
million in FY1993. See Figure 11. 





























[B] SEC filings for non-Gaap numbers.
Note:
[1] Non-GAAP financials are not available prior to FY2009. 
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2013.76 Of these 673 companies, 335 (50 percent) had 2013 revenues at least ten percent 
below their all-time peak.77 
60. Considering the life cycle of a company and what type of business it is in can provide a 
broad perspective on the likely path of future cash flows of the firm. All else equal, a 
company with a larger expected cash flow growth rate in a stable industry is worth more 
than a company with flat or declining cash flows in an unstable industry. To illustrate the 
relationship between anticipated future growth in cash flows and investment value, 
consider simplified investments that pay a perfectly stable stream of cash flows forever. 
For example, if the discount rate is ten percent, how much should you pay for an 
investment that pays exactly $100 annually forever? Using the standard Gordon Growth 
Model,78 the value is equal to the first cash flow divided by the difference between the 
discount rate and the growth rate. In this example, the cash flow growth rate is zero 
percent, so the correct valuation of this investment is $100 / (0.10 – 0.00) = $1,000. If the 
cash flows were expected to grow by three percent per year (e.g., $100, $103.00, 
$106.09, etc.), the value of the investment would be $100 / (0.10 – 0.03) = $1,428, or 
nearly 43 percent more than the value of an investment with no growth. If the cash flows 
were expected to decline by three percent per year, the investment would be valued at 
$100 / (0.10 − (−0.03)) = $769, or 23 percent less than the example with no growth. Note 
that the declining cash flow scenario still generates a significant value for the firm, albeit 
less than the examples with flat or growing cash flows. 
2. Technology Companies and Growth 
61. Technology companies share these dynamics with other companies, though with some 
important differences. In the early stages, technology companies with new, innovative, 
                                                     
 
76  SICs include 3570 Computer and Office Equipment; 3571 Electronic Computers; 3572 Computer 
Storage Devices; 3575 Computer Terminals; 3576 Computer Communications Equipment; 3577 
Computer Peripheral Equipment, Not Elsewhere Classified; 3578 Calculating and Accounting 
Machines (No Electronic Computers); and 3579 Office Machines, Not Elsewhere Classified. 
77  Exhibit 7. In this analysis, I measure revenues in nominal terms. If measured in real terms, the 
fraction of firms with revenues at least ten percent below their all-time peak would be larger. 
78  Brealey, Richard, Stewart Myers, and Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance, 11th ed., 
2014, McGraw-Hill/Irwin (“Brealey et al.”), p. 91. 
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and valuable technology are often able to achieve remarkably high growth rates, resulting 
in very high valuations for relatively young companies, as investors anticipate years of 
steep increases in revenues and cash flows. This phenomenon explains some of the 
extremely high valuations investors place on quite young technology companies with 
limited current cash flows. 
62. This same phenomenon of rapid changes in technology also has implications for later life 
cycles of technology companies. Maintaining growth in cash flows is particularly 
challenging in businesses where new companies are able to displace older companies 
relatively easily. For many mature companies, especially in technology, successful 
innovation is often necessary to maintain or slow—but not reverse—the path that leads to 
flat and ultimately declining cash flows. Over the past decades, many companies selling 
personal computers have gone from industry leaders with high growth to flat and even 
declining sales within just a few years. For example, in the figure below, one can see that 
there have been various companies selling PCs (and tablets) that have been the industry 
leader over the past two decades, only to lose that lead to others in this highly 
competitive market. In addition, other companies exited the PC business (for example, 
Tandy and Commodore were top computer manufactures in the 1980s, but either declined 
significantly or exited the market by the mid-1990s).79 
                                                     
 
79 Hayes, Thomas C., “COMPANY NEWS; Deal to End Tandy's Role In Computer Manufacturing,” The 
New York Times, May 27, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/27/business/company-news-deal-to-
end-tandy-s-role-in-computer-manufacturing.html>, accessed June 5, 2015; Gnoffo, Anthony Jr. “The 
Decline And Fall Of Commodore Intl. It Was A Failure Of Marketing, Not Technology,” The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, <http://articles.philly.com/1994-05-08/business/25829860_1_commodore-
officials-irving-gould-services-and-computer-bulletin>, accessed June 5, 2015. 
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Figure 12. The Evolution of Leading PC and Tablet Companies – 1990 to 2013 
 
63. In addition, the overall speed with which older technology is superseded by new 
technology is also quite rapid, and getting even more so. As the figure below illustrates, it 
took decades before the telephone achieved near-universal penetration, whereas more 
recently the internet and cellphones have achieved penetration of more than 50 percent of 























[A] Diamonds indicate leading vendors (in units shipped) for a given year.
[B] 2013 shipments are projections.
Source:
[1] “Worldwide PC and Tablet Market,” Computer Industry Almanac, Inc., March 1, 2013, 
<http://www.marketresearch.com/ Computer-Industry-Almanac-Inc-v3269/Worldwide-PC-Tablet-March-7406753/>, 
accessed May 8, 2015.
Gateway
Units Shipped (in Thousands, Log Scale)
Lenovo/IBM
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Figure 13. Household Adoption Rates of Various Technologies – 1900 to 2005 
 
Source: New York Times80 
64. This rapid spread of new technology creates opportunities for new technology companies 
to achieve high growth—and corresponding high valuations—but also creates challenges 
for mature technology companies. As consumer tastes and preferences change, a 
company’s core product may become less necessary or be superseded by a new 
technology. Researchers at MIT, for example, recently estimated that tablet computers 
reached the 10 percent household penetration rate nearly twice as fast as any other 
technology they studied, including smartphones.81 As another example, a 2014 Harvard 
Business Review article entitled “The Industries Plagued with the Most Uncertainty” 
developed a list of industries ranked by a combination of demand and technology 
uncertainty.82 Of 49 industries studied, “Computers” was second among industries with 
the most uncertainly, behind only “Medical Equipment.” 
65. One method used by many technology companies to try to reverse the trend toward flat or 
declining revenues and earnings and maintain a technological edge is to acquire other 
                                                     
 
80  Felton, Nicholas, “You are What You Spend (Image),” New York Times, February 10, 2008, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2008/02/10/opinion/10op.graphic.ready.html>, accessed April 
14, 2015. 
81  “Are Smart Phones Spreading Faster than Any Technology in Human History?,” MIT Technology 
Review, May 9, 2012, <http://www.technologyreview.com/news/427787/are-smart-phones-spreading-
faster-than-any-technology-in-human-history/>, accessed April 14, 2015. 
82  Dyer, Jeff, Nathan Furr, and Curtis Lefrandt, “The Industries Plagued by the Most Uncertainty,” 
Harvard Business Review, September 11, 2014, <https://hbr.org/2014/09/the-industries-plagued-by-
the-most-uncertainty>, accessed April 14, 2015. 
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companies with new or complementary technology that is earlier on the adoption curve 
and thus able to generate future growth. Indeed, this strategy is largely the one adopted 
by Dell. Implementing such a strategy can result in increasing revenues and cash flows 
for a company, and increased acquisition cost. However, whether or not such acquisitions 
increase the value of a company is a function of the expected return on investment 
compared to that company’s cost of capital. Simply growing future revenues and cash 
flows by making investments that return no more than the cost of capital will not increase 
the firm value.83 
3. How Equity Markets Value Mature Technology Companies and 
Implications for Expected Future Cash Flows 
66. For publicly traded companies, the stock market effectively incorporates the future cash 
flow expectations of all potential buyers and sellers. All else equal, if some investors 
have expectations for high growth in future cash flows, those investors will be willing to 
pay more for a share of equity in a company than investors who view the future path of 
cash flows for the same company less optimistically. By making assumptions about the 
appropriate discount rate and then reviewing the current earnings, cash flows, and market 
price of a company, one can assess the market’s equilibrium expectations about the 
general path of future cash flows. Of course, the actual path of cash flow growth or 
decline will almost never be a constant percentage increase or decrease in each year. But 
this type of analysis can nonetheless provide an estimate of the general direction of 
expected cash flows in the future. 
67. As I discuss in more detail later, a valuation tool that equity analysts and other financial 
professionals frequently use is an earnings multiple, which normalizes a measure of value 
such as the Enterprise Value (EV) of the company84 by dividing by a measure of earnings 
                                                     
 
83  Koller, Tim, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of 
Companies, 5th ed., McKinsey & Company, John Wiley and Sons, 2010 (“McKinsey”), p. 15. 
84  Enterprise value is typically measured as the market value of all of the equity in the company plus the 
debt of the company, minus the cash of the company. See, for example, Damodaran, Aswath, 
Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset, 3rd ed., John 
Wiley & Sons, 2012 (“Damodaran, Investment Valuation”), p. 501. 
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(typically Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization, or EBITDA). 
Reviewing this ratio provides some understanding as to how the market views the future 
of an individual company and also allows for comparisons across companies. While such 
a method necessarily simplifies certain aspects of valuation, it provides very useful 
information as to the direction of the expected path of earnings of the company. 
68. The basic mathematics of this ratio shows that the higher the ratio, the higher the 
expected growth of the earnings measure, and vice versa. In particular, the implied 
growth rate is the discount rate minus the inverse of the valuation multiple (M), or g = r – 
1/M.85 To provide an example, if the earnings multiple is 5 and the discount rate is ten 
percent, the implied growth rate would be g = 0.1 – (1/5), which simplifies to an expected 
future earnings growth rate of negative ten percent. Indeed, using this formula, any 
earnings multiple below ten would imply a negative growth rate. 
69. The use of EV/EBITDA ratios is quite common, and provides a consistent metric to use 
across companies. However, it should be noted that EBITDA is not identical to free cash 
flow, which is the underlying basis for the value of any investment under the discounted 
cash flow model. In order to develop an implied growth rate for cash flows, it is common 
for finance professionals to consider operating cash flows less capital investments as a 
way of understanding the general path of expected future cash flows. Consider, for 
example, the value of Hewlett Packard (HP), which I discuss in more detail in Section 
VII. In October 2013, HP had a reported EV/EBITDA multiple of 4.34, based on an EV 
of approximately $58 billion. While the EBITDA was $13.3 billion, the operating cash 
flows less capital spending was approximately $9.7 billion, corresponding to a multiple 
compared to EV of approximately 6.0.86 Using an example discount rate of ten percent, a 
reasonable illustrative hypothesis, the anticipated growth in future operating cash flows 
less capital expenditures would be g = 0.1 − (1/6), which simplifies to an implied growth 
of negative 6.7 percent. Because the cash flow measure is less than EBITDA, the implied 
                                                     
 
85  See, for example, McKinsey, p. 243. 
86  S&P Capital IQ, accessed May 14, 2015. 
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growth rate is not quite as negative as if EBITDA were the measure of earnings, though it 
is still quite negative. 
70. To further illustrate this concept, the figure below summarizes the equivalent data for a 
list of selected mature, large technology companies as of October 29, 2013.87 Note that it 
includes information for Apple, often seen as a very successful, innovative company. 
Many of these technology companies have relatively low EV/EBITDA multiples and also 
have flat or negative growth rates for operating cash flow less capital spending. In fact, 
the average growth rate for this set of companies is negative 2.4 percent and the average 
EV/EBITDA ratio is 7.6. HP and ASUS, both large sellers of PCs, have among the 
lowest EV/EBITDA ratios and both have implied growth of negative five percent or 
worse. 
                                                     
 
87  These companies were selected because they are examples of large (at least $1 billion in EV), mature 
technology companies. This list also includes many of the companies that are identified in the Proxy 
as having certain portions of their business be comparable to portions of Dell’s business (see Dell 
Inc., Schedule 14A, August 14, 2013 (“August 14 Proxy Statement”), p. 31). The selected companies 
also have operating cash flows less capital spendings that is both positive and at least 50 percent of 
EBITDA. 
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Figure 14. Implied Cash Flow Growth Rates for Selected Technology Companies as 
of October 29, 2013 ($ Millions) 
  
71. EV/EBITDA ratios are common measures not only for technology companies in general, 
but were also commonly used by professionals in evaluating the value of Dell, including 
in the Proxy Statements, the valuation spreadsheets used by parties involved in the 
transaction, and equity analysts’ reports. Ratios of 4.0 to 5.0 were quite common for Dell 











Flow Less Capital 
Spending1
ASUS $3,624             4.2 $558 -5.4%
HP     57,785             4.3          9,698 -6.8%
Intel   116,388             5.8        10,497 1.0%
Tech Data Corp       2,099             5.9             519 -14.7%
Cisco     88,509             6.5        11,868 -3.4%
Xerox     19,153             6.9          2,822 -4.7%
Symantec     13,665             7.2          1,292 0.5%
Microsoft   233,111             7.3        23,669 -0.2%
Apple   441,018             7.9        45,501 -0.3%
CA     13,426             8.4          1,181 1.2%
Oracle   139,063             8.5        14,181 -0.2%
EMC     47,278             9.2          5,663 -2.0%
NetApp       9,435           10.6          1,187 -2.6%
Wipro     17,664           13.2             948 4.6%
Average     85,873             7.6          9,256 -2.4%
Source: 
[A] S&P Capital IQ.
Note:
[1] 10% reasonable illustrative discount rate.
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Figure 15.  Alternate Estimates of EV/EBITDA Multiples for Dell 
 
Company EV/EBITDA Ratio Source
J.P. Morgan 3.5 to 5.5 Fairness Opinion
Evercore 3.0 to 5.0 Fairness Opinion
Silver Lake 4.5 Final Spreadsheet Model
BCG 3.71 Spreadsheet Model
Houlihan Lokey 4.0 10/22/2013 Presentation
Morningstar 4.1 to 7.8 9/13/2013 Report
UBS 1.9 to 3.9 8/16/2013 Report
Goldman Sachs 6.8 to 7.1 8/15/2013 Report
Deutsche Bank 3.6 to 4.3 8/15/2013 Report
BMO 4.6 8/15/2013 Report
Morgan Stanley 4.0 2/5/2013 Report
Barclays 4.7 1/16/2013 Report
Bank of America 5.2 to 5.4 1/15/2013 Report
Sources:
Notes:
[A] August 14 Proxy Statement, p. 33.
[B] August 14 Proxy Statement, p. 42.
[C] SLP_DELLAP00073088-123, at 92.
[D] BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”).
[E] DELLE00730635-0700 (“Dell Inc. Discussion Materials,” Houlihan Lokey, October 22, 2013), at 
656.
[F] "A Private Dell Is a Better Dell," Morningstar, September 13, 2013, p. 1
[G] "Dell Inc.: Dell Slightly Beats as the Curtain Falls," UBS Investment Research, August 16, 2013, p. 
1
[H] "Dell Inc.: Pushing for share at the expense of margins," Goldman Sachs Equity Research, 
August 15, 2013, p. 1.
[I] "Dell: Dell beats despite weak margins," Deutsche Bank, August 15, 2013, p. 2
[J] "More of The Same," BMO Capital Markets, August 15, 2013, p. 1.
[K] "Deal Unlocks Value Not New Strategy," Morgan Stanley Research North America, February 5, 
2013, p. 3.
[L] "Michael Dell Seems to Be Seeking a Private Future," Barclays, January 16, 2013, p. 2.
[M] "Dell Inc.: Arguments for and against LBO; we think unlikely," Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 
January 15, 2013, p. 1.
[1] BCG reports EV/EBIT multiple of 4.5, which corresponds to EV/EBITDA multiple of 3.7.
[2] Analyst reports provide yearly EV/EBIT multiple estimates, which in some cases vary across 
years.
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72. As shown in Figure 14, an EV/EBITDA ratio of four to five is similar to the range 
observed for mature technology companies that are most similar to Dell, like HP. These 
imply an equilibrium expectation by buyers and sellers in the market of long-term 
declines in earnings and cash flows. Not surprisingly, as the figure below illustrates, 
Dell’s EV/EBITDA ratio (and the corresponding implied growth in operating cash flows) 
have changed significantly over Dell’s life cycle as it went from a company with 
significant future expected growth to one with more modest prospects. 
Figure 16. Dell’s Historical EV/EBITDA Multiple – 1989 to 2013 
 
73. Past growth is not a guarantee of future growth. For example, one study showed that 
firms with revenue growth above 20 percent in a base year saw their growth rate decline 
from a median of about 33 percent to less than ten percent within five years.88 The 
transitory nature of growth is particularly common in technology companies. McKinsey 
examined ten-year inflation-adjusted revenue growth rates and found that the computer 
                                                     
 













[1] For FY1994, the average of EV/EBITDA of FY1993 and FY1995 is used as data are not provided for FY1994.
[2] EBITDA is measured over the last twelve months (LTM.)
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industry had the second highest growth rate for the period from 1987 to 1997 among the 
28 industries it considered (14 percent), but its growth rate for the following decade was 
the third lowest (two percent).89 In a 2002 paper, Professor Damodaran analyzed the 
correlations in earnings growth for firms across one-, three-, and five-year periods. While 
correlations were generally relatively low in all situations, one interesting result was that 
technology firms had correlation coefficients only one-third to one-half as high as non-
technology companies.90 This finding is consistent with technology firms not being 
particularly stable in terms of earnings, and with companies that were once highly 
profitable becoming less so over relatively short time periods. Professor Damodaran 
observed: “[Correlations are] consistently lower for technology firms than they are for the 
rest of the market. This would suggest that you should be more cautious about using past 
growth, especially in earnings, for forecasting future growth.”91 
74. Another way to consider the relationship between long-term growth and technology 
company market valuation is to review the observed revenue growth of technology 
companies over recent years and consider how the stock market values these companies. 
Revenue growth is not the same as cash flows, of course, but it provides a measure of 
whether a company is generally growing or shrinking its business. To consider this 
relationship, I obtained historical revenue and EV/EBITDA data from Capital IQ for a list 
of public technology companies included in the August 14, 2013 Proxy Statement 
discussing the Dell transaction.92 These companies include Acer, ASUS, Avnet, BMC, 
CA, Cisco, CSC, EMC, HP, IBM, Ingram Micro, Insight Enterprise, Lenovo, Microsoft, 
NetApp, Oracle, Symantec, Tech Data Corp., Wipro, and Xerox. I divided these 20 
companies into four groups (quartiles) based on revenue growth from 2008 to 2013.93 I 
then computed the median EV/EBITDA ratios for each of the four groups. As one can see 
                                                     
 
89  McKinsey, p. 94. 
90  Damodaran, Aswath, “Looking Forward: Estimating Growth,” 2002, 
<http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/papers/growth.pdf>, accessed March 18, 2015, p. 9. 
91  Damodaran, Aswath, “Looking Forward: Estimating Growth,” 2002, 
<http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/papers/growth.pdf>, accessed March 18, 2015, p. 9. 
92  See Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, August 14, 2013, p. 31. 
93  I exclude Acer due to its negative earnings in FY2013. 
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in the figure below, higher revenue growth firms were generally associated with higher 
EV/EBITDA ratios and lower revenue growth firms were associated with lower 
EV/EBITDA ratios. Dell was in the bottom quartile, and its EV/EBITDA multiple of 4.8 
matched the median for that group. 




75. Firms with flat or declining past revenue growth, as is the case for Dell, had low 
EV/EBITDA ratios, implying long-term expected decline in future cash flows. Of course 
this relationship between revenue and cash flows is not precise, because companies can 
decide to grow revenue by charging lower prices and earning lower profits. Nonetheless, 
the fact that many mature technology companies have flat or declining revenues is 
consistent with the idea that markets do not expect mature technology companies to 
continue to generate the same or growing cash flows into perpetuity. 
76. Of course, this general expectation of modestly declining cash flows for many mature 
technology companies such as Dell does not mean that these companies are expected by 
Company Number of Companies
Median Revenue 




Bottom Quartile 5 -1.4% 4.8
25th – 50th Percentile 5 1.6% 6.6
50th – 75th Percentile 5 4.9% 7.9
Top Quartile 5 10.6% 9.1
Sources: 
[A] Capital IQ (Dell EV/EBITDA from FY2013 reported figures).
[B] August 14 Proxy Statement, p. 31
Notes:
[1] Revenue growth ranges are [-5.2%, -1.0%], [1.0%, 3.3%], [4.2%, 6.9%], and [7.2%, 15.7%] for the bottom, 25th-50th, 50th-75th, 
and top quartiles, respectively. Cutoff percentiles for the quartiles are: less than 0.5% for the bottom quartile, 0.5% to 3.8% for 
the second quartile, 3.8% to 7.0% for the third quartile, and above 7.0% for the fourth quartile.
[2] EV is calculated as market value + short-term debt + long-term debt + minority interest + preferred shares - cash.
[3] Select companies include Dell and those listed in the August 14 Proxy Statement, which are Computer Sciences 
Corporation, Hewlett-Packard Company, ASUSTeK Computer, Inc., and International Business Machines Corporation 
(bottom quartile), Tech Data Corp., Insight Enterprise, Symantec Corporation, CA, and Xerox Corporation (second quartile), 
Wipro, Ingram Micro, Microsoft Corporation, BMC Software, and Cisco Systems, (third quartile), and Avnet, Oracle 
Corporation, EMC Corporation, Lenovo Group Limited, and NetApp (top quartile). Dell is in the bottom quartile. Acer is 
excluded because it has a negative EBITDA for FY2013.
JX 896A - p. 47 of 205
  Highly Confidential 
Page 45/156 
 
investors to go bankrupt or cease to exist in the foreseeable future. In fact, mature 
companies with cash flows that are expected to be flat or decline can have significant 
value, though certainly less value for a given level of cash flows than younger companies 
whose cash flows are expected to experience future growth. Likewise, the expectation 
does not mean that Dell or other mature technology companies will never be able to 
innovate and find opportunities to achieve new levels of growth. But considering only 
optimistic scenarios is not the equilibrium expectation of the market, where investors 
consider the range of future outcomes and ultimately develop a value based on the 
expected future cash flows. And, as I noted, whether a strategy of acquiring companies to 
grow future cash flows increases firm value depends on the cost of the required 
investment. Only projects and investments that return more than their cost of capital will 
increase firm value. 
77. Finally, a low implied long-term growth rate is consistent with any number of actual 
paths, none of which include the imminent demise of the company. For example if cash 
flows were $3 billion per year, a constant decline of six percent per year would mean that 
even after 30 years, the cash flows would still be $500 million per year. But the actual 
path could also be one of initial growth, followed by a steeper decline; a steeper decline, 
followed by growth; or a combination of declines, increases, and flat periods. It certainly 
does not mean that the company would decline to zero or go out of business. 
B. Dell’s Historical Stock Price and Reaction to Announcement 
78. As shown in Figure 18 below, Dell’s stock price had declined in the years leading up to 
transaction. Just as the EV/EBITDA multiple shown in Figure 16 dropped since 1999 as 
Dell matured and growth slowed, so too the share price of Dell’s equity fell by more than 
50 percent from its peak in 2000 to January 2007.94 Between 2007 and 2013, Dell’s stock 
price declined further from the $25 per share range. In part, this decline in value was due 
to the deep global recession as discussed earlier, though even after the broader market 
began to improve in 2009 (as reflected in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500)), 
                                                     
 
94  Dell’s stock price was $55.70 in March 2000 and declined to $24.43 in January 2007. Bloomberg LP. 
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Dell’s stock price never returned to the 2007 and 2008 levels, as shown in the figure 
below. In fact, Dell’s market price fluctuated around the $13.75 level for several years, 
from late 2009 through mid-2012, at which point it declined to a range of $9 to $11 per 
share. 
Figure 18. Dell Stock Price and S&P 500 Index – January 1, 2007 to January 13, 
2013 
 
79. The stock market price is the market-clearing price of potential buyers and sellers for a 
firm’s equity. There has been significant research among finance academics about how 
and when markets absorb new information.95 Academic research agrees that well-
functioning markets with many buyers and sellers, such as the market for Dell’s stock on 
NASDAQ, absorb all available and relevant public information very quickly (often 
                                                     
 
95  For a review of this literature, see Fama, Eugene and Kenneth French, “Efficient Capital Markets: II” 
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within seconds),96 and thus prices reflect the cumulative market consensus of the value of 
a share of stock, incorporating all relevant information. 
80. We can see the speed of the stock market’s reaction to news when we view Dell’s stock 
price reaction to discussions about a possible LBO transaction. The first movement, 
included in the figure above, was a modest increase in Dell’s price by 4.4 percent, from 
$9.31 to $9.72 on December 3, 2012, while the overall stock market, as measured by the 
S&P 500, dropped 0.5 percent. On the prior non-trading day, there was speculation in a 
Goldman Sachs analyst report that Dell might be a candidate for an LBO, though the 
report did not cite any specific information or offers: 
With Dell shares trading at such a discounted valuation, the company’s 
sizeable cash position and Michael Dell’s previous public comments 
surrounding the possibility of taking the company private (Dell CEO says 
considered taking company private, Reuters, June 3, 2010 and Dell CFO: 
Going private still an option, CNNMoney, November 5, 2010), we 
constructed a Dell LBO model to help gauge the potential viability and 
attractiveness of such a transaction.97 
81. The more significant stock market reaction was on January 14, 2013, when Bloomberg 
first reported that Dell was in talks to go private. On this day, the price rose 13.0 percent, 
from a $10.88 closing price on the day prior to $12.29 at the close of trading on January 
14, while the S&P 500 dropped by 0.1 percent. In fact, the largest increase occurred 
immediately after the Bloomberg report hitting the wire at 2:04 pm, when the stock rose 
9.8 percent within one minute.98 This stock price increase occurred despite the lack of any 
information about a specific offer price in the Bloomberg report. As the figure below 
shows, the stock continued to increase some from this point. On February 5, 2013, when 
                                                     
 
96  See, for example, Busse, Jeffrey and T. Clifton Green, “Market Efficiency in Real Time,” Journal of 
Financial Economics 65, 2002, p. 415 (stock prices respond to analysts’ commentary on CNBC 
segments within seconds); Greene, Jason T. and Watts, Susan G. Watts, “Price Discovery on the 
NYSE and the NASDAQ: The Case of Overnight and Daytime News Releases,” Financial 
Management, 25, 1996, p. 19 (reactions occur within first several post-announcement trades on 
NYSE and NASDAQ). 
97  “Dell Inc.: Finding Deep Value Amid the Pessimism: Upgrade to Buy from Sell,” Goldman Sachs 
Equity Research, December 2, 2012, p. 8. 
98  See “Dell Is Said to Be in Talks to Go Private,” Bloomberg LP, January 14, 2013, 2:04p.m. EST. 
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the Merger bid was announced at $13.65,99 the price increased 2.6 percent to $13.42 per 
share. 
Figure 19. Dell Stock Price and S&P 500 Index – December 1, 2013 to October 28, 
2013  
  
82. In broad terms, this stock price analysis shows that the thousands of investors who held 
Dell stock valued it at a price fluctuating around $13 to $14 per share between 2009 and 
late 2012.100 As seen in Figure 19, during the year leading up to the Merger, the stock 
market value of Dell had declined, with a price below $11 per share (and as low as $8.89 
per share) during the six month prior to the announcement of the bid. Once the LBO 
process was revealed to the public, the price rose to a price corresponding to the 
transaction price. This stock market analysis is consistent with the Merger price of 
                                                     
 
99  “Dell Enters Into Agreement to Be Acquired By Michael Dell and Silver Lake,” Dell Inc., February 
5, 2013, <http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/uscorp1/secure/2013-02-04-michael-dell-silverlake-
acquisition>, accessed April 16, 2015. 
100  For example, S&P Capital IQ shows that as of December 31, 2011, there were 1,039 institutional and 
















December 2, 2012 - Goldman Sachs 
mentions possible LBO
January 14, 2013 - Bloomberg
reports LBO talks
February 5, 2013 - Merger 
bid announced
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$13.75—well above the then-current stock market price of below $11 per share—being 
the ceiling for the fair price per share as of October 29, 2013. As discussed earlier, 
modern finance research attributes virtually no minority discount to large, well governed, 
publicly traded companies like Dell.101 
C. Analysts’ Price Targets, Forecasts, and Commentary 
83. In addition to observing the actual transaction prices in the market for Dell’s shares, I 
reviewed additional information regarding the value of a company’s equity by 
considering examples of data and opinions being offered by professional stock market 
equity analysts. Equity analysts are financial professionals who analyze companies or 
industries and are paid to provide guidance and opinions to investors. Where multiple 
equity analysts cover the same company, they may have different opinions from one 
another about the likely future performance of particular business segments or the overall 
company’s prospects. No equity analyst is perfect in his or her predictions, of course, and 
one should be careful about how such information is used. However, I believe—as do 
many financial academics and professionals—that evaluating the opinions and analyses 
of equity analysts is useful information to consider in undertaking equity valuations.102  
84. In my review, I have considered several types of information generated by the equity 
analysts who followed Dell. First, from a numerical perspective, I reviewed the analysts’ 
per-share price targets for Dell. A price target is an analyst’s forecast of the future stock 
price. While analysts’ reports typically do not specify the exact time periods for price 
forecasts, the general understanding among finance professionals is that they represent 
                                                     
 
101  See, for example, Nath, Eric W., “Best Practices Regarding Control Premiums: Comments Regarding 
the Appraisal Foundation’s Proposed White Paper on Control Premiums,” Business Valuation Review 
30, 2011, pp. 140-143; Shishido, Zenichi, “Fair Value of Minority Stock in Closely Held 
Corporations,” Fordham Law Review 62, 1993, p. 683; Coates, John C., IV, “Fair Value as an 
Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions,” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 147, 1999, p. 13. See also Hamermesh, Lawrence A. and Michael L. 
Wachter, “The Short and Puzzling Life of the ‘Implicit Minority Discount’ in Delaware Appraisal 
Law,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 156, 2007, p. 2. 
102  See, for example, Jegadeesh, Narasimhan and Woojin Kim, “Value of Analyst Recommendations: 
International Evidence,” Journal of Financial Markets 9, 2006, pp. 274-309. 
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the anticipated price 12-18 months into the future.103 Reviewing and evaluating price 
targets provides a useful summary of analysts’ outlook for the stock.  
85. In the figure below, I plot the price targets from equity analysts who followed Dell during 
the 12 months from January 2012 through December 2012 (prior to the news of the 
announcement becoming public in January 2013).104  
Figure 20. Equity Analysts’ Price Targets for Dell – 2012  
 
86. Figure 20 shows that equity analysts covering Dell developed individual price targets on 
varying dates, often clustered around the release of quarterly results. The figure also 
shows the monthly average of all analysts’ price targets active during that month. There 
                                                     
 
103  Heinzl, John, “What Every Investor Should Know about Analysts’ Price Targets,” The Globe and 
Mail, September 10, 2012, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/investor-
education/what-every-investor-should-know-about-analysts-price-targets/article627565/>, accessed 
April 11, 2015; Deposition of Drago Rajkovic, April 15, 2015 (“Rajkovic Deposition”), p. 78. 
104  de la Merced, Michael and Quentin Hardy, “Dell Shares Rise on News Company May Go Private,” 
New York Times, January 14, 2013, <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/dell-shares-surge-after-
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[A] IBES analyst forecasts provided by ThomsonOne.
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was a clear declining trend during 2012, with every one of the price targets at or above 
$13.75 in early 2012 and nearly 90 percent of the analysts developing price targets below 
$13.75 by the last quarter of 2012. My analysis focuses on the period before the 
announcement of the potential merger became public in January 2013, because from that 
point on analysts were primarily focused on the transaction and potential changes in the 
transaction price, rather than a forecast of the equity price should Dell continue as a 
publicly traded company. 
87. One important implication of this analysis is that the relatively low stock price for Dell 
was not reflective of the analysts having fundamentally missed some aspect of Dell’s 
business. In fact, the average price target in late February 2012 was above $18 per share. 
During 2012, analysts evaluated the industry situation and Dell’s strategy and 
positioning, and reduced their price targets. It is difficult to believe that analysts were 
unaware of important aspects of Dell’s business.  
88. Another quantitative method of understanding the sentiment of analysts about the 
forecast for Dell in the period leading up to the transaction is to consider their forecasts 
for earnings. In the figure below, I plot the IBES analysts’ consensus three-year forecasts 
for Dell’s earnings (measured as Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, or EBIT) done in 
July 2012, and again 14 months later in September 2013, just before the closing of the 
transaction. During that period, analysts nearly cut in half their EBIT forecasts for 
FY2014 and FY2015, from just over $4 billion per year to just over $2 billion per year. 
This dramatic reduction in analysts’ forecasts is consistent with the decline in price 
targets and the decline in the prospects for the PC market during the year leading up to 
the Merger. 
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Figure 21. Analysts’ Forecasts of Dell’s EBIT – July 2012 and September 2013 
  
89. In addition to financial and quantitative predictions, equity analysts often provide 
narrative commentary about particular business segments or a company’s overall 
business. As a corroboration to the more quantitative measures, I reviewed equity 
analysts’ reports and assessed whether they were optimistic, neutral, or pessimistic about 
Dell’s prospects. This review necessarily involves some judgment, and is not a substitute 
for quantitative analysis or standard valuation techniques. However, it can assist in 
corroborating a valuation, as one would expect that declining price targets would be 
accompanied by narrative elaboration that includes discussion that is more pessimistic 
than at earlier points in time.  
90. In my analysis, I generally observed more pessimism than optimism in the period leading 
up to the transaction, consistent with the declining stock price. I also observed some 
analysts who had been more optimistic in earlier periods expressing increasing pessimism 
as Dell’s financial performance weakened. In my review of Dell’s business segments, I 
found that there was more optimism about certain Dell segments often referred to as 













[A] DELLE00293261-347 (Dell Annual Report, January 31, 2014), p. 80.
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Conversely, I found that there was more pessimism about “Core Dell” (which includes 
businesses such as End User Computing, where Dell has traditionally generated a 
significant amount of revenue). In Exhibit 8, I provide examples of some of the varied, 
and often changing, sentiments surrounding Dell’s prospects.  
91. In summary, the analysts’ price targets prior to the transaction show equity analysts had 
sharply declining price targets, with nearly 90 percent of analysts having price targets 
below $13.75 during the quarter prior to the Merger becoming public after the average 
price target was nearly $20 per share at the beginning of 2012. Similarly, many industry 
and equity analysts were revising down their financial forecasts, suggesting a broad range 
of uncertainty about Dell’s future prospects. These observations are consistent with the 
stock market price trend. Finally, I note that analysts’ narrative commentary generally 
corroborates my findings. 
IV. THE DEAL PROCESS 
92. As a second valuation approach, I examine the process by which Dell solicited and 
evaluated offers for the LBO of the public stockholders. My examination is from the 
perspective of finance principles rather than legal principles, and seeks to answer the 
question of whether $13.75 represents a fair price for the previously publicly traded 
shares as of October 29, 2013, which traded for less than $11 per share in January 2013 
(when the deal process became public) and less than $10 per share in December 2012 
(when the idea of an LBO was first mentioned by analysts). 
93. An LBO deal process has some of the same characteristics as a stock market valuation, 
with some important differences. The price formation processes are similar in that both 
are efforts by buyers and sellers to determine a market price. In the case of a stock 
market, it involves a large number of buyers and sellers and many transactions per day, 
each involving modest amounts of equity ownership (at least on a percentage basis). In 
the case of an LBO, it is typically a small number of very sophisticated potential buyers 
who consider purchasing the entire company in a transaction that would result in private 
ownership of the company. While there may be tens of thousands of individual owners of 
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shares of the company, the potential LBO buyers are typically negotiating with a single 
entity—the Board of Directors—which acts as the representative of the stockholders. 
94. Before I discuss the deal process in more detail, it is important to also understand the role 
LBO firms play in determining the value for companies. As in this case, most LBOs are 
typically done with the involvement of a sophisticated private equity (PE) firm. Like 
most equity investors, PE firms make money primarily by being able to sell their equity 
investment for more than they originally paid to acquire it. There are a number of ways 
this may be achieved. PE firms often achieve a profit through “financial engineering” 
(that is, buying properly valued firms using large amounts of debt and increasing the 
value of the equity by paying down the debt).105 PE firms also attempt to manage their 
investments in a way that increases value.  
95. The materials I have reviewed are consistent with this LBO transaction being primarily a 
financial engineering opportunity. In fact, in its modeling of the transaction, Silver Lake 
did not change the EBITDA valuation multiple that it used to model an exit from the 
investment.106 By maintaining a constant EBITDA exit multiple, Silver Lake implicitly 
assumed the same long-term negative growth rate that was already expected by the 
market and the analyst community. Its investment returns were expected to be generated 
primarily though anticipated access to low-cost debt, the pay down of this debt, and thus 
the larger equity ownership share of a similarly-valued investment.107 However, even if 
that were not the case, a robust deal process creates competition among buyers and 
results in a re-valuation of the firm, which benefits the existing stockholders. As long as a 
process encourages competitive bidding, bidders will increase their offers up until the 
point where they have made a full-value bid.108 Thus, a rigorous deal process can function 
                                                     
 
105  Rosenbaum, Joshua, and Joshua Pearl, Investment Banking: Valuation, Leverage Buyouts, and 
Mergers & Acquisitions, John Wiley and Sons, 2013, p.199. 
106  SLP_DELLAP00073088-123, at 92. 
107  SLP_DELLAP00073090 (‘000179199 (Silver Lake Model Sept 17, 2013).xlsx,’ at ‘Model’ sheet). 
108  Rosenbaum, Joshua, and Joshua Pearl, Investment Banking: Valuation, Leveraged Buyouts, and 
Mergers & Acquisitions, John Wiley and Sons, 2013, p. 93, 315-316. 
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as a safeguard against the rare circumstance of a truly mispriced large, publicly traded 
firm. 
96. I frame my analysis of the deal process by considering some of the key finance principles 
involving price discovery and valuation matters. In Exhibit 9, I included a timeline of the 
key dates in the deal process, summarized in simplified form below: 
Figure 22. Summary Timeline of Deal Process 
 
A. Independent Seller Negotiators 
97. In some LBO processes, including Dell’s, large owners of publicly traded shares may 
also become stockholders in the newly private company. In this case, Michael Dell was a 
large shareholder of Dell before the transaction, with 13.9 percent of the outstanding 
shares,109 and became the largest shareholder in the private company, with a total share of 
approximately 75 percent including affiliated entities.110 In LBO situations involving an 
existing shareholder, it is important to ensure that the representative negotiating on behalf 
                                                     
 
109  Mr. Dell had 244,485,019 shares prior to the transaction. This figure does not include 26,984,832 
shares of common stock held in a separate property trust for Mr. Dell’s wife and 2,964,869 shares of 
common stock held in trusts for the benefit of the children of Mr. Dell and his wife, and as to which 
Mr. Dell disclaims beneficial ownership. See August 14 Proxy Statement, p. 78. 
110  SLP_DELLAP00069188-296, at 196. SLP equity is $1.4 billion out of a total of $5.569 billion, or 
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of the sellers does not have incentives that might advantage the continuing shareholder(s) 
at the expense of the selling stockholders. 
98. Dell’s Board of Directors quickly recognized that Michael Dell was likely to be a major 
shareholder in a newly private company. On August 20, 2012, six days after Mr. Dell 
informed Mr. Mandl, the Company’s lead independent director, of his interest in a going-
private transaction, the Board formed a Special Committee, comprised of four 
independent non-management directors (Alex Mandl, Janet Clark, Laura Conigliaro, and 
Kenneth Duberstein) to negotiate on behalf of the stockholders.111 They also established 
various rules to further ensure their independence, such as resolving not to recommend 
any going-private transaction or alternative to such a transaction without the prior 
favorable recommendation by the Special Committee.112 They also granted the Special 
Committee exclusive authority to: 
• Reject any potential transaction;  
• Consider any proposal to acquire the Company involving Mr. Dell and to consider 
alternative proposals from other parties; 
• Engage independent legal and financial advisors; 
• Make a recommendation to the Board with respect to any such proposed 
transaction; and 
• Evaluate, review, and consider other potential strategic alternatives that may be 
available to the Company.113 
B. Independent Advisors 
99. LBO transactions are often quite complex and require significant amounts of information 
that must be processed in a limited amount of time. It is common in such situations for 
the sellers (represented by the Board) to hire sophisticated professional advisors who can 
assist in the process, providing independent advice and assisting with negotiations.  
100. In this case, the Special Committee had numerous sophisticated and reputable advisors: 
                                                     
 
111  Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, May 31, 2013 (“May 31 Proxy Statement”), pp. 20-21. 
112  DELLE00302254-2258 (Board of Directors (“BOD”) Resolutions, August 20, 2012), at 257. 
113  DELLE00302254-2258 (BOD Resolutions, August 20, 2012), at 256-258. 
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• Evercore Group L.L.C. (“Evercore”) to act as an additional financial advisor for 
the Special Committee and run the go-shop; whose arrangement provided them 
financial incentives, in the form of a success fee, to identify and encourage 
potentially qualified buyers;114 
• J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (“J.P. Morgan”) as its initial independent financial 
advisor;115 
• Boston Consulting Group as an independent management consultant to assist the 
Special Committee in evaluating strategic alternatives available to the 
Company;116 and 
• Debevoise & Plimpton LLC, a nationally recognized law firm, as independent 
counsel.117 
101. I am familiar with each of these advisors. They are all highly reputable and qualified 
professional firms. 
C. Broad Range of Sophisticated Buyers 
102. In an LBO transaction, there is often an initial round of discussions with potential buyers, 
followed by a formal set of negotiations with one or more buyers, an announcement, and 
a later round involving information gathering and potential bidding by other interested 
buyers. This sequence is not the only one possible in which events can proceed in an 
LBO, though it is common one.118 Indeed, common sense suggests that having multiple 
potential buyers will generally lead to a higher price. If there is only one buyer, they may 
realize there are no other interested parties and thus bid a price lower than the price that 
would have been offered had more parties been interested. 
                                                     
 
114  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 35; DELLE00302240-2241 (Special Committee Meeting Minutes, 
January 8, 2013); DELLE00805291-5302 (Evercore Engagement Letter, January 10, 2013). 
115  May 31 Proxy Statement, pp. 21-22; DELLE00302197-2198 (Special Committee Meeting Minutes, 
August 29, 2012). 
116  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 28; DELLE00302223-2224 (Special Committee Meeting Minutes, 
November 5, 2012); DELLE00302140-2150 (BCG Engagement Letter, November 12, 2012); 
DELLE00623759-3767 (BCG Engagement Letter, April 12, 2012). 
117  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 21; DELLE00302269-70 (Special Committee Meeting Minutes, August 
24, 2013). 
118  For example, J.P. Morgan discussed alternative processes with the Board on September 14, 2012. See 
DELLE00301715-1758 (“Presentation to the Denali Special Committee,” J.P. Morgan, September 14, 
2012), at 749.  
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103. In this case, the Special Committee went to great lengths to ensure that many buyers were 
available.119 Because the Dell Merger was one of the largest LBO transactions in 
history,120 it was important to ensure that the largest, most sophisticated potential 
investors were able to review information and submit bids. During the period before the 
deal was officially announced, the Special Committee held discussions with several 
potential investors: 
• Silver Lake, the eventual investor (along with Michael Dell) and the fifteenth 
largest private equity firm in the world as of 2014;121 
• KKR, the second largest private equity firm in the world, with $27 billion raised 
within the past five years;122 and 
• TPG, the fifth largest private equity firm in the world, with $18 billion raised 
within the past five years.123 
104. These are three of the largest and most sophisticated private equity firms in the world. I 
also note that this was a period of time when banks and other lenders were very willing to 
work with these sophisticated firms to line up necessary financing for economically 
sensible transactions. For example, in its September 14, 2012 presentation to the Special 
Committee, J.P. Morgan noted that while there were risks: “the high yield and leveraged 
                                                     
 
119  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 43. 
120  “Dell Inc.: Raising Price Target, LBO Floor Justified,” UBS Investment Research, January 15, 2013, 
p. 1. 
121  “Ranking of the Largest Private Equity Firms by PE Capital Raised, 2014,” Private Equity 
International, May 2014, pp. 48-53, 
<https://www.privateequityinternational.com/uploadedFiles/Private_Equity_International/PEI/Non-
Pagebuilder/Aliased/News_And_Analysis/2014/May/News/PEI 300 2014.pdf>, accessed April 14, 
2015. 
122  “Ranking of the Largest Private Equity Firms by PE Capital Raised, 2014,” Private Equity 
International, May 2014, pp. 48-53, 
<https://www.privateequityinternational.com/uploadedFiles/Private_Equity_International/PEI/Non-
Pagebuilder/Aliased/News_And_Analysis/2014/May/News/PEI 300 2014.pdf.>, accessed April 14, 
2015. 
123  “Ranking of the Largest Private Equity Firms by PE Capital Raised, 2014,” Private Equity 
International, May 2014, pp. 48-53, 
<https://www.privateequityinternational.com/uploadedFiles/Private_Equity_International/PEI/Non-
Pagebuilder/Aliased/News_And_Analysis/2014/May/News/PEI 300 2014.pdf.>, accessed April 14, 
2015.  
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loan markets are very strong and are at the lowest yields since the indexes have been 
tracked.”124 
105. After the purchase was initially negotiated with Silver Lake and announced, the Special 
Committee held an initial 45-day “go-shop” period for the solicitation of additional bids, 
which could be extended beyond 45 days under certain circumstances.125 During this 
period, Dell’s bankers and financial advisors had contact with at least 67 potential buyers, 
13 of whom signed a non-disclosure agreement.126  
106. Two notable parties in this group were the Blackstone Group (the third largest private 
equity firm in the world127) and Carl Icahn. During this period, Dell offered to reimburse 
both Blackstone and Carl Icahn up to $25 million each for their due diligence costs. 
While this may not be the first time such an offer to pay for due diligence has ever been 
made, it is unusual for a company to offer to pay significant sums to additional potential 
investors during a go-shop period, and is consistent with a genuine effort to obtain the 
maximum possible price for existing stockholders.128  
107. In addition to the specific outreach efforts to obtain buyer interest, the publicity 
surrounding the process and the length of time of the negotiations were sufficient, in my 
opinion, to ensure that all reasonable potential buyers knew of the opportunity to bid for 
Dell. Perhaps the most tangible evidence of this can be seen in the amount of coverage 
the Wall Street Journal devoted to the Dell LBO. As one can see from the figure below, 
                                                     
 
124  DELLE00301715-758 (“Presentation to the Denali Special Committee,” J.P. Morgan, September 14, 
 2012), at 738. 
125  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 54. 
126  JPM_0202732-750 (“Project Denali: Go-Shop Process Update,” Evercore Partners, March 24, 2013), 
at 35. See also EVERCORE00040054 (“Restricted docs (go shop)_EVR_V49.xlsx”); 
EVERCORE00042459 (“Restricted docs (go shop)_EVR_V58.xlsx”); EVERCORE00058374 
(“Restricted docs (go shop)_EVR_V99.xlsx”). 
127  “Ranking of the Largest Private Equity Firms by PE Capital Raised, 2014,” Private Equity 
International, May 2014, pp. 48-53, 
<https://www.privateequityinternational.com/uploadedFiles/Private_Equity_International/PEI/Non-
Pagebuilder/Aliased/News_And_Analysis/2014/May/News/PEI 300 2014.pdf>, accessed April 14, 
2015. 
128  Sorkin, Andrew Ross, “A $25 Million Question Over a Bid for Dell,” New York Times, April 1, 2013, 
<http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/a25millioncharadeoverabidfordell/>, accessed April 17, 
2015. 
JX 896A - p. 62 of 205
  Highly Confidential 
Page 60/156 
 
there were more than 85 days between mid-January 2013 and mid-October 2013 when an 
article or an op-ed discussing the Dell transaction appeared in the print or online versions 
of Wall Street Journal.129 These articles extensively discussed the process, include many 
quotes from both the Company and those concerned about the deal or the process. 
Figure 23. Days With an Article or Op-Ed About the Dell Transaction in the Wall 
Street Journal – 2013  
 
108. For example, on March 21, the Wall Street Journal discussed both General Electric (one 
of the largest corporations in the world) and Blackstone (one of the largest private equity 
funds in the world) as potential buyers or investors in part or all of Dell.130 Given this 
amount of coverage, it would have been virtually impossible for any sophisticated 
potential buyer or investor during this period not to know that Dell was contemplating a 
transaction and that Dell’s board was willing to consider various offers. 
                                                     
 
129  See Appendix B for a listing of articles. 
130  Terlep, Sarah and Kate Linebaugh, “Blackstone, GE Capital Discussed Bid for Dell Unit,” Wall 
Street Journal, March 21, 2013, 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324103504578374453238957018 >, accessed 
April 28, 2015. 
Source:
[A] Wall Street Journal.
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109. In addition to considering a wide range of buyers, the Special Committee also considered 
a range of alternatives to an LBO sale of the Company before recommending the LBO 
purchase involving Michael Dell and Silver Lake. These considerations are consistent 
with an effort to consider whether alternative uses of Dell’s assets might generate a 
higher value for current stockholders. Options considered included:131 
• A separation of the Company’s End User Computing (EUC) and Enterprise 
Solutions and Services (ESS) businesses; 
• A sale of Dell Financial Services (DFS); 
• A spin-merger transaction involving the Company’s EUC business and a strategic 
company; 
• A return of capital strategy by means of a share repurchase or cash dividend 
funded with new debt and/or existing cash; and  
• “Continuing to execute management’s long-term plan and remaining as a publicly 
held company, potential changes to that plan, and adjustments in the management 
team.”132  
D. Neutralized Insiders and Aligned Incentives 
110. In addition to having numerous qualified buyers, it is also significant in cases in which an 
insider is involved that potential buyers are not deterred from making an offer out of fear 
that the insider will not participate with them, that they will face an unfair playing field, 
or that should they win the bid, the insider will not maximize the value of the company. 
Michael Dell recognized the fact that there could be concerns about his involvement, and 
he committed to trying to achieve the highest price for existing shareholders. For 
example, he stated in his June 2013 presentation to stockholders filed with SEC: “From 
the outset of the process last August, I made clear that I was ready to participate with 
whatever sponsor was willing to pay the highest price. . . . During the go-shop process I 
made clear that I was ready to participate with another buyer if another buyer were 
willing to pay a higher price.”133 In addition, when the process threatened to stall after 
Silver Lake refused to go any higher in its bid, Michael Dell personally elected to take 
                                                     
 
131  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 26. 
132  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 23. 
133  Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, June 27, 2013, p. 7.  
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less for his existing stock in order to allow for an increase in the price offered to other 
shareholders and a special dividend. As a consequence, the value attached to Mr. Dell’s 
shares was $12.51 per share, tens of millions of dollars less than his percentage share 
would otherwise have been worth.134 
111. In this case, the entire Board agreed not to recommend any transaction without the prior 
favorable recommendation of the Special Committee, which did not include Michael 
Dell. In addition, the Board imposed safeguards to ensure that Michael Dell did not gain 
an undue advantage in the process. These included: 
Prohibiting Michael Dell from: 
• Proposing a transaction involving the Company unless invited to do so by the 
Special Committee;135 
• Entering into agreements with any party, including any exclusivity arrangements 
with any financing sources, regarding a transaction involving the Company 
without the Special Committee’s consent;136 
• Sharing confidential information with any other party, including the sponsors;137 
and 
• Participating in the deliberations of the Special Committee regarding the merger 
agreement and the transactions contemplated therein. He further agreed to abstain 
from the Board’s vote on whether the merger agreement should be recommended 
for stockholder approval.138 
Requiring Michael Dell to: 
• Work in good faith with other potential sponsors if requested to do so by the 
Special Committee and to refrain from taking any actions that would prevent him 
from doing so;139 and 
• Represent that his evaluation of a possible transaction would not interfere with the 
performance of his duties as Chief Executive Officer of the Company.140 
                                                     
 
134  August 14 Proxy Statement, p. 48.  
135  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 22. 
136  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 22. 
137  DELLE00805164-5170 (Michael Dell Confidentiality Agreement). 
138  May 31 Proxy Statement, pp. 42 and 113. 
139  DELLE00805164-5170 (Michael Dell Confidentiality Agreement, p. 37). 
140  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 22. 
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112. The Board and Michael Dell also agreed to two additional provisions relating to the 
voting on any proposal and the development of the final offer. First, any merger 
agreement would have to “be adopted by holders of a majority of the outstanding shares 
of Common Stock entitled to vote thereon not held by Mr. Dell, certain related family 
trusts and members of management, or other persons having an equity interest in . . . 
Merger Sub;”141 This was later amended to be the majority of the shares that were voted 
in person or by proxy.142 Second, Michael Dell and his affiliates agreed to “vote their 
Common Stock in the same proportion to the number of shares voted by the Company’s 
unaffiliated stockholders” in favor of either (i) a superior proposal if the merger 
agreement was terminated and the Company entered into a definitive agreement with 
respect to such superior proposal or (ii) the adoption of the merger agreement in the event 
of a change of recommendation.143  
113. These restrictions and safeguards are consistent with a process that aligns the incentives 
of all parties to achieve a fair price for non-continuing stockholders and also allows 
bidders other than those initially involved to participate on an equal basis.  
E. Modest Deal Protections 
114. Another potential concern in an LBO transaction is that the initial bidder may negotiate 
onerous provisions such that it would be uneconomical for any other bidder to make an 
offer, because the company would be forced to pay a large penalty or breakup fee to the 
initial bidder. It is reasonable for a company that develops the initial contacts and invests 
the time, capital, and other resources necessary to develop a bid to want some 
compensation should another party ultimately submit a higher bid. At the same time, if 
the terms of any “deal protection” devices are too onerous, even other bidders who would 
have been willing to offer more to existing stockholders will find such an opportunity 
uneconomical. 
                                                     
 
141  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 40. 
142  August 14 Proxy Statement, at “Notice of Special Meeting of Stockholders.” 
143  May 31 Proxy Statement, pp. 123-24; DELLE00714906-5077 (Michael Dell Voting 
Agreement/Interim Investors Agreement). 
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115. In this case, the deal protection terms were not particularly onerous. The primary deal 
terms of interest were: 
• A breakup fee of $180 million (reduced from $450 million),144 which is less than 
one percent of the $24.9 billion transaction value and approximately ten cents per 
share; and 
• A single matching right,145 which granted Silver Lake only one opportunity to 
match an alternative, higher offer.146 
116. These deal protection devices are modest compared to many going-private transactions, 
and would not be sufficient to prevent a bid from a qualified potential buyer who 
believed the value was substantially greater than $13.75.147 
F. Robust Disclosures 
117. In addition to having multiple bidders and aligning incentives to allow additional topping 
bids, from a finance perspective it is also important that information be available to 
potential bidders to encourage full-value bids. In this case, Dell structured the process in 
order to allow information to be disseminated. This structure was done through at least 
two methods, both of which combined to provide a significant amount of information 
during the sales process for both current stockholders and potential bidders. 
118. In the first method, many documents and important information were filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and available to all investors. In my review 
of the SEC filings between January 2013 and October 2013, I found nearly 200 
                                                     
 
144  Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, August 2, 2013, p. 3. 
145  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 11. 
146  If Silver Lake had unlimited matching rights, it could avoid making its best offer because it would 
always be able to top a standing offer by a nominal amount. A study of 331 merger agreements 
between 2002 and 2006 found that 41 percent had rights to make at least one matching offer. See 
Quinn, Brian, “Re-Evaluating the Emerging Standard of Review for Matching Rights in Control 
Transactions,” Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 36, 2011, pp. 1018-1019 and 1052. 
147  A study of termination fees finds that the median target termination fee (paid to the bidder) is 3.3 
percent of deal value and ninety-five percent of the deals have a termination fee above 1.2 percent of 
deal value. See Officer, Micah, “Termination Fees in Merger and Acquisitions,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 69, 2003, p. 443. A study of U.S. buyouts finds that 79 percent of “add-on go-shop” 
transactions (those with a market canvass before and after the announced agreement) have match 
rights. See Subramanian, Guhan, “Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and 
Implications,” Business Lawyer 63, 2008, p. 745. 
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documents relevant to the transaction,148 including documents discussing the process, 
documents responding to proposals by Carl Icahn, and various other relevant documents. 
The documents provided information to support the arguments both for and against the 
transaction. For example, the SEC filings contained a detailed June 2013 presentation 
prepared by Southeastern Asset Management arguing against the transaction149 and an 
open letter in July 2013 from Michael Dell to stockholders explaining his reasons for 
taking Dell private at $13.75 per share.150 
119. In the second method, prospective bidders had access to a “data room” that contained 
approximately 4,000 documents and spreadsheets that could be used in their due 
diligence process.151 I understand that at least eight potential buyers—Blackstone, 
Francisco Partners, GE Capital, Insight, Carl Icahn, Mitsubishi, Vector Capital, and 
Wells Fargo—were qualified by Dell and given access to the data room during the 
process, though the exact levels of access and degree to which data was accessed varied 
by potential buyer.152  
G. Bidding History 
120. The bidding history on the deal also reveals the extent to which the deal process resulted 
in a fair price for the equity. On October 23, 2012, after approximately two months of 
initial review and due diligence, there were two initial expressions of interest (not formal 
bids), with a range of $12 to $13 per share from KKR, and $11.22 to $12.16 per share 
                                                     
 
148  Appendix C. 
149  Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, June 27, 2013. 
150  Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, July 25, 2013. 
151  EVERCORE00040054 (“Restricted docs (go shop)_EVR_V49.xlsx”); EVERCORE00042459 
(“Restricted docs (go shop)_EVR_V58.xlsx”); EVERCORE00058374 (“Restricted docs (go 
shop)_EVR_V99.xlsx”). 
152  A ninth potential buyer (“Strategic Party C”) also received access, but did not make use of it. See 
May 31 Proxy Statement, pp. 43-46; JPM_0202732-2750 (“Project Denali: Go-Shop Process 
Update,” Evercore Partners, March 24, 2013), at 735; EVERCORE00045179. I also note that while 
KKR did initial due diligence and submitted initial interest, it did not pursue obtaining access to the 
data room. 
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from Silver Lake.153 Over the next ten months, Silver Lake made formal offers at an 
escalating series of prices, often as offers counter to Dell’s solicitation for higher bids. 
More specifically, Silver Lake raised its price seven times during this period, with the 
final increase being to the $13.75 price per share plus a special $0.13 per share dividend 
in August 2013.154 In addition, Michael Dell agreed to multiple concessions. In January 
2013: “Mr. Dell stated that he would consider reducing the valuation of his rollover 
shares (as well as all of the MD Investors) to $13.36 per share” in order to help Silver 
Lake increase its offer to $13.60 per share.155 Then, in July 2013, Mr. Dell further 
reduced the valuation of his [the MD Investors’] shares to $12.51 to help fund the $0.13 
special cash dividend and to help increase Silver Lake’s offer to $13.75.156 He also 
contributed $500 million of cash to help fund the buyout, and MSD Capital invested 
another $250 million.157  
121. The complete Silver Lake bidding history is shown in the graphic below. On a 
cumulative basis, including the $0.13 special dividend, the Special Committee achieved a 
price $2.66 higher than the low end of the initial interest submitted by Silver Lake of 
$11.22, a 24 percent increase in consideration. 
                                                     
 
153  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 27 (listing “Sponsor A”). KKR is identified as “Sponsor A.”. See Mandl 
Deposition, p. 43. 
154  May 31 Proxy Statement, pp. 30, 37, 38, 40, and 41; August 14 Proxy Statement, pp. 20, 22, and 24. 
155  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 38. 
156  August 14 Proxy Statement, pp. 21-22, 27, 33, 38, 40-41, and 48 
157  SLP_DELLAP00069188-296, at 196. 
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Figure 24. Dell Stock Price and Bid History – August 2012 to October 2013 
 
122. Another interesting aspect of the bidding history and share price of Dell is the fact that 
the market price of Dell’s shares, which were still publicly traded during this period of 
bidding, generally hovered around or even below the Merger price. The only time during 
this period when the stock price rose above $13.75 was a period in which Blackstone was 
involved, when the price modestly exceeded the Merger price before dropping below 
$13.75 once they dropped out of the process in April 2013.158 Blackstone described the 
reasons for its withdrawal: 
While we still believe that Dell is a leading global company with strong 
market positions, a number of significant adverse issues have surfaced 
since we submitted our letter proposal to you on March 22nd, including: 
(1) an unprecedented 14 percent market decline in PC volume in the first 
quarter of 2013, its steepest drop in history, and inconsistent with 
Management’s projections for modest industry growth; and (2) the rapidly 
eroding financial profile of Dell. Since our bid submission, we learned that 
                                                     
 
158  See Terlep, Sharon, David Benoit, and Shira Ovide, “Blackstone Abandons Its Pursuit of Dell,” Wall 
























[B] Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, May 31, 2013, pp. 27, 30, 37, 38, 40, 41; Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, August 14, 2013, pp. 20, 22, 24.
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the company revised its operating income projections for the current year 
to $3.0 billion from $3.7 billion.159 
Clearly if the value of Dell were above $13.75, a sophisticated buyer like Blackstone 
would have strong financial incentives to pursue such a transaction. 
123. If the stock market believed that the offers being made by Michael Dell were 
unreasonably low or otherwise undervalued the Company, then one would expect to see a 
market price meaningfully higher than the then-proposed Merger price as the market 
anticipated higher prices during the bidding process from other PE firms who would have 
been willing to top an undervalued bid by Silver Lake in order to realize the increased 
value. I myself have been involved in matters with this fact pattern, such as the dispute in 
the Delaware court involving a bid by Airgas and Air Products160 and I consider the 
amount and sustained duration of any difference between the market price and the bid 
price in determining whether an offer price has maximized the value of the Company for 
existing stockholders.  
124. In July 2013, the Wall Street Journal noted that Dell faced significant industry challenges 
and that the success of the transformation strategy was uncertain: 
[T]here is legitimate concern that Dell’s main businesses—selling PCs and 
servers—won’t improve. It remains hard to see the deal’s opponent-in-
chief Carl Icahn turning that around. 
Long-term investors’ apparent willingness to vote down the deal might 
just signal that they are willing to have Mr. Dell execute the same strategy 
publicly that he argues can only be done privately. But his strategy’s 
success looks highly uncertain, unlike the potential share-price collapse if 
the deal blows up.161 
125. In summary, I find the sale process to be very thorough and complete. From a finance 
perspective, it was designed to attract multiple qualified buyers and obtain maximum 
value for existing stockholders. There were active negotiations with three of the five 
                                                     
 
159  Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, April 19, 2013. 
160  Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., v. Airgas, Inc., et al., No. 5249-CC (Del. Ch. 2011). 
161  Winkler, Rolfe, “Wild Card Won’t Win Dell,” Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2013, 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324263404578614032500176620>, accessed April 
27, 2015 (emphasis added). 
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largest private equity firms in the world, in addition to the negotiations with Silver Lake 
and several other potential buyers. Overall, the deal process resulted in a $2.66 (24 
percent) improvement over the low end of Silver Lake’s initial expression of interest 
($11.22). The fact that no superior offers were received despite a thorough and rigorous 
process, with strong safeguards to assure Michael Dell’s involvement did not discourage 
other potential bidders, supports the final Merger price of $13.75 being a ceiling on the 
fair value for Dell. 
V. VALUATION USING DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL 
A. Overview of Discounted Cash Flow Approach 
126. The DCF valuation approach is a technique for determining the value of a stream of cash 
flows. A DCF valuation is sometimes referred to as an “intrinsic valuation” or a 
“fundamental valuation” because it relies on a build-up of value from detailed projections 
and estimates. DCF valuation is a widely used technique, and I believe it is a useful 
approach to, among other things, understand the key drivers of value and sensitivity of 
various relationships. 
127. I am also aware of the limitations of a DCF approach, as it requires forecasts of future 
cash flows.162 Even a highly skilled financial professional will not derive an accurate 
valuation if his or her work is based on inaccurate assumptions about the future 
performance of the business. That task is especially challenging in situations where the 
market environment in which the company operates is changing and where the company 
itself is modifying its focus or strategy. Both of these factors are present in this situation.  
128. For a company such as Dell, the stream of expected cash flows extends well into the 
future. A standard tool in DCF modeling, rather than attempting to explicitly project cash 
                                                     
 
162  McKinsey, p. 303 (“[DCF] is only as accurate as the forecasts it relies on”); Damodaran, Aswath, The 
Dark Side of Valuation: Valuing Young, Distressed, and Complex Businesses, 2nd ed., FT Press, 2012 
(“Damodaran, The Dark Side of Valuation”), p. 64 (“All the [DCF] approaches we described share a 
common theme. The riskiness of an asset or business is encapsulated in one number - a higher 
discount rate, or lower cash flows. This computation almost always requires us to make assumptions 
(often unrealistic) about the nature of risk.”). 
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flows many decades into the future, is to split the stream of cash flows into an initial 
period of several years of explicit projections through a specific date, followed by the 
“terminal period” thereafter. This type of DCF analysis does not mean the company will 
necessarily be sold as of the terminal date (though it might), but rather recognizes that 
once a firm reaches a steady state, the terminal value can be estimated using other 
standard valuation formulas (for example, the Gordon Growth model). 
129. Determining the equity value of a share of stock requires several adjustments to the DCF 
value, which is based on the ongoing operations of the company.163 First, one must add 
the value of any non-operating assets (for example, excess cash) to the DCF value 
because the DCF model only captures the value of the operating assets (that is, assets 
generating the projected cash flows). Second, one must subtract the value of debt or other 
liability claims on the firm’s assets from the enterprise value. Third, one must divide the 
resulting value by the number of undiluted shares to determine the equity value per share.  
130. Given this structure, there are six fundamental elements of a DCF-based valuation, each 
of which I discuss below in more detail: 
• Multi-year projections of company operating profits; 
• The amount of investment required to achieve the projected operating profits;  
• The terminal period analysis (including the terminal period growth rate); 
• The tax rates during both the projection period and the terminal period;  
• The discount rate; and 
• Any non-operating amounts that need to be added or subtracted to the value of the 
operations derived from the DCF. 
B. Multi-Year Projections of Cash Flows from Company Operations 
1. Time Horizon for Cash Flow Projections 
131. The first step in analyzing the cash flows projections from operations is to consider the 
current status of the business and the point at which it will be stable. The standard 
approach to calculating the terminal value in a DCF model assumes that the cash flows 
                                                     
 
163  McKinsey, p. 267; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 423. 
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from the business are a “perpetuity.” That is, the cash flows change at a constant rate g 
forever thereafter. As a result, the terminal value should be calculated at a point in time 
when revenue growth has stabilized, the company is reinvesting a constant fraction of its 
earnings, and its existing and new investments earn the same return on capital on a 
sustainable basis.164 As I discussed previously, this assumption is reasonable even if the 
cash flows during each period deviate somewhat around the selected long run average 
growth rate. 
132. As discussed above, at the time of the Merger, the PC industry was in a tremendous 
period of uncertainty. Indeed, Dell itself, having anticipated some of these changes, was 
undergoing a transition from a focus on desktop and notebook PCs (Core Dell) to 
enterprise computing, software, and other services (New Dell). As I describe more fully 
below, that transition was anticipated to result in New Dell eventually becoming the 
largest source of Dell’s profits and cash flows. However, my understanding of the needed 
transitions for Dell, and my analysis of the uncertainties in the market, lead me to 
conclude that Dell’s business model would still be in some transition beyond an initial 
four to five year projection period.165 Indeed, as I noted previously, during the two years 
leading up to the transaction, IDC had revised its multi-year forecasts from significant 
worldwide growth to an overall decline in worldwide PC sales, reflecting a lack of 
stability over the next several years. 
                                                     
 
164  McKinsey, p. 186; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, pp. 310-317. 
165  J.P. Morgan believed that the transition to New Dell would not be complete within the forecast 
horizon. J.P. Morgan also understood that the market perception was that the transition would be “a 
difficult road” for the Company. See Rajkovic Deposition, pp. 28, 100, 139-140, and 237. Brian 
Gladden stated that Dell was “somewhere in -- the middle” of the transition that extend at least into 
FY2018 (“five plus” years from July 2012”), and also noted concern among investors about the 
Company’s ability to execute the acquisitions and transformation. See Gladden Deposition, pp. 48, 
83, and 102-104. Lutao Ning stated that the transition would take longer than three years and may 
take longer than seven years, with reference to the experience of other companies such as Apple, 
IBM, Philips, and Kodak. See Ning Deposition, pp. 122-125. Alex Mandl, Chair of the Special 
Committee, described the transformation of being a process of at least four to five years from 2009. 
See Deposition of Alex Mandl, April 2, 2015 (“Mandl Deposition”), pp. 18-19. 
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133. Michael Dell testified that the transition to becoming an enterprise-focused solutions 
company had begun many years before and was ongoing.166 Because the various available 
cash flow projections do not extend to the point where Dell is expected to have stabilized, 
I use what is often referred to as a three-stage DCF model for my valuation. This method 
is a common approach in valuation for companies and industries in transition.167 In a 
three-stage DCF model, the first stage is based on multi-year forecasts available as of the 
valuation date, which may be quite detailed. The second stage (the transition period) 
continues at the end of the explicit forecast period and then extends for additional years 
until a projected period of stability is reached. In this valuation, following both standard 
practice168 and professional judgment, I conclude that an additional five-year stabilization 
period is appropriate. I then model the terminal period as a perpetuity. 
2. Selection of Initial Cash Flow Projections 
134. As I noted, a DCF analysis requires reliable and accurate projections in order to yield 
accurate results. In this case, I am aware of four multi-year financial projections that are 
candidates for consideration, each of which I discuss below. I reviewed each of these 
projections and carefully considered information related to each projection, such as 
embedded assumptions (including the outlook for the PC market) and how each set of 
projections was viewed by Dell management, investors, and other market participants.  
135. While I conclude, based on the analysis I discuss below, that the “BCG 25% Case” 
projections were the most accurate and reliable set of projections available during the 
time period in question, it is clear that each set of projections was challenged by: (i) the 
rapidly deteriorating and highly uncertain environment facing the market for PCs and, to 
a lesser extent, servers at the time of the transaction, and (ii) the significant uncertainty 
                                                     
 
166  Michael Dell Deposition, pp. 111-113. 
167  The three-stage model is recommended for businesses that are in transition. See Damodaran, 
Investment Valuation, pp. 316-318; Metrick, Andrew and A. Yasuda, Venture Capital and the 
Finance of Innovation, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, 2010 (“Metrick”), pp. 196-197; McKinsey, p. 
186. 
168  For example, Ibbotson uses a three-stage DCF model with a five-year first stage and a five-year 
second stage. Ibbotson, 2013 Cost of Capital Yearbook, 2013, p. 13. As I discuss below, the valuation 
results are not highly sensitive to reasonable changes in the length of the second stage. 
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surrounding the success and timing of the transformation of the Company from 
predominant reliance on its EUC business to a primary focus on “New Dell,” with the 
focus on services, software, and providing more complete IT solutions to small and mid-
size business customers. 
136. As I discuss, I believe that a DCF analysis based on the BCG 25% Case and a 
confirmatory analysis utilizing the “Bank Case” will be helpful to the Court in 
determining a fair value for the Company, and they are useful for determining a point 
estimate of the value, along with sensitivity analyses around the point estimate. I also 
believe that the inherent uncertainty of any forecasts of cash flows during a period of 
industry uncertainty and company transition demonstrates the need for consideration of 
the market price and deal process, and that these should be used to assess the 
reasonableness of any DCF analysis. The fact that actual buyers and sellers of the stock 
had determined that the value was under $10 per share in December 2012, and the fact 
that no actual buyer was willing to offer more than $13.75 per share during the robust 
deal process speaks to how strongly one should weigh optimistic and pessimistic views of 
the Company’s future that can be embodied in any DCF analysis and assumptions. 
137. In the next sections, I discuss each of the potential projections available for consideration, 
including the basis on which each was prepared and any strengths and weaknesses of 
each. To summarize the projections, I begin each section with a graphical presentation 
showing projected revenues, non-GAAP operating income, gross margin, and operating 
margin, along with Dell’s historical performance leading up to the projections. 
(a) July 2012 Plan 
138. The first set of projections I considered are the full-company projections developed by 
Dell, dating back to July 2012 (“July Plan”), 15 months prior to the valuation date. The 
figure below summarizes the revenue, gross margin, operating income, and operating 
margin assumptions included in these projections, along with the associated actual results 
for each quarter of FY2013 and FY2014.  
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Figure 25. Actual and Projected Financial Measures for the July Plan   
 
139. These projections extended only three years (FY2014 to 2016) and were developed in the 
normal course of business by Dell management.169 As I understand the projection process, 
Dell developed these projections based on input and analysis from people in each of 
Dell’s major business groups. The Proxy Statement describes these projections as 
follows:  
                                                     
 
169  The July Plan was prepared as part of Dell’s normal annual process of developing three-year 
projections, which typically began in February or March and would conclude around June. Dell did 
not prepare its normal three-year forecast in the summer of 2013 because of the pending transaction. 
See Gladden Deposition, pp. 15-20, 113, and 214. 
Sources:
[A] DELLE00804597 ("July 2012 Plan_summary_428886.xlsx").
[B] SEC filings. 
Note:
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Management prepared the July Plan in a process that included input from 
the Company’s individual business segment leaders as to their best 
estimates of the future financial performance of their respective business 
segments in light of its then-current understanding of the industry and 
competitive dynamics, key strategic and investment priorities and other 
business initiatives.170 
The fact that the projections were developed with broad input throughout the Company is 
generally a positive factor, because such projections would reflect the then-current 
expectations of the Company. 
140. I carefully evaluated the spreadsheet associated with these projections.171 I found these 
projections to be based on quite a detailed evaluation, with numerous tabs and sub-
analyses of businesses, including analyses and projections of many of the recent 
acquisitions. Information on market size forecasts came from IDC forecasts from the first 
quarter of calendar 2012, standard information sources in the computer industry.172 
141. Because my assignment is to develop a valuation 15 months later than the July 2012 
Company projections, it is necessary to consider whether the data underlying the 
projections (from the first quarter of calendar 2012) and the resulting projections were 
still reasonably reliable as of the valuation date or could be readily adjusted for my 
purposes. As I discussed in detail earlier, the period beginning in 2011 was one of 
significant industry turmoil and relatively poor performance by Dell. These basic 
observations make the potential use of the July 2012 projections problematic. As a 
general matter, the July Plan anticipates strong revenue and earnings growth for FY2013 
through FY2016, with revenues increasing from $63.0 billion in 2012 to $74.0 billion in 
2015 and operating income increasing from $5.2 billion in 2012 to $7.0 billion in 2015.173 
Unfortunately, as I noted earlier, Dell’s actual financial performance in the seven quarters 
leading up to the Merger was relatively poor, in contrast to the strong performance 
anticipated in the July projections. Dell missed the average operating income projections 
                                                     
 
170  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 96. See also Gladden Deposition, pp. 16-18. 
171  DELLE00804598 (“July 2012 Model Detail_FY16v8detail_429706.xlsx”). 
172  DELLE00804598 (“July 2012 Model Detail_FY16v8detail_429706.xlsx”), at ‘BlackBook Q1Cy12’ 
sheet.  
173  DELLE00804597 (“July 2012 Plan_summary_428886.xlsx”), at ‘Dell P&L Summary’ sheet.  
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in five of those seven quarters.174 In fact, the operating income projection for FY2014 in 
the July Plan was $5.6 billion,175 though Dell’s actual operating income for FY2014 was 
only $2.3 billion, 59 percent less than what the July Plan predicted.176 As discussed 
previously and in more detail below, not only was Dell undergoing its transformation 
during this period, but the industry was also in a state of uncertainty, with significant 
downward revisions to forecasts. 
142. I also reviewed the various documents and presentations considered by the Board of 
Directors and Special Committee during this period to help understand whether the July 
Plan was considered reliable by those knowledgeable directors.177 Those documents 
indicated that these projections were not considered to be reliable estimates of the 
expected path (which should be neither unduly optimistic nor unduly pessimistic) of 
revenues and earnings of the Company. As one example, the Proxy Statement noted that 
even in July 2012 there were concerns about the reliability of these projections: “When 
management presented the July Plan to the Board at the July 12, 2012 meeting, 
management also updated the Board on the Company’s weaker than expected 
performance in the second quarter, the effects of which were not reflected in the July 
Plan.”178 Indeed, only one month later, Dell reduced the FY2013 guidance it had provided 
to the market, dropping the expected non-GAAP earnings per share guidance from $2.13 
per share” to “at least” $1.70 per share, a 20 percent drop.179  
143. After considering the positive aspect of these projections (especially the fact they were 
prepared by the Company with broad input as part of a normal projection process) and 
                                                     
 
174  Figure 9. 
175  DELLE00804597 (“July 2012 Plan_summary_428886.xlsx”), at ‘Dell P&L Summary’ sheet. 
Operating income is after “corporate hedge.” 
176  SLP_DELLAP00073088-123, at 95. 
177  See, for example, May 31 Proxy Statement, pp. 23 and 96; neither JPMorgan nor Evercore used July 
projections in the fairness opinion (August 14 Proxy Statement, pp. 35, 46). 
178  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 96. 
179  “Dell Record Fiscal Year 2012 Highlighted by Enterprise Solutions and Services Strength,” Dell Inc., 
Feb 21, 2012, <http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/uscorp1/secure/2012-02-fyrelease>, accessed April 
14, 2015; “Dell Reports Second Quarter Financial Results,” Dell Inc., August 21, 2012, 
<http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/uscorp1/secure/201208release13q2>, accessed April 14, 2015. 
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the negative aspects of these projections (the lack of incorporation of additional industry 
information and the Company’s poor performance during the subsequent 15 months), I 
conclude that these projections are not reliable for purposes of a DCF valuation as of the 
Merger date. 
144. This judgment was also the conclusion of the Special Committee, which as early as 
September 2012 noted: “In light of the Company’s operating performance and industry 
challenges, the Special Committee questioned whether the July Plan represented an 
accurate outlook for future years given the current state of the Company’s business.”180 In 
addition, Dell had historically lagged behind its own projections, particularly regarding 
the performance of the EUC segment, focused on the sale of desktops and notebooks.181 
(b) September 21, 2012 Case  
145. Within a very short time after the July Plan was prepared, it became clear to the Special 
Committee that the July 2012 three-year projections were no longer reliable.182 In order to 
provide a more accurate set of projections, the Board asked Management, led by Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) Brian Gladden, to update the projections and extend them for 
two additional years.183 A small team from Dell engaged in this exercise, with the 
resulting projections (“September 21 Case”) summarized below. 
                                                     
 
180  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 23. 
181  BCG00013577-3634 (“Project Denali, Appendix – Forecast Assumptions,” February 5, 2013), at 
589-595, 634. 
182  Mandl Deposition, pp. 73-74; DELLE00302225-0226 (Special Committee Minutes, September 13, 
2012). 
183  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 23. 
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Figure 26. Actual and Projected Financial Measures for the September 21 Case 
 
146. The Proxy Statement described the context in which Mr. Gladden was asked to prepare 
the September 21 Case: 
In light of the Company’s operating performance and industry challenges, 
the Special Committee questioned whether the July Plan represented an 
accurate outlook for future years given the current state of the Company’s 
business and requested that Mr. Gladden update the July Plan for the other 
fiscal years covered by the July Plan to reflect management’s current 
views of the expected future financial performance of the Company. In 
addition, Mr. Gladden was asked to expand the forecasts to include two 
Sources:
[A] DELLE0093835 (“1.1.18 5yrFinancialModel - 9-21.xlsm”).
[B] SEC filings. 
Note:
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additional fiscal years in order to provide potential bidders with sufficient 
information to conduct customary valuation analyses.184 
147. Mr. Gladden himself noted that the environment had changed relatively rapidly during 
the period the July Plan was being prepared, thus necessitating an update even just a few 
months later:   
Well, as of 2011 into 2012, we were experiencing a dramatic deterioration 
in PC demand; so, significant slowdown in demand in PCs and some 
macro changes in how people used PCs, the -- the tablet impact, the 
smartphone impact. There was always this fear, and it was really 
manifesting itself at that time.185 
148. Unlike the development of the July Plan, the September 21 Case was not a large-scale 
effort involving numerous people throughout the organization. Instead, as a result of the 
transaction process that had commenced, it was a higher-level analysis involving a small 
set of senior company management.186 The streamlined nature of the process can also be 
seen in the September 21 Case spreadsheet itself. Unlike the spreadsheets for the July 
Plan, which had numerous tabs and references and detailed analyses, the September 21 
Case was contained on only a few tabs of a spreadsheet, with the core assumptions and 
analyses contained on approximately 100 lines of the spreadsheet.187 In essence, the 
September 21 Case took a simplified version of many of the key assumptions in the July 
Plan, lowered the near term revenue projections and to a lesser extent operating income 
projections, but left a similar growth slope in later years, albeit starting from a lower 
level.  
149. In my review of these projections, I found certain positive aspects to inform valuation. Of 
note, they were more recent (by two months) than the July 2012 projections. 
Unfortunately, they still predate the Merger by 13 months, during a period of tremendous 
industry uncertainty, rapidly declining industry forecasts, and poor actual company 
                                                     
 
184  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 23. 
185  Gladden Deposition, p. 49. 
186  May 31 Proxy Statement, pp. 24-25. 
187  The core assumptions and analysis are contained in the “Summary P&L” tab, lines 4-125. The 
September 2012 projections are contained in the “1.1.18 5yrFinancialModel - 9-21.xlsm” spreadsheet. 
See DELLE0093835. 
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financial performance (including declining gross and operating margins) that fell below  
equity analysts’ expectations. In addition, while the projections do build on certain 
assumptions and analyses from the Company-sponsored July Plan, there is very little 
detail behind the projections, making it difficult to carefully consider the reliability of 
many of the assumptions and estimates.  
150. I also carefully considered how participants in the transaction viewed the September 21 
Case. In the Proxy Statement the Special Committee described their own, 
contemporaneous judgments as to the reliability of these projections:  
[The Special Committee discussed] its doubt as to whether the projections 
set forth in the September 21 Case prepared by management . . . are 
realistically achievable in light of, among other factors, the Special 
Committee’s views regarding the assumptions as to the PC industry 
outlook underlying such projections, the Company’s future revenue 
forecasted in such projections, and the Company’s historical difficulty in 
achieving forecasted revenue and earnings per share.188 
151. Notwithstanding these concerns, it is also noteworthy that both the July Plan and 
September 21 Case were discussed and considered extensively in the Proxy Statement, 
and the financial data from each were fully available to stockholders and potential 
bidders. As an example, J.P. Morgan’s fairness opinion did not use the July Plan and 
made some limited use of the September 21 Case, which it described as for 
“informational purposes only.”189 The bank noted: “Based on discussions with the Special 
Committee and BCG, as well as the recent history of management’s failure to achieve its 
forecasts, we understand that the 9/21 management forecasts [sic] is aspirational in 
nature.”190  
                                                     
 
188  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 52. 
189  August 14 Proxy Statement, pp. 34-35 (“J.P. Morgan’s analysis took into account its discussions with 
the Special Committee, management and BCG, including the factors and circumstances discussed 
with the Special Committee surrounding the forecasts and analyses prepared by BCG and 
management. Taking into account the actual performance of the Company, the condition of the 
markets in which it is active and such discussions, the ranges with respect to the September 21 Case 
and the BCG 75% Case were calculated for informational purposes only, and J.P. Morgan gave no 
weight to the September 21 Case and the BCG 75% Case in its discounted cash flow analysis.”). 
190  DELLE00622636-2660 (“Presentation to the Denali Board of Directors,” J.P. Morgan, February 4, 
2013), at 657 (emphasis added). 
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152. In his deposition, Mr. Mandl, the chair of the Special Committee, was quite direct about 
his opinion of the reliability of both the July and September forecasts prepared by 
management: 
So at that point, by the time we get to September, there was a clear view, 
given all the input we got from experts, advisors, analysts, industry 
analysts, that the long-term trends or the majority of business of Dell, 
which is of course the EUC business, was in a declining trend, and then 
the board felt strongly that the forecast that was presented in September, 
even though it was adjusted from the July plan, was unrealistic in terms of 
the reality of the business.191 
. . . 
. . . the longer range assumptions [in the September Plan] in terms of PC 
growth and related outlooks he did not change, which was a problem with 
the board, because they did not agree with that.192 
153. Silver Lake Partners, as part of its own modeling and due diligence on the deal, also 
reviewed these projections and concluded they were not reliable, ultimately developing 
their own, independent set of projections (discussed below as the “Bank Case”). As it 
attempted to work with the September projections, it referenced scenarios like “Adjusted 
Management Case” and “Haircut Management Case” as it considered the materials Dell’s 
management had prepared.193 In addition, Mr. Durban of Silver Lake testified: 
Q. Do you recall Silver Lake having a view of the September 21st case at 
any point in time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What do you recall? 
A. I recall reflecting on that 9/21 case, as I look at the profitability and the 
revenue growth of the case, and it seemed optimistic. 
And, you know, we can cross compare it. You know, as I look at right 
now, I have a point of view right now. You know, for our most recent 
quarter, these numbers look extraordinarily high.194 
                                                     
 
191  Mandl Deposition, pp. 79 (emphasis added). 
192  Mandl Deposition, p. 83 (emphasis added). 
193  SLP_DELLAP00101859-942, at 888.  
194  Durban Deposition, pp. 120-121. 
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154. Indeed, a relatively simple thought experiment suggests that neither the July Plan nor the 
September 21 Case were considered reliable by actual market participants. If either one 
of these projections were close to reliable, and if one expected that cash flows past the 
projection period in either projection would do anything other than decline substantially, 
then stockholders or potential bidders would have been willing to pay much, much more 
for Dell than the price that actual stockholders and actual bidders were willing to pay as 
of the Merger date and the period leading up to that date. For example, if Dell were really 
going to generate, say, annual cash flows of $4 billion that would continue forever, then 
the value of the operating assets assuming an illustrative discount rate of ten percent 
would be worth nearly double the value assigned by the either market or the most 
sophisticated PE firms in the world.  
155. This large discrepancy in value suggests that the September 21 Case is unduly optimistic 
as of the Merger date. Such a conclusion is consistent with the deterioration in the market 
and the gap between actual and projected performance during the period between the 
time the September 21 Case was prepared and the Merger date. As a result, I do not 
believe these projections are reliable for the purpose of developing a DCF valuation. 
(c) Boston Consulting Group (BCG) Analyses 
156. The third set of projections I considered are those developed by BCG in late 2012 and 
early 2013. I understand that these projections were requested by the Special Committee 
in light of the changing industry outlook.195 As part of my analysis, I had access to the 
spreadsheets prepared by BCG and my staff and I also discussed the projections with the 
BCG personnel responsible for preparing the projections.196 As I discuss below, BCG 
prepared a base case analysis (“BCG Base Case”) and two alternatives (“BCG 25% 
Case” and “BCG 75% Case”) that reflected varying degrees of success in achieving 
potential cost savings. I conclude that the 25% Case is the most reliable of these and most 
                                                     
 
195  Deposition of Lutao Ning, April 29, 2015 (“Ning Deposition”), pp. 16-17; May 31 Proxy Statement, 
p. 100; Figure 8 and Figure 9. 
196  Teleconference with BCG, March 18, 2015; Teleconference with BCG, June 2, 2015; Teleconference 
with BCG, November 24, 2014. 
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reflects the industry and company conditions. Below I summarize the financial 
implications of the BCG 25% Case projections. 
Figure 27. Actual and Projected Financial Measures for the BCG Cases 
 
157. The BCG Base Case provided a baseline projection for Dell’s financial performance: 
“based on the current business mix and geographical distribution of the Company’s 
portfolio, taking into account, among other factors, industry prospects and the Company’s 
Sources:
[A] BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”).
[B] SEC filings. 
Note:
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competitive position within the industry.”197 This formulation was reflected in the Special 
Committee meetings in December 2012 and January 2013: 
December 2012: [T]he Special Committee noted that the September 21 
Case assumed a higher growth rate in the PC business than predicted by 
analyst estimates. After discussion, it was the consensus of the Special 
Committee that BCG should be requested to express its views regarding 
the Company’s future financial performance based on BCG’s industry 
outlook.198 
January 2013: . . . the purpose of the independent financial forecast 
prepared by BCG was to provide the Committee with an objective view as 
to the Company’s likely future performance if it were to remain a publicly 
held entity.199 
158. BCG’s projections for Core Dell were not based on the September 21 Case, but rather a 
new, extremely detailed analysis, with many tabs and sub-analyses covering the market 
size, market share, prices in various markets (and sub-markets with different “price 
points”) such as desktops, notebooks, tablets, and other businesses. Much of this new 
analysis was based on August 2012 IDC forecasts, with additional reductions made by 
BCG from these forecasts in later years.  
159. BCG’s development of New Dell projections starts with the management projections 
developed in the September 21 Case, with modifications to the revenue estimates such 
as:200 
• Server revenues – no adjustments; 
• Storage revenues – reduced from the September 21 Case based on updated 
industry forecasts, with a total reduction of 24 percent by FY2017; and 
• Networking revenues – reduced from September 21 Case based on updated 
industry forecasts, with a total reduction of 49 percent by FY2017. 
160. In addition to the modifications in revenue, BCG modifies the assumptions about gross 
margins and operating expenses from the September 21 Case, and modifies the method 
by which services revenues and expenses are calculated. The BCG plan also incorporates 
                                                     
 
197  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 100; Ning Deposition, pp. 78-79 and 89. 
198  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 33. 
199  DELLE00302237-2239 (Special Committee Minutes, January 2, 2013), at 237 (emphasis added). 
200  BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”), ‘New Denali model_BCG (2)’ sheet. 
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the investments already made by Dell, and models the investment needed to replace 
capital and to account for changes in working capital, but does not model additional 
investment needed for acquisitions. 
161. There are numerous positive aspects of the BCG projections, as they: 
• were prepared, used, and available to buyers and stockholders during the process 
and were discussed extensively in the Proxy; 
• incorporated more recent industry information than the July Plan or September 21 
Case, which is important considering the rapid changes occurring between 2011 
and 2013;201  
• incorporated some management input, primarily through their reliance on the 
New Dell analysis, but also through some limited interaction with management;202  
• were specifically prepared for the exact same purpose as this valuation, modeling 
the business as an ongoing public company; and 
• explicitly consider cost saving alternatives that the Company had already begun, 
as I discuss below. 
In its subsequent analysis for its fairness opinion, J.P. Morgan vetted the projections and, 
when asked about the projections in deposition, Mr. Rajkovic of J.P. Morgan described 
BCG’s work as “careful and fairly thorough.”203 
162. The BCG projections are, of course, not perfect for the purposes of a valuation as of the 
Merger date. They were initially prepared in late 2012 and early 2013, and thus are still 
several months out of date by the time of the Merger. In addition, they do not have as 
much direct management involvement as other projections.204 According to Dell: “The 
BCG Forecast represented the view of BCG based on its knowledge of the Company and 
the markets in which the Company operates, its expertise and experience as a 
                                                     
 
201  The BCG model was based on IDC data from August 2012, while the July Plan was based on IDC 
data as of the first quarter of calendar 2012 and the September 21 Case did not include any additional 
new sources. See BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”); DELLE00804597 (“July 2012 
Plan_summary_428886.xlsx”); DELLE0093835 (“1.1.18 5yrFinancialModel - 9-21.xlsm”). 
202  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 29; Mandl Deposition, p. 127-128 (“[BCG] had access to whatever they 
want, wanted, so there was no restrictions on who they could talk to.”); Ning Deposition, pp. 72-74. 
203  Rajkovic Deposition, pp. 154-155. 
204  Michael Dell Deposition, p. 222, Exhibit 15 (DELLE00141891). 
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management consultant and its discussion with the Company’s management.”205 Given 
the concerns over management’s recent accuracy in its forecasting, over-reliance on their 
input may have resulted in unduly optimistic forecasts.  
163. BCG’s projections generally view Dell as changing with the market and approximately 
maintaining market share in premium and value sub-segments.206 However, because 
Dell’s greatest market shares are in desktops and higher-end PCs, as BCG models the 
market shifting more toward notebook computers and lower-end desktop computers, 
Dell’s overall market share actually declines, dropping from just over 12 percent in 
FY2012 to just under nine percent in FY2017.207 Projections of Core Dell PC sales were 
based on IDC’s August 2012 PC market projections, which BCG then revised downward 
to reflect deterioration in the market as of the end of 2012. Projections for New Dell 
relied on Dell’s September 21 Case, which were then revised downward to result in five 
percent annual revenue growth for New Dell between FY2014 and FY2017. In its Base 
Case, BCG projected that operating margins would decline for Core Dell and improve for 
New Dell. 
164. In developing the BCG Base Case, BCG incorporated its expectations of how Dell would 
perform financially if it were to continue operating as a public company in the future. 
BCG did not view the Base Case as a floor on Dell’s challenging financial performance. 
For example, a BCG presentation on May 31, 2013 included a “stress case” that was 
below the Base Case and reflected additional downside risk to the EUC and ESS 
segments.208 In that scenario, Dell’s Stress Case financial performance was approximately 
$770 million per year worse in operating income than the Base Case by FY2017.209 
165. BCG also recognized that Dell may be able to respond to the financial pressures with new 
initiatives to improve financial performance. Dell operates in highly competitive 
businesses, where customers have many choices over the hardware and software they 
                                                     
 
205  May 31 Proxy Statement, p. 100. 
206  Exhibit 4; Ning Deposition, pp. 112-115. 
207  Exhibit 4. 
208  DELLE00426720-794 (Special Committee Offsite, May 31, 2013), at 749-751. 
209  DELLE00426720-794 (Special Committee Offsite, May 31, 2013), at 750. 
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purchase. Particularly in competitive businesses, it is critical for companies to continually 
seek to keep costs as low as possible in order to compete effectively with cost-conscious 
competitors. Indeed, Dell has had a long history of being cost-focused.210 Of course, in 
competitive industries, where all companies are constantly trying to reduce costs, most of 
the benefit of cost savings will go to consumers in the form of lower prices, rather than to 
the bottom line of each company saving the costs. Thus, it is true both that cost savings 
are critical and that cost savings are very difficult to translate into additional incremental 
profits. Mr. Dell himself discussed these challenges in his deposition. When asked about 
documents identifying up to $3.6 billion of potential cost savings initiatives, Mr. Dell 
noted that compared to identifying and even acting on cost savings initiatives: “achieving 
an actual cost savings relative to the bottom line is an entirely different matter.” Further, 
he noted: “it’s a generally understood principle within our management that these kind of 
cost-savings targets do not necessarily all result in direct bottom-line improvement, due 
to a variety of factors, many [of] which are industry or well beyond macro related.”211 
166. In the period leading up to the transaction, Dell’s management and Board had already 
raised concerns about Dell’s declining financial performance, and had identified a 
number of potential cost saving initiatives that may be able to reduce costs without 
affecting revenues. In this section, I discuss these cost savings initiatives and how these 
were incorporated by BCG. 
167. One scenario considered by BCG was referred to as the “BCG 25% Case.” In this 
scenario, BCG reviewed various potential cost savings initiatives and identified potential 
cost savings that could total up to $810 million per year in net cost savings after a phase-
in of several years.212 Because these cost savings were approximately 25 percent of the 
$3.3 billion aspirational cost savings identified by Dell as part of its broader cost 
                                                     
 
210  Dell Inc., 2010 Form 10-K, filed March 18, 2010, pp. 1, 13, 26, and 29; Dell Inc., 2009 Form 10-K, 
filed March 26, 2009, pp. 1 and 13. 
211  Michael Dell Deposition, pp. 309 and 311. 
212  BCG00013577-3634 (“Project Denali, Appendix – Forecast Assumptions,” February 5, 2013), at 579 
and 619. 
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reduction efforts, this scenario was named the “BCG 25% Case.”213 The specific 
initiatives within the BCG 25% Case had already been approved by Dell’s Board, and 
BCG’s judgment was based on their review of the opportunities and their firm’s 
experience working on similar projects with other companies.214 The bulk of the savings 
were derived from two sources: 
• Product costs: a transition in the location in which PCs were assembled (lower 
cost cities in China), how they were assembled (build to standard specification 
instead of building customized machines to each order), and how they were 
shipped (reducing expensive air shipping).215 This resulted in estimated reductions 
to COGS starting at $200 million per year in FY2014 and increasing to $320 
million per year in FY2017. 
• Personnel: a “delayering” of Dell’s management structure to reduce the number of 
managers for a given workforce, effectively reducing personnel costs. This 
resulted in estimated savings starting at $0 million per year in FY2014 and $490 
million per year from FY2015 to FY2017. 216 
168. As noted earlier, in competitive industries where competitors are also seeking to reduce 
costs, it is very difficult to retain the benefits of cost savings as higher profits rather than 
having to use the savings to reduce prices to maintain your competitive position. 
Assuming the savings would be retained by Dell as higher profits is thus an assumption 
likely to potentially overstate the value of Dell. Again, given the highly competitive 
environment, as market participants observed, it is highly unlikely that significant cost 
savings would flow to Dell’s bottom line.217 Instead, it is more likely that Dell’s 
customers would demand lower prices given lower costs, and thus assuming complete 
retention of profits is very optimistic. 
169. As an additional cautionary note, it is often the case that cost savings initiatives prove 
more difficult than anticipated and actual effect on profits may be less than the goal. For 
                                                     
 
213  BCG00013577-3634 (“Project Denali, Appendix – Forecast Assumptions,” February 5, 2013), at 618. 
214  May 31 Proxy Statement, pp. 28 and 100. 
215  BCG00013577-3634 (“Project Denali, Appendix – Forecast Assumptions,” February 5, 2013), at 618; 
Ning Deposition, pp. 190-191; Teleconference with BCG, June 2, 2015. 
216  BCG00013577-3634 (“Project Denali, Appendix – Forecast Assumptions,” February 5, 2013), at 618; 
Ning Deposition, pp. 158, 190, and 257; Teleconference with BCG, June 2, 2015. 
217  Durban Deposition, p. 135; Ning Deposition, p. 162; Rajkovic Deposition, pp. 190-191. 
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example, in the May 13, 2013 presentation, BCG itself noted that even the 25 percent 
cost savings were “not on track.”218 The assumption that $810 million in cost savings fell 
to the bottom line is reasonable, if not somewhat optimistic. 
170. In his deposition, Drago Rajkovic of J.P. Morgan discussed the initial list of cost savings 
ideas (which ranged from $2.8 to $3.3 billion depending upon the degree to which the 
ideas were identified)219 and how much of that was included by BCG he noted:  
And then the question becomes how many of those ideas can be put in 
practice and can be successfully executed. And then the other question 
becomes how much of those cost savings gets reinvested in the business. 
Because when you look at historically, and you talk to the management 
historically, they had a continuous cost-saving initiatives. But whatever 
they would save in cost, they would reinvest in other parts of the business 
to keep driving the business.  
So that -- those cost saving historically didn't necessarily drop to the 
bottom line.  
So the questions which one had – which BCG had to contend with was 
how much of this 2.8 is real, rather than a set of bullets on a piece of 
paper, how much of that could be executed. And then out of that quantum, 
how much can you really have drop to the bottom line, and how much do 
you reinvest in the business.  
So those were the key issues they had to grapple with.220 
171. The BCG 25% Case appears to have received serious consideration by many parties 
involved in the sale process and was presented to investors. For example, in the February 
4, 2013 Special Committee meeting: 
Messrs. Altman, Hiltz and Nataraj noted that a key factor in Evercore’s 
analysis of the fairness of the proposed transaction was its view that the 
BCG 25% productivity case represented the most likely scenario of all the 
projections that had been presented to the Committee . . 
Mr. Woolery noted that J.P. Morgan had independently reached the same 
conclusion regarding the BCG 25% productivity case.221 
                                                     
 
218  DELLE00426720-794 (Special Committee Offsite, May 31, 2013), at 738, 742, and 785.  
219  Rajkovic Deposition, pp. 180-191. 
220  Rajkovic Deposition, pp. 190-191. See also SLP_DELL_0000830-0889, at 837. 
221  DELLE00302264-68 (Special Committee Meeting Minutes, February 4, 2013), at 268 (emphasis 
added). 
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172. BCG also considered and presented an even more aggressive cost savings scenario. This 
scenario had even larger cost savings, equivalent to nearly 75 percent of the aspirational 
cost savings goal, leading to the name “BCG 75% Case.” In the BCG spreadsheet, the 
BCG 75% Case results in additional profits of $2.5 billion per year in 2017, which 
compared to the base case is an increase of 84 percent. Unlike the BCG 25% Case, the 
BCG 75% Case consisted of initiatives that were more general and lacked specific 
implementation plans. Examples of the additional initiatives that could potentially lead to 
an additional $1 billion or more in annual savings included additional overseas shipping 
changes, “labor arbitrage,” simplification of the number of unique products, cost takeout 
of logistics, and sales and G&A cost process reconfiguration.222 As before, a list of cost 
savings programs does not mean that they will be realized, and certainly does not mean 
that anything like that amount would be retained by the Company in the form of 
increased profits. Thus, the assumption that Dell could translate 75 percent of several 
billion dollars of cost savings initiatives to the bottom line, without having to pass on cost 
savings to consumers in the form of lower prices in order to stay competitive, appears 
extremely unrealistic.  
173. I also reviewed the relevant discussion about the BCG 75% Case in the Proxy Statement 
and other sources. For example, the Proxy Statement notes the Special Committee’s 
consideration:  
. . . its doubt as to whether the productivity cost reductions reflected in the 
BCG 75% Case . . . are realistically achievable in light of, among other 
matters, the fact that only some of those cost reductions have been 
specifically identified by the Company’s management and the fact that J.P. 
Morgan’s analysis indicated that the cost reductions assumed in the BCG 
75% Case would imply margins in fiscal year 2016 that are higher than 
those ever achieved by the Company or its principal competitors.223  
174. Both Evercore and J.P. Morgan discussed the BCG 75% Case. Evercore’s fairness 
opinion included it as the upper bound on its “BCG Productivity Case,”224 and J.P. 
                                                     
 
222  BCG00013577-3634 (“Project Denali, Appendix – Forecast Assumptions,” February 5, 2013), at 618. 
223  May 31 Proxy Statement, pp. 52-53 (emphasis added).  
224  August 14 Proxy Statement, p. 39. 
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Morgan’s fairness opinion included it for “informational purposes only.”225 As J.P. 
Morgan noted in July 2013: “Given [the] aggressive margin expansion assumptions, the 
BCG 75% Case was deemed by the Special Committee to be aspirational at best.”226  
175. Consistent with the view that the BCG 25% Case was optimistic, and that the BCG 75% 
Case was considered not achievable, actual operating income for FY2014 was $2.3 
billion, as compared to a forecast of $3.56 billion under the BCG 25% Case. While the 
difference in operating income between the scenarios was relatively modest in FY2014, 
in later years, the BCG 75% Case projected annual income that was hundreds of millions 
dollars higher than the BCG 25% Case. 
(d) Bank Case  
176. The fourth set of projections I considered are those prepared by Silver Lake with 
feedback and input from management. These projections do not consider Dell as a 
publicly traded company, but rather consider Dell as a privately held company. These 
projections are often referred to as the “Bank Case” as a reference to the fact that they 
were presented to potential lenders in the LBO and also to bond rating agencies.227 The 
figure below illustrates the financial expectations of the Bank Case model. 
                                                     
 
225  August 14 Proxy Statement, pp. 34-35 and 45. 
226  JPM_163104-128 (“Presentation to Fairness Committee - Project Denali,” J.P. Morgan, July 31, 
2013) at 112 (emphasis added). 
227  I understand that the final Bank Case model is SLP_DELLAP00073125 (“000179199.xlsx”). 
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Figure 28. Actual and Projected Financial Measures for the Bank Case Projections 
 
177. There are several positive factors associated with the Bank Case, including: 
• Prepared during 2013 and finalized close in time to the transaction; 
• Presented to lenders and debt rating agencies;228 
• Closer involvement from management than the BCG projections, though still not 
actually prepared by management;  
• Included additional investment amounts to achieve growth, including $400 
million per year for acquisitions in addition to investment to replace capital and 
fund working capital needs; and 
                                                     
 
228  DELLE00276467-99 (Project Denali Revised Bank Case, August 19, 2013), at 468. 
Sources:
[A] SLP_DELLAP00073088 - 123.
[B] SEC filings. 
Note:
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• Incorporated the strategy that focused on gaining share through reduced margins 
and prices.229 
178. These considerations are important, particularly the fact that these are much closer in 
time to the Merger date. However, there are several limitations of the Bank Case 
projections for the present purpose. First, they reflect the expectations of the winning co-
investor in the process. As such, they may have an upward, optimistic bias.230 As an 
example, the spreadsheets show anticipated improvement in PC gross margins from 20.3 
percent in FY2014 to 22.1 percent in FY2018. This view is at odds with much of the 
market commentary at the time expecting additional pressure on both PC unit sales and 
PC gross margins. For example, S&P Capital IQ noted in September 26, 2013: “We 
forecast an annual gross margin of 20% in both FY14 and FY15, as pricing pressure will 
likely persist. We are seeing significant margin erosion in DELL’s end user computing 
market.”231 In addition, the Company’s actual gross margins had declined, not improved, 
in recent years, dropping from 22.0 percent in Q1 FY2013 to 20.6 percent in Q1 FY2014, 
as shown in the earlier figures.232 
179. A second important limitation is that the Bank Case projections were prepared modeling 
Dell as a private company, not as a public company, as is needed for a fair value 
valuation. In very broad terms, those projections anticipated a basic business strategy as a 
private company that was similar to Dell’s strategy as a public company. However, in 
many other ways, such as the speed of the transition and specific decisions about how to 
run the business, the approach would necessarily be different as a private company than 
as a public company. Indeed, the core rationale of going private was to allow Dell to 
make some of the potentially painful transitions required to adjust to new market 
conditions without the scrutiny and constraints that come with being a public company. 
Michael Dell discussed some of the differences between being a public and private 
company in his deposition: 
                                                     
 
229  SLP_DELLAP00073125 (“000179199.xlsx”), at ‘EBITDA Bridge’ sheet.  
230  The tendency for a winning bidder to overpay is known as a “winner’s curse.” See, for example, Berk, 
Jonathan and Peter DeMarzo, Corporate Finance, 3rd ed., Pearson, 2014, pp. 822-823.  
231  Zino, A., “Dell Inc,” S&P Capital IQ, September 26, 2013, p. 1. 
232  Dell Inc., Form 10-Q for period ending May 3, 2013, filed June 12, 2013, p. 38. 
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Q. That’s actually what I’m having trouble with. Why can you make more 
[of the changes in the company] faster [as a private company]? Do you 
have more money as a private company? Do you have access to capital 
easier? 
A. As a private company, you have to pay the debt service, and certainly 
taking into consideration the health of the business with respect to the 
creditors who loan the money. But other than being able to pay the debt 
service, it’s possible to focus on growing the business even if the financial 
results are highly volatile, which is not generally well-received in the 
public markets. 
Q. So there’s nothing that stops you from doing any of these three things: 
From increasing the number of stores in India from 400 to 800, from 
adding sales force or for increasing R&D? You have the money to do that 
whether it be public or private. You’re just saying in the public forum, that 
it is not looked on favorably by shareholders? Is that what you’re coming 
down to? 
A. I think that not all shareholders are the same. There are some 
shareholders who might appreciate a strategy like the one that I’ve 
discussed, and there’s some shareholders that might not appreciate the 
strategy like the one I’ve discussed.233 
180. In the August 2013 presentation to the rating agencies, Silver Lake and Michael Dell 
broadly described the difference between a public company and a private company 
focus:234 
As a private company, Dell can accelerate its transformation and pursue 
strategies to maximize long-term cash flow that would not be possible in a 
public market setting:  
- Strategy to run the business to maximize cash flow 
- Invest for growth and execute against cost savings opportunities 
- Future acquisitions are expected to be complementary rather than 
transformational in nature 
181. Former CFO Brian Gladden noted that a number of Michael Dell’s proposed initiatives 
“would have been more challenging in an public company setting.”235 Similarly, Special 
Committee Chairman Alex Mandl noted that the initiatives that Michael Dell wanted to 
                                                     
 
233  Michael Dell Deposition, pp. 157-158. 
234  DELLE00381187-1249 (“Denali Acquirer Inc. Rating Agency Presentation,” Dell Inc., August 2013), 
at 193. 
235  Gladden Deposition, pp. 197-198 and 223. 
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pursue would require a change to the current transformation that was underway and 
would be “impractical” as a public company.236 
(e) Conclusion on Projections 
182. The figure below shows the revenue estimates for each of the projections considered. I 
also include the actual data for fiscal years 2011 through 2014 as a reference point. The 
July Plan and September 21 Case both reflect significant growth and had projections for 
FY2014, which were about 75 percent complete by the Merger date, that were well above 
the actual level. The BCG 25% Case and Bank Case revenue projections are more 
moderate. Revenue, while as relevant to valuation as cash flows, reflects the interaction 
of market conditions and Dell’s strategy for dealing with the market. For example, the 
fact that the BCG 25% Case shows declining revenue reflects the view that the overall 
market was declining, and particularly in those higher-end segments where Dell had the 
largest share. The Bank Case, which shows some revenue growth, though at lower levels 
than either the July Plan or September 21 Case, reflects a strategy to try to protect market 
share and also to invest through acquisitions for additional growth.  
                                                     
 
236  Mandl Deposition, pp. 48-50, and 55. 
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Figure 29. Comparison of Revenue Projections – FY2014 to FY2018 
 
183. A more focused look at the FY2014 forecasts also shows the challenges in using the 
forecasts prepared for Dell as a public company, even those from BCG. As of October 
29, approximately 75 percent of FY2014 was complete. In the figures below, I illustrate 
the various projections—and sensitivities to those projections—made for FY2014. These 
figures also include a reference to the Board Case, which reflected management’s 
updated projections for FY2014 as of March 2013.237 
184. Figure 30 illustrates that the revenue projections from the July Plan and the September 21 
Case were all billions of dollars above the amounts forecast by BCG and the one-year 
Board Case, both of which turned out to be very close to the actual FY2014 revenues. In 
fact, even the “Recession” sensitivities prepared by management for the July case turned 
out to be optimistic, despite the fact that no recession occurred in FY2014. 
                                                     
 
237  The Company did not independently prepare any multi-year projections after September 2012. The 
Board Case was an updated one-year plan that management prepared, and was approved by the Board 
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Sources:
[A] DELLE00804597 ("July 2012 Plan_summary_428886.xlsx").
[B] DELLE0093835 (“1.1.18 5yrFinancialModel - 9-21.xlsm”)
[C] BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”).
[D] SLP_DELLAP00073088-123, at 094 (Project Denali - Illustrative LBO & Operating Model, September 17, 2013). 
[E] DELLE00293261-347 (Dell Annual Report, January 31, 2014), at 340; Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013, p.26.
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Figure 30. Comparison of Revenue Projections – FY2014 
 
185. Indeed, even then-CFO Brian Gladden, who spearheaded the efforts on both the July Plan 
and September 21 Case, noted that by the spring of 2013 neither of these projections was 
management’s own best forecast of FY2014: 
Q. At the time of this meeting on March 6th and 7th, 2013, did the 
September 21st projections still represent management’s latest, best 
forecast of the future performance of the company? 
A. Not for 2014, it did not, for fiscal year ’14. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because we had significantly reduced the profitability of the business 
as part of this proposed plan for fiscal year ’14.238 
186. Even more telling are the FY2014 projections for operating income. In the figure below, I 
present similar information as the prior figure, but focus on the operating income 
estimates. As one can see, every single projection, including both the BCG Base Case 
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Sources:
[A] DELLE00804597 ("July 2012 Plan_summary_428886.xlsx"). 
[B] Gladden Deposition, Exhibit 9, p. 21 (DELLE00017549-581).
[C] DELLE0093835 (“1.1.18 5yrFinancialModel - 9-21.xlsm”).
[D] BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”).
[E] Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, May 31, 2013, p.100.
[F] SLP_DELLAP00073088-123, at 094 (Project Denali - Illustrative LBO & Operating Model, September 17, 2013).
[G] DELLE00293261-347 (Dell Annual Report, January 31, 2014), at 340.
Projection Actual $56.4
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and the BCG 25% Case, were hundreds of millions of dollars higher than the actual 
operating income. 
Figure 31. Comparison of Operating Income (Non-GAAP) Projections – FY2014 
 
187. After considering the context, content, and discussion regarding each of the projections, I 
conclude that the BCG 25% Case is the most accurate and reliable overall view of the 
Company’s potential future cash flows through FY2017 as a public company. I also 
conclude that the Bank Case, while not available to transaction participants at the time 
and reflecting the view of the Company as a private entity, is useful to consider as 
corroboration for my analysis because it was closest in time to the valuation date, had 
management involvement, and included information shown to potential lenders and 
rating agencies. In the next sections, I discuss the BCG 25% Case, necessary adjustments 
to these projections, and resulting fair value estimate. Subsequently, I discuss the results 
of a similar corroboration DCF analysis done using the Bank Case. 
188. As discussed, developing DCF projections during a period of industry instability and 
company transition is challenging. The Company clearly had declining financial 
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[B] Gladden Deposition, Exhibit 9, p. 21 (DELLE00017549-581). 
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[D] BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”).
[E] Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, May 31, 2013, p.100.
[F] SLP_DELLAP00073088-123, at 094 (Project Denali - Illustrative LBO & Operating Model, September 17, 2013.)
[G] DELLE00293261-347 (Dell Annual Report, January 31, 2014), at 340.
Projection Actual $2.3
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uneven since then. In fact, Dell’s more recent performance has been much weaker, 
illustrating the challenging and uncertain environment facing investors, even today. 
Michael Dell testified: “if I look at our business right now, it’s doing worse than it’s been 
doing in a long, long time. So the trough might be right now.”239 Mr. Durban of Silver 
Lake also was asked about the financial performance of the investment both pre-closing 
and post-closing. Mr. Durban noted that in the first quarter of FY2016, Dell suffered a 
decline in revenue equivalent to a negative six percent annual rate.240  
3. Necessary Adjustments to BCG 25% Projections 
189. As is standard in financial modeling, the BCG 25% Case projections are generated by a 
spreadsheet model.241 That model is “dynamic,” in that changes to key input assumptions 
result in different cash flow projections. I have identified over 1,100 different 
assumptions and estimates included in this model.242 For example, revenue projections for 
products such as desktop computers are based on assumptions about market size, market 
share, and average sales prices for various market segments. Revenues related to certain 
derivative products (for example, software and peripherals) are modeled based on 
“attachment rates” to the revenues of an affiliated product group (for example, 
computers). Most of the financial projections other than revenue are modeled as a 
function of revenue.243 For instance, the cost of goods sold is calculated by multiplying 
revenue by (1 − assumed gross margin percentage). Many of the assumptions in the BCG 
model vary by product and year. 
190. A standard premise in valuation analysis is that the financial projections should reflect 
expectations and understandings based on information available as of the valuation 
                                                     
 
239  Michael Dell Deposition, pp. 189-190. 
240  Durban Deposition, pp. 315-316. 
241  The final spreadsheet that was used to generate the BCG cases in the Proxy Statements is 
BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”). See Ning Deposition, pp. 11 and 205-206. 
242  BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”). Note that for the Bank Case there are over 920 
different assumptions. See SLP_DELLAP00073125  ( “000179199.xlsx”).  
243  Not all items are a percentage of revenue. For example, taxes are calculated as an assumed tax rate 
times taxable income. 
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date.244 While I have determined that the BCG 25% Case is the most appropriate set of 
projections to use for valuing Dell as a public company, certain adjustments to those 
projections are necessary to reflect the change in market conditions between the time they 
were prepared in late 2012/early 2013 and the Merger date of October 29, 2013.  
191. In order to ensure the adjusted revenue, operating profit, and other financial measures are 
consistent with BCG’s model, I developed my DCF model directly from the BCG 
spreadsheet file, preserving the functional relationship among variables and their 
assumed inputs. I then made certain adjustments, described in detail below, to update 
assumptions to reflect information as of the Merger date and correct an inconsistency 
within the BCG model that results from updating the assumptions. I discuss each of these 
adjustments below. 
(a) Adjustment 1 – Updated PC Industry Forecasts  
192. The BCG model for Core Dell segments was based initially on August 2012 market data 
from IDC, a standard industry source for market information. The market outlook for the 
desktop and notebook PC market, as captured by IDC’s forecasts, deteriorated between 
December 2012 (when the BCG projections were initially prepared) and the valuation 
date of October 29, 2013. In order to reflect the market outlook as of the valuation date, I 
updated the August 2012 IDC forecast that BCG used in its model with the August 2013 
IDC forecast, the most recent forecast as of the valuation date. While IDC also produced 
a forecast in November 2013 with even lower projections for PC sales, I did not use that 
forecast in my model because it was not available as of the valuation date. However, I 
note that market participants and potential bidders at the time may well have been aware 
of the continued downward trend and applied a further reduction to the August 2013 IDC 
projections. Had I adjusted the IDC estimates down even further, my estimate of fair 
value would have been lower. For example, if the November 2013 IDC forecast had been 
used, the estimate of fair value would have been approximately $0.20 per share lower. 
                                                     
 
244  Damodaran, Aswath, “What is Valuation?” 
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/background/valintro.htm>, accessed April 
15, 2015. 
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193. The figure below shows the IDC forecasts between calendar year 2012 and calendar year 
2014 for both desktops and notebooks. As the figure makes clear, this period included 
significant reductions in the IDC forecasts during this period. Interestingly, when asked 
about IDC’s forecasts, Brian Gladden, Dell’s then-CFO noted: “[T]hey had a tendency to, 
especially when there were shifts and cycles in the industry, react very slowly in updating 
their forecasts.”245 
Figure 32. IDC Long-Term Forecasts of Worldwide Desktop and Notebook Sales 
Prepared Between 2012 and 2014246 
 
                                                     
 
245  Gladden Deposition, p. 79. 
246  The references in the figures to two months before the Merger correspond to the August 2013 
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Sources: 
[A] IDC Worldwide Quarterly PC Tracker,  August 2012, February 2013, May 2013, August 2013, November 2013, February 2014, and May 2014.
[B] BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”), tab "Denali base case," row 127
Notes:
[1] For years in which shipment estimates were not available, values were interpolated.
[2] The labels "2-5 months prior to Merger" and "4-7 months after Merger" refer to two sets of projections made close together in time, and which have 
almost identical values.
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194. To implement my adjustment, I calculated the change in market size using the new IDC 
data, which implied an approximately ten percent decline by FY2017 for desktop PC 
sales and a 23 percent decline by FY2017 for notebook sales compared to the forecasts 
adjusted by BCG. To be conservative, I implemented this change proportionally over the 
13 quarters from the Merger date through the end of FY2017 in order to avoid a dramatic 
decline in the initial years. The change in revenue resulting from the adjustment is shown 
in the figure below. As I discuss later, an equivalent type of adjustment was necessary for 
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[1] For years in which shipment estimates were not available, values were interpolated.
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Figure 33. BCG 25% Case Revenue Projections Before and After Adjustments – 
FY2014 to FY2017 
 
(b)  Adjustment 2 – Updated Attachment Rates for New Dell 
195. While certain BCG assumptions for New Dell were based on the September 21 Case, one 
input that BCG did not take directly from the September 21 Case was the estimate of the 
ratio of Support and Deployment (S&D) revenue as a function of the underlying 
hardware revenue. Instead of using the attachment rate directly from the September 21 
Case, in the original BCG model the S&D revenue for New Dell was modeled by BCG as 
a fixed percentage of total S&D revenue, based on other information received by BCG,247 
which included BCG’s then-estimated revenue from both Core Dell and New Dell sales. 
That approach is no longer appropriate when changes are made to Core Dell, and thus I 
revert to the more standard approach developed by Dell’s management of using a specific 
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attachment rate for New Dell sales. I use the same percentage (17 cents of S&D revenue 
per dollar of New Dell hardware sales) found in the September 21 model for my 
calculations.248 
196. Adjusting the revenue and attachment rates has the effect of decreasing revenue and 
earnings by an amount that is relatively modest but grows over time. For the 
approximately one quarter of FY2014 remaining after the transaction, for example, the 
BCG 25% Case initially had EBITDA of $1,369 million. After my adjustments to the 
market forecasts and attachment rates, EBITDA for this period was $1,299 million. My 
adjustments resulted in projections that are more consistent with aactual EBITDA for this 
period of $762 million.249 I have not made additional adjustments to more accurately 
reflect the lower-than-expected results at the end of FY2014. 
(c) Adjustment 3 – Stock-based Compensation Expense 
197. Dell provided stock-based compensation (SBC) to its employees and non-employee 
directors.250 Stock-based compensation is a form of compensation that provides 
employees with stock or options. Although stock-based compensation is technically not a 
cash outflow, it does represent a cost to the company because the shares or options have 
value. Stock-based compensation clearly represents a transfer of value from equity 
holders and therefore must be accounted for in a valuation.251 
                                                     
 
248  DELLE0093835 (“1.1.18 5yrFinancialModel - 9-21.xlsm”), at cell G176 of ‘Details’ sheet. 
249  Actual EBITDA, adjusted for stock-based compensation, acquisitions, and merger-related costs, was 
$3,090 million for FY2014. See DELLE00293261-3347 (Dell Inc., 2014 Annual Report, January 31, 
2014), at 341. For the first three quarters of that fiscal year, actual adjusted EBITDA was $2,328 
million, a difference of $762 million. See DELLE00292619-2677 (Dell Inc., Quarterly Report, 
November 1, 2013), at 672. 
250  Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013, pp. 101. 
251  Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 448 (“[E]xpected option issues in the future will increase the 
number of shares outstanding in the terminal year, and therefore reduce the portion of the terminal 
value that belongs to existing equity investors. . . . A more realistic approach to incorporating future 
option grants into value is to estimate the value of options that will be granted in the future as a 
percentage of revenues or operating income.”). See also McKinsey, p. 282 (“the value of options that 
will be granted in the future needs to be captured in the free cash flow projections or in a separate 
DCF valuation.” emphasis in original); Damodaran, “Employee Stock Options (ESOPs) and 
Restricted Stock: Valuation Effects and Consequences,” 2005, p. 37. 
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198. The BCG 25% Case subtracts $362 million for SBC to calculate operating income.252 The 
$362 million figure is the pre-tax amount of SBC Dell paid in FY2012, the most recent 
available at the time BCG prepared its forecasts.253 BCG did not incorporate the tax shield 
associated with the SBC expense.254  
199. I adjust the treatment of SBC in the BCG 25% Case by updating to use the most recent 
information as the Merger date and measuring on an after-tax basis. Dell’s 10-K for FY 
2013 reports after-tax SBC of $243 million. Because the tax rate on SBC is different from 
Dell’s overall operations (discussed below), I present SBC separately from operating 
income as a reduction when calculating cash flows. More specifically, my operating 
income is what is commonly referred to as EBITAO (earnings before interest, taxes, 
amortization, and options), which does not subtract SBC. Because operating income itself 
does not subtract the cost of SBC, I subtract the after-tax cost of SBC from operating 
income when calculating cash flows. 
(d) Adjustment 4 – Additional Transition Period 
200. As discussed earlier, the industry was in a state of significant flux in the years leading up 
to the transaction, and Dell itself was in the midst of a transformation. Considering all 
these factors, Dell’s business would not be expected to achieve a steady state by the end 
of the initial BCG projection period in FY2017.255 That observation is why I conclude 
that a three-stage DCF in appropriate. The first stage is the forecast from BCG through 
FY2017, with the adjustments described above. For the second stage, I selected a five-
year transition period through FY2022, both because this period is a standard modeling 
convention256 and because it allows key metrics such as growth rates, profit margins, and 
reinvestment rates to stabilize. 
                                                     
 
252  BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”), at rows 40-45 of ‘6-HO’ sheet; BCG00013577-
3634 (“Project Denali, Appendix – Forecast Assumptions,” February 5, 2013), at 580. 
253  Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013, pp. 105. 
254  BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”), at row 57 of ‘6- HO’ sheet. 
255  See, for example, Gladden Deposition, p. 83; Ning Deposition, pp. 122-125.  
256  Ibbotson, 2013 Cost of Capital Yearbook, 2013, p. 13. 
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201. The second stage of the DCF model preserves the key structure and relationships from 
the first stage, with the key assumptions (for example, gross margins, ratios of working 
capital to sales, etc.) mirroring the relationships during the first stage.257 The second stage 
also considers the transition between the revenue and cost assumptions in the initial 
period and those modeled in the terminal period, which I discuss in more detail below. 
For example, if revenue is expected to decline in the projection period and grow in the 
terminal period, that change is modeled during the transition period. This type of 
transition modeling reflects the transitional changes in the business as it moves to achieve 
the steady state modeled in the terminal period. 
202. The specific method I use during the transition period is to change revenue growth rates 
each year by a constant amount so that the revenue growth assumption at the end of the 
projection period in FY2017 transitions smoothly to the revenue growth assumption 
assumed in the terminal period. I do so separately for the EUC and related segments 
referred to as “Core Dell” and the ESG and related segments referred to as “New Dell.” 
For example, the revenue growth for the Core Dell segments in the BCG 25% Case (after 
adjustments) was negative 10.4 percent in FY2017 and is assumed to be positive 2.0 
percent per year in the terminal period, as discussed below. Thus, each year in the 
transition period, one-fifth of the difference in these rates is added in order to achieve a 
smooth transition. While a transition path could be faster or slower than this, there is no 
specific empirical data to indicate what the speed of such a transition would be, and thus 
assuming an equal annual change during this period is reasonable.258 
C. Investment Required to Achieve the Projected Operating Profits 
203. Determining the cash flows in a DCF analysis generally begins with operating profits, 
which are equal to the revenues less the expenses of actually producing the goods and 
services (often referred to as cost of goods sold, or COGS) and the operating expenses. 
                                                     
 
257  For SBC, I model the expense as a constant percentage of FY 2017 revenues, which results in lower 
SBC during the transition period than maintaining a constant $243 million. 
258  Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 375; Damodaran, The Dark Side of Valuation, pp. 287-288 and 
292-293. 
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Two other items that reduce cash flows available to investors are taxes (discussed in the 
next section) and any needed investment expenditures. In this section, I discuss the 
investment expenditures in more detail. 
204. Investment is sometimes referred to as “plowback,” as these include funds that are being 
invested back into the company to fund ongoing operations and growth rather than being 
available for distribution to investors. As a result, investment expenditures reduce cash 
flows available to investors in the near term. There are three primary forms of investment 
expenditures that are incorporated in DCF models: 
• Investments to fund net working capital, such as changes in the levels and timing 
of cash flows for accounts receivable and accounts payable; 
• Capital expenditures (“capex”) to replace worn-out physical capital, such as plant 
and equipment; and 
• Investments to increase total invested capital of the firm, in the form of 
acquisitions or additional capex.  
205. Both the BCG 25% Case and the Bank Case include investment amounts for capex and 
for working capital needs. The investments needed for working capital are higher in the 
BCG 25% Case than the Bank Case, which is consistent with a private firm’s ability to be 
more aggressive in its management of working capital than a public company.259 To 
determine the amount of investment in each model for working capital and capex during 
the transition period, I preserve the existing relationships in the final year of the initial 
projection period 
206. From a DCF modeling perspective, investment plays a particularly important role with 
respect to assumed growth. A firm that is growing quickly will require more investment, 
all else being equal. A leading valuation treatise emphasizes this relationship via the 
investment rate (IR) as IR = g/ROIC, where ROIC is the return on new invested capital.260 
For a given ROIC, higher growth increases the needed investment rate, or the fraction of 
after-tax operating profits that are invested. This concept also applies in the reverse—the 
                                                     
 
259  “Value Creation Tutorial: What Private Equity Has to Teach Public Companies,” Strategy& (formerly 
Booz & Company), 2011.  
260  See McKinsey, pp. 39 and 212.  
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rate of growth is constrained by the investment rate and the return on capital. If a firm 
elects to limit its investment, then growth will necessarily be lower as a result. A key 
point is that: “growth and reinvestment are linked, and estimates of one have to be linked 
with estimates of the other.”261 In simple terms, growth does not come for free. Many 
leading valuation texts recognize this common sense notion that growth requires 
investment.262 The requirement to reinvest more to fund future growth decreases current 
cash flows. While in a spreadsheet it is possible to project revenue and profit growth 
without investment, this would not accurately reflect financial economic realities. 
207. Exactly how much investment expenditure is needed to achieve a given level of growth 
depends upon the financial return on investment. All else equal, an assumed high return 
on capital results in a lower investment amount needed to achieve a given level of 
growth. However, in a competitive market, a firm cannot sustain a high return on capital 
indefinitely.263 Valuation resources recommend assessing the reasonableness of financial 
projections by examining the projected return on invested capital.264 An excessive ROIC 
suggests the projections may be unrealistic because either growth in operating profits is 
too large for the given level of investment or the level of investment is too low for a 
given level of growth.265 Academic research and thinking is consistent with firms earning 
a return on capital approximately equal to their cost of capital over time.266 For example, 
McKinsey observes that firms without sustainable competitive advantages will be unable 
to earn more than their cost of capital in the long run.267 
208. The need for future investment to fund growth was also recognized by Dell management 
and equity analysts. For example, CFO Brian Gladden explained that $1.9 billion of the 
$14.2 billion revenue growth from FY2013 to FY2016 contemplated by the July Plan was 
                                                     
 
261  Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 302. 
262  McKinsey, p. 212; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 313; Metrick, p. 205; Berk, Jonathan and 
Peter DeMarzo, Corporate Finance, 3rd ed., Pearson, 2014, p. 695. 
263  McKinsey, p. 66. 
264  McKinsey, p. 206; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 291. 
265  Damodaran, Investment Valuation, pp. 299-300; McKinsey, p. 289. 
266  Another way of stating this point is that projects with positive net present value are difficult to 
identify. See, for example, Brealey et al., pp. 278-279 and 286-289.  
267  McKinsey, p. 214. 
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from additional acquisitions that had not yet been identified.268 Further, he stated that 
those acquisitions were required in order to facilitate the transition to an enterprise-
solution provider.269 As discussed below, analysts such as Goldman Sachs discussed 
Dell’s recent acquisitions and the need for future investments, which the Bank Case 
explicitly considers in the form of acquisitions. 
209. During the period from FY2009 to FY2013, Dell made significant investments for 
acquisitions as its strategy to shift to enterprise IT solutions was implemented. Exhibit 10 
shows that Dell’s annual capex and acquisition expenditures during that period totaled 
over $14 billion.270 As an illustration of the challenges of achieving growth, even with 
this $14 billion of acquisitions, Dell’s actual revenues and operating earnings declined 
from FY2011 to FY2013. While it may well have been that the revenues and operating 
income would have decreased further without the acquisitions, just the simple fact of 
declines shows the challenges of achieving significant growth. Dell’s actual experience 
underscores the fact that being realistic about the return on invested capital is important 
in developing an objective view of the Company’s future. Likewise, this is consistent 
with the view of analysts at the time. Goldman Sachs noted on December 2, 2012 that: 
We believe that the company continues to have work ahead of it in its 
enterprise transformation, which will necessitate still sizeable amounts of 
investments. In our view, this would imply that the company may need to 
keep its debt capacity dry for acquisitions and further investments. 
Although the company may be taking a brief period to integrate its flurry 
of acquisitions ($7.5 billion in acquisitions in the last two years) and focus 
on execution in an increasingly difficult macro environment, Dell still 
likely has billions more in acquisitions ahead of it if it plans on fully 
executing on its mission to become an enterprise solutions company. As 
such, we believe any consideration of an LBO or a far more aggressive 
repurchasing of company stock would assume that Dell has halted or 
delayed its enterprise transformation goals and chosen to take advantage 
of a sharp downdraft in its stock price. As such, we believe investors 
should consider these scenarios as a potential cushion for incremental 
                                                     
 
268  Gladden Deposition, pp. 91-92 and Exhibit 6 (DELL00017471-494); DELLE00804598 (“July 2012 
Model Detail_FY16v8detail_429706.xlsx”), at ‘Revenue’ sheet. 
269  Gladden Deposition, pp. 93-94 and 97. 
270  See also Gladden Deposition, Exhibit 7 (DELLE00346096-138, at 104). 
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downside to the stock price, rather than an opportunity for sharp 
appreciation from current levels.271 
210. The unadjusted BCG model includes two of the three types of investment discussed 
above. First, BCG includes expenditures on net working capital that are necessary to 
support the operations of the business as it grows. To model those expenditures BCG 
makes specific assumptions about certain balance sheet items and revenues.272 Second, 
the BCG model includes a certain amount of capex. The amount of capex in the BCG 
model is based on assumptions about the relationship between capex and revenues, which 
effectively approximate the replacement of existing capital.273 The BCG model does not 
contain investments related to acquisitions.274 I leave BCG’s assumptions unchanged 
during the initial period from FY2014 to FY2017. 
211. To model growth-focused investment during the transition period, I use the investment 
rate approach described above. To begin, I calculate the investment rate in the terminal 
period as the terminal period growth rate divided by the return on invested capital. The 
total amount of investment required in that year is the after-tax operating profit multiplied 
by the investment rate. Because I do not subtract stock-based compensation from 
operating income, after-tax operating profit in the model is EBITAO less taxes on 
EBITAO minus the after-tax cost of stock-based compensation. Thus, the required 
investment for the terminal period (T+1) is calculated as:275 
Required InvestmentT+1 = [EBITAOT+1 × (1 − τ) − after-tax SBCT+1] × g/ROIC.  
                                                     
 
271  “Dell Inc. Finding Deep Value Amid the Pessimism: Upgrade to Buy from Sell,” Goldman Sachs 
Equity Research, December 2, 2012, pp. 15-16. 
272  For instance, BCG assumes that New Dell has days sales outstanding (DSO) of 53.5 in FY2014, 
which means that accounts receivable associated with New Dell are equal to about 15 percent its 
annual sales (= 53.5/365). See BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”), at cell L402 of the 
‘5-ND’ sheet. 
273  For example, BCG assumes that capex for New Dell in FY2014 equals 1.1 percent of New Dell 
revenues. See BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”), at cell L414 of the ‘5-ND’ sheet. 
274  DELLE00543431-3514 (“Project Denali Compendium of Presented Materials,” February 5, 2013), at 
494. Many sheets in the DCF model have line items for additional acquisitions, but they are blank. 
See, for example, BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”), at row 151 of ‘5-ND’ sheet, row 
26 of ‘Core Denali-base’ sheet, and row 26 of ‘New Denali-base’ sheet. 
275  The after-tax operating profits [EBITAOt × (1 − τ) − after-tax SBC] is what McKinsey refers to as Net 
Operating Profits Less Adjusted Taxes (NOPLAT). McKinsey, pp. 38 and 154. 
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212. To calculate the required investment during the terminal period, I assume that the return 
on capital is equal to the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) (discussed below).276 
While some companies may earn more than their cost of capital in the long term and 
some may earn less, this assumption is consistent with the long run view offered by 
McKinsey: “[i]n a perfectly competitive economy, ROICs higher than the cost of capital 
get competed away.”277 As described in my review of Dell’s outlook, the Company is a 
large, mature technology company and operates in a highly competitive industry in which 
competitive advantages are short-lived.278 In such an environment, it would be very 
aggressive to assume that the ROIC for Dell would exceed its cost of capital in the long 
run. Indeed, as a simple consideration, the fact that Dell had several billion dollars of 
excess cash on the balance sheet at a time when cash deposits were earning de minimis 
amounts of interest suggests that Dell did not have an abundance of investment 
opportunities that would generate returns in excess of the cost of investment.279  
213. The required annual investment calculated above is about $465 million for FY2023. The 
amount of investment already incorporated through capex, net working capital, and 
acquisitions based on BCG’s assumptions is about $7 million, resulting in a difference 
(Additional Required Investment) of about $458 million.280 For FY2017, the Additional 
Required Investment is zero. Rather than assume Additional Required Investment in 
FY2018 jumps immediately to the terminal period level of $458 million, I transition 
smoothly from the FY2017 level to the steady-state in FY2023 by incrementing the 
Additional Required Investment by $92 million per year.281 This transition has the effect 
of allowing a return on new investment that exceeds the cost of capital during the 
                                                     
 
276  McKinsey, pp. 66, 206 and 214; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p.291.  
277  McKinsey, p. 66.  
278  The economics of an industry are important determinants of the sustainability of the return on 
invested capital. Such factors include the length of the product life cycle, innovative intensity, and the 
potential for product renewal. See McKinsey, p. 67. 
279  See, for example, Berk, Jonathan and Peter DeMarzo, Corporate Finance, 3rd ed., Pearson, 2014, p. 
584.  
280  Exhibit 18. 
281  $92 million is one-fifth of the change in Additional Required Investment from then end of the explicit 
projection period to the terminal period. 
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transition phase, declining to the point where the return on new investment equals the 
WACC by the terminal period. This transition is consistent with the concept that earning 
more than the cost of capital in the long run is difficult in a competitive market. Using 
this conservative approach results in hundreds of millions of dollars less in investment 
during the transition period than would otherwise be required. 
D. Terminal Period Analysis 
214. As indicated above, the standard practice in valuing a stream of cash flows that continues 
into the future is to determine a terminal value that captures the value of cash flows 
beyond the explicit forecast period. When those cash flows grow at a constant rate g, the 
valuation formula, often referred to as the Gordon Growth formula, is VT = CFT+1/(r − g). 
A larger growth rate increases value, all else remaining equal. However, the “all else 
remaining equal” caveat is extremely important. Growth requires investment, so higher 
growth assumptions reduce cash flows (CFT+1). On balance, the effect the growth rate has 
on terminal value depends on the firm’s return on capital. Growth adds value for firms 
that invest and earn a return on capital in excess of the cost of capital, is neutral in value 
for firms that earn a return on investment exactly equal to their cost of capital, and 
decreases value when the return on capital is lower than the cost of capital.  
215. For the terminal period, applying the required investment as discussed above results in a 
terminal value of:282 
VT = [EBITAOT+1 × (1 − τ) − after-tax SBCT+1] × (1 − g/ROIC)/(WACC − g).  
216. An important feature of the terminal value calculated in this manner is that it is not 
particularly sensitive to the assumed growth rate. In fact, in the case when the return on 
invested capital is equal to the WACC, terminal value does not depend on the growth rate 
at all.283 In that situation, investment for growth that returns the cost of capital will leave 
the overall firm value unchanged. This result makes sense, as growing by adding zero 
NPV projects does not add value. 
                                                     
 
282  McKinsey, pp. 39 and 212; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, pp. 313-314; Metrick, p. 205. 
283  That is, VT = [EBITAOT+1 × (1 − τ) − after-tax SBCT+1] / WACC. 
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217. To model growth during the terminal period, I use a terminal growth rate of two percent. 
This rate is based on an assumption that growth for Dell will be at the long-term expected 
rate of inflation, which I find to be approximately two percent based on standard 
sources.284 Given the industry projections, Dell’s actual performance, and Dell’s stage of 
development, an assumption of no real growth, but nominal growth to keep pace with 
inflation, is reasonable. Note that if average unit prices remain flat or fall, this could 
mean growth in the number of PC units sold, though increasingly it is expected that 
growth will be from the New Dell sources. Consistent with the idea that firms cannot 
extend a competitive advantage to earn excess returns in perpetuity, I assume the return 
on newly invested capital in the terminal period is equal to the cost of capital.285 
218. As with many aspects of my model, I am employing a relatively conservative assumption 
concerning Dell’s long-term growth rate by assuming a positive growth rate of two 
percent. The terminal growth rate assumptions embedded in a number of third-party 
valuations performed around the time of the Merger are much lower than the rate I have 
employed in this valuation. For example, J.P. Morgan conducted an “illustrative DCF” 
analysis using terminal growth rates between negative 1.0 percent and positive 2.5 
percent in an October 9, 2012 presentation, but later reduced its growth outlook and 
switched to using an exit multiple approach instead because they lacked a benchmark to 
select a particular negative growth rate.286 In addition, BCG had a more modest view of 
Dell’s long-term growth, consistent with the absence of investment through acquisitions 
in its model. BCG’s terminal value calculation for its base case implied negative 4.9 
percent perpetuity growth rate and it is only 0.0 percent for the high case.287  
                                                     
 
284  As of June 2013, OECD projected a CAGR of 2.02 percent for the GDP deflator in the U.S. between 
2015 and 2060. (2.9919/1.2141)^(1/45) − 1 = 0.0202. See “Economic Outlook No. 93- June 2013- 
Long-term Baseline Projections,” OECD, 
<http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EO93_LTB>, accessed April 23, 2015; In October 
2013, IMF projected inflation of 2.1 percent in the U.S. for 2018. See “World Economic Outlook: 
Transitions and Tensions,” International Monetary Fund, October 2013, p. 160, Table A5. 
285  McKinsey, pp. 66, 206 and 214; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p.291.  
286  Rajkovic Deposition, pp. 90-91, 228-230, and Exhibit 6 (DELLE00433675-727), at 689. 
287  Ning Deposition, pp. 239-240. 
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219. Finally, as I discussed earlier, mature technology companies, including Dell, are often 
valued by the market at multiples that imply expected declines in their long-term cash 
flows. In fact, the actual LBO model developed by Silver Lake and discussed above as 
the Bank Case had such multiples. While specific projections are only done through 
FY2018, the LBO model examines potential exit values at various points in time, were 
the owners to either sell the Company to others or potentially have it re-emerge as a 
public company. Those exit values are based on assumed EBITDA multiples rather than a 
terminal value calculated from a specified growth rate. The multiples used by Silver Lake 
is 4.5 times EBITDA.288 As I noted above, such multiples imply cash flows that are 
declining by approximately negative five percent per year in the long run.  
E. Tax Rates During Both the Projection Period and the Terminal Period  
220. In addition to investment needs, the owners of a firm also have their cash flows reduced 
by income taxes paid to the U.S. Treasury, applicable state governments, and foreign 
governments, as appropriate. A DCF model must include provisions for taxes in the 
projection period, the transitional period (if included), and the terminal period. I rely on 
Professor Stephen Shay, an expert on taxation and tax policy, and his analysis of Dell’s 
tax situation for my primary assumptions on tax rates.289 As I describe below, I assume 
Dell is able to defer significant amounts of taxes in both the projection and transition 
periods, and thus model a constant tax rate meaningfully below the statutory marginal tax 
rate during the projection period and the transition period. I then use the statutory 
marginal tax rate, including both Federal and state taxes, during the terminal period. 
1. Tax Rate During Projection and Transition Periods 
221. During the projection period, I use a tax rate of 17.8 percent, which is the rate identified 
by Professor Shay, the tax expert for Dell in this proceeding, from information in Dell’s 
                                                     
 
288  SLP_DELLAP00073088-123, at 92. 
289  Expert Report of Stephen Shay, June 5, 2015 (Corrected August 26, 2015) (“Shay Report”, 
“Corrected Shay Report”); Teleconference with Stephen Shay, May 29, 2015. 
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financial statements.290 This rate is slightly lower than the 20 percent rate originally used 
by BCG in its modeling291, and the derivation of this rate is consistent with the 
methodology described in the McKinsey valuation text.292 I continue this constant 17.8 
percent tax rate in the transition period. 
2. Tax Rate During the Terminal Period 
222. For the terminal period, I apply the marginal tax rate. The reason for doing so is that 
strategies that reduce current taxes are generally deferral strategies, not avoidance 
strategies, and are generally not sustainable in perpetuity.293 Professor Damodaran states: 
“[T]ax credits are seldom perpetual and firms eventually do have to pay their deferred 
taxes.”294 Thus, even if a firm is currently successful at paying a rate lower than the 
marginal rate, eventually marginal rates will have to be paid, and deferred taxes will also 
eventually have to be paid. In my analysis, I consider the marginal tax rates prevailing at 
the time of the transaction. While various tax proposals have been suggested that may 
modify tax rates or tax rules in the future, none of these were known with certainty 
(indeed, none are known even today), and thus it is inappropriate to speculate about 
changes to future tax policy in the DCF analysis. 
223. For the terminal period, Professor Shay has concluded that the appropriate tax rate is the 
federal marginal tax rate of 35 percent plus approximately 0.8 percent additional for state 
income taxes.295 The use of a marginal tax rate in the terminal period is consistent with a 
number of valuation texts.296 
                                                     
 
290  Corrected Shay Report, pp. 4 and 18. 
291   BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”). 
292  McKinsey, pp. 534-535; Shay Report, p. 18. 
293  Shay Report, p. 20.  
294  Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 252.  
295  Shay Report, pp. 19-20. 
296  Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 213; McKinsey, p. 261; DePamphilis, Donald, Mergers, 
Acquisitions, and Other Restructuring Activities, Academic Press, 2014, p. 276; S., Pratap Giri, 
Investment Banking: Concepts, Analysis and Cases, McGraw Hill Education, 2013, p. 218. 
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3. Treatment of Foreign Tax Deferral 
224. One consideration in a DCF analysis is how to model the change between the lower 
projection tax rate that includes the benefit of deferring taxes and the higher terminal rate. 
For example, Dell’s effective tax rate reported in its financial statements is lower than the 
federal statutory rate because of the tax deferral associated with foreign profits.297 One 
approach proposed by Professor Damodaran is to model the tax rate as transitioning 
during this period. For example, he states: 
In valuing a firm, should you use the marginal or the effective tax rates. If 
the same tax rate has to be applied to earnings every period, the safer 
choice is the marginal tax rate, because none of the four reasons noted can 
be sustained in perpetuity. As new capital expenditures taper off, the 
difference between reported and tax income will narrow; tax credits are 
seldom perpetual and firms eventually do have to pay their deferred taxes. 
There is no reason, however, why the tax rates used to compute the after-
tax cash flows cannot change over time. Thus, in valuing a firm with an 
effective tax rate of 24 percent in the current period and a marginal tax 
rate of 35 per, you can estimate the first year’s cash flows using the 
effective tax rate of 24 percent and then increase the tax rate to 35 percent 
over time. It is good practice to assume that the tax rate used in perpetuity 
to compute the terminal value be the marginal tax rate.298 
225. Professor Shay has concluded that a more conservative approach would be to model the 
lower tax rate including tax deferral as continuing throughout the projection period and 
the transition period.299 I agree that this is a conservative approach, and I adopt it in my 
analysis. As I discuss later, these deferrals will eventually come due, and I have modeled 
the resulting financial impact in my later additions and subtractions from the DCF value. 
F. Discount Rate  
226.  To determine the value of Dell’s future cash flows as of the Merger date, I next need to 
discount the cash flows back to values standardized at October 29, 2013. The standard 
methodology for doing such discounting is to consider the cash flow in each period and 
                                                     
 
297  Shay Report, pp. 11-12. 
298  Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 252 (emphasis added). 
299  Shay Report, p. 22. 
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discount that cash flow back to the valuation date at the company’s WACC. The WACC 
represents the investors’ opportunity cost of providing capital.300 The WACC considers 
the cost of equity and debt financing and weights them based on their contribution to the 
firm’s capital structure. The cost of debt is measured on an after-tax basis, as interest 
expense often can be deducted on a firm’s tax return and the cash flow projections do not 
reflect such tax deductions.301 There are several important elements in determining the 
WACC, each of which I discuss in detail. 
1. Capital Structure 
227. A WACC discount rate essentially calculates a cost of debt and a cost of equity, then 
takes the weighted value of these based on the assumed share of each into the future. The 
share of debt and equity going forward into the future is referred to as the “capital 
structure” of the firm. The capital structure used in the WACC should represent the 
projected mix of financing had Dell continued as an ongoing public company.302 To 
calculate Dell’s capital structure, I review its historical capital structure from recent 
years, including the sum of short-term debt, long-term debt, and the market value of its 
equity.303  
228. Figure 34 shows Dell’s capital structure beginning in August 2006. As one can see, 
Dell’s capital structure was initially nearly 100 percent equity and began to change in 
about 2009 as Dell added debt to its capital structure. By early 2011, Dell had 
approximately 80 percent equity in its capital structure. The equity share continued to 
decline in the following years, reaching a low of approximately 64 percent by late 2012. 
                                                     
 
300  McKinsey, p. 231. 
301  Damodaran, The Dark Side of Valuation, pp. 35-36 (“The other dimension on which debt and equity 
can vary is in their treatment for tax purposes, with cash flows to equity investors (dividends and 
stock buybacks) coming from after-tax cash flows, whereas interest payments are tax-deductible. In 
effect, the tax law provides a benefit to debt and lowers the cost of borrowing to businesses. . . . The 
after-tax cost of debt for most firms will be significantly lower than the cost of equity for two reasons. 
First, debt in a firm generally is less risky than its equity, leading to lower expected returns. Second, a 
tax saving is associated with debt that does not exist with equity.”). See also McKinsey, pp. 197 and 
261; Brealey et al., pp. 480 and 485. 
302  McKinsey, pp. 261-262. 
303  Exhibit 11. See Damodaran, Investment Valuation, pp. 216-219; McKinsey, pp. 261-264. 
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Through 2013, prior to the transaction, Dell was reducing its debt level and its Dell’s 
capital structure reached 83 percent equity and 17 percent debt as of the Merger date.  
Figure 34. Dell’s Capital Structure – 2006 to 2013  
 
229. I selected a steady-state capital structure of 74.75 percent equity, 25.25 percent debt for 
the following reasons. First, this is the average capital structure over the same two-year 
period that was used in my calculations of the beta estimate. Second, this period covers 
the period of both higher and lower relative levels of debt for the Company in recent 
periods. Third, while the level of debt was declining for several quarters prior to the 
Merger date, I have conservatively assumed that the long-term capital structure of Dell 
would have included more debt (with a lower cost than equity) than was present on 
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2. Cost of Equity 
230. A standard approach to calculating the cost of equity capital is the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). William Sharpe, among others, developed the CAPM in the 1960s and 
he won the 1990 Nobel prize in Economics for his work on the model.304 This approach is 
a standard one for measuring the cost of equity,305 and I have used this approach many 
times in my work on valuation. 
231. The CAPM posits that the expected return on a stock investment is equal to the risk-free 
rate plus an additional amount that is related to the risk of the stock. In particular, the risk 
adjustment is equal to the product of the stock’s risk, as captured by beta, and the equity 
risk premium. The CAPM is specified by the following formula:  
Cost of Equity = rf + β × (ERP),  
where rf is the risk-free rate, β is the firm’s beta, and ERP is the equity risk premium.306  
(a) Risk-Free Rate 
232. I select a 20-year constant maturity U.S. Treasury as the risk-free instrument. Its yield on 
October 29, 2013 was 3.31 percent.307 The 20-year Treasury yield is widely used by 
finance and valuation professionals and recommended in many valuation books.308 In 
addition, using the 20-year Treasury yield is consistent with the equity risk premium data 
                                                     
 
304  Sharpe, William, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk,” 
Journal of Finance 19, 1964, pp. 425-442; “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel 1990,” Nobelprize.org Nobel Media, 
<http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laurates/1990 >, accessed April 16, 
2015. See also Lintner, John, “The Valuation of Risky Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments 
in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets,” Review of Economics and Statistics 47, 1965. 
305  McKinsey, pp. 235-236; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 208. 
306  McKinsey, p. 235; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 208. 
307 “Market yield on U.S. Treasury Securities at 20-year Constant Maturity, Quoted on Investment Basis, 
Inflation-indexed,” The U.S. Federal Reserve, 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Output.aspx?rel=H15&series=b57005a7873f7a7187e5
88a64e5c3a3a&lastObs=&from=&to=&filetype=csv&label=include&layout=seriescolumn>, 
accessed April 16, 2015. 
308  See, for example, Pratt and Grabowski, Cost of Capital, 5th Ed., Wiley, 2014 (“Pratt and Grabowski”), 
p. 94; Ibbotson, 2013 SBBI Valuation Essentials Report, p. 221 
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from Ibbotson Associates, which I discuss below.309 Finally, a 20-year maturity is 
consistent with accepted practice of selecting a cost of capital that reflects the duration of 
the assets.310 
(b) Beta  
233. Beta measures the risk of a stock as reflected by the sensitivity of the stock’s returns to 
returns on the overall market. For example, a beta of 2.0 means that when the market 
goes up by one percent the stock’s value rises by two percent all else equal, and vice 
versa. A firm that is highly sensitive to the market (for example, beta = 2.0) is riskier than 
one that is less sensitive to the market (for example, beta = 0.5). As a result, the CAPM 
assigns a higher cost of equity to the stock with the higher beta. 
234. Beta is measured by the slope coefficient from a regression of the stock’s returns on the 
market index returns. The regression model requires several choices and may involve 
important adjustments, which can affect the final estimate. These choices include: (1) the 
length of time used to evaluate relative movements, (2) the frequency of the data during 
that period, (3) the selected market index, (4) whether to adjust for the company’s cash 
holdings, and (5) the company’s capital structure.  
235. First, I select a two-year period (January 12, 2011 to January 11, 2013) as the sample 
period for the regression used to estimate beta. This period precedes news on January 14, 
2013 that Dell was involved in a potential LBO, which affected the stock price. While a 
five-year measurement window is often used in valuation analysis, I believe a two-year 
window is more appropriate in this case for several reasons. One reason is that the two-
year beta better reflects the changing nature of Dell’s business. For example, McKinsey 
                                                     
 
309  Ibbotson SBBI, 2012 Valuation Yearbook, 2012, p. 55. 
310  In Revised Exhibit 12, I calculate the duration of Dell’s projected cash flows under the Adjusted BCG 
25% Case and the Adjusted Bank Case. Assuming a range of discount rates of 8.5 percent to 10.5 
percent (one percentage point above and below a baseline discount rate of 9.5 percent), the cash flow 
duration ranges from about 12 to 17 years. Exhibit 13 shows that the 20-year Treasury has a duration 
of about 15 years, which will bracket the range of durations for Dell’s cash flows when combined 
with the selected maturity of the debt index, discussed below. The duration of a 10-year Treasury is 
less than 10 years, so it is below the duration of Dell’s cash flows. See McKinsey, p. 232 (“The 
duration of the securities used to estimate the cost of capital must match the duration of the cash 
flows.”). See also Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 155.  
JX 896A - p. 123 of 205
  Highly Confidential 
Page 121/156 
 
cites the increase in IBM’s beta as it transitioned from hardware to services in the late 
1990s as an example of when it is appropriate to use a shorter beta estimation period.311 I 
analyzed the series of betas estimated over a two-year period going back in time, and I 
find Dell’s beta has increased by about a third compared to its average in 2009 and 
2010.312 
236. In addition, a two-year measurement period also avoids overlap with the global financial 
crisis and subsequent recession. I also note that using a five-year window with monthly 
returns (as is common) actually results in a higher raw beta (1.33 vs. 1.11), increasing the 
WACC.313 Using the beta estimated over a two-year window is thus more conservative. 
237. The second choice related to beta is the frequency of the return interval. Within the two-
year estimation window, I use weekly returns, which typically provides 104 observations. 
Monthly returns, while common with longer measurement periods, are less desirable 
here, as the two-year window would result in only 24 observations. In the other extreme, 
betas estimated from daily data over a shorter period, such as one year, are sensitive to 
the particular sample period and may be less reliable as forecasts of future betas.314 Daily 
data are also more sensitive to “noise” in the trading process.315 The combination of 
weekly data and a two-year sample is a common choice that balances the sample size, 
noise in higher frequency data, and representativeness of the sample window.316  
238. The third choice in the calculation of beta is the measure of overall stock market behavior 
against which to compare the individual stock’s movement. In this case, I select the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 (dividend-adjusted) index (S&P 500). This choice is widely used 
                                                     
 
311  McKinsey, pp. 247-248. See also Pratt and Grabowski, p. 94; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 
188. 
312  Exhibit 14. 
313  See Bloomberg LP. 
314  A recent study finds that “high-frequency [daily] betas are not better or more precisely estimated 
proxies of systematic risk; instead they are distinct economic quantities relative to low-frequency 
betas, which properly capture systematic risk.” See Gilbert, Thomas, Christopher Hrdlicka, Jonathan 
Kalodimos, and Stephan Segal, “Daily Data is Bad for Beta: Opacity and Frequency-Dependent 
Betas,” Review of Asset Pricing Studies 4, 2014, p. 82. 
315  See, for example, Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 188; McKinsey, p. 248. 
316  I note that two years of weekly data is the default for beta from Bloomberg. See McKinsey, pp. 247-
248; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 188. 
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in practice and supported by valuation texts.317 Another reason for using the S&P 500 is 
to ensure consistency with the equity risk premium I employ, discussed below. 
239. Figure 35 shows the estimated beta from regressions using the two-year sample of 
weekly returns and the S&P 500 index as the proxy for the market portfolio. The figure 
reports weekly betas measured on each day of the week. For weekly returns measured on 
Fridays, which is the default used by Bloomberg, the raw beta from the regression is 
1.15. As shown in the figure below, there is some variation across the other ending days 
between Monday and Friday. I adopt the slightly more conservative weekly average of 
1.11. The figure below also shows that Ibbotson, a standard source for finance estimates, 
identified a raw beta of 1.14 as of December 31, 2012 (the last full year available before 
the transaction) for the industry classification that includes Dell.318 
                                                     
 
317  McKinsey, p. 249; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 188. 
318  I use the “Composite” beta, which is a capitalization-weighted beta for the 66 firms in SIC 357. I did 
not use the SIC 3571 Composite because it includes only 13 firms other than Dell. Ibbotson, 2013 
Cost of Capital Yearbook, 2013, ‘SIC 357’ and ‘SIC 3571.’ I view the Ibbotson industry beta as 
illustrative because I do not believe that there is a representative sample of peer firms. See Section 
VII. 
JX 896A - p. 125 of 205
  Highly Confidential 
Page 123/156 
 
Figure 35. Two-Year Raw Beta Estimated from January 12, 2011 to January 11, 
2013 by Day of the Week 
  
240. The fourth choice is whether to adjust the beta estimate from the regression for the 
company’s cash holdings.319 The DCF model is designed to value the operating assets of 
the business, so the discount rate should reflect the risk of those operating assets and 
exclude any effects of non-operating assets. The observed beta from the regression 
measures the stock’s variation to the market based on both: (1) the actual capital structure 
                                                     
 
319  I considered, but rejected, other adjustments for non-synchronous trading and estimation error. An 
adjustment for non-synchronous trading is warranted for thinly traded stocks and is not appropriate 
for Dell. A shrinkage adjustment recognizes that beta is estimated with error and will tend to revert to 
the market or industry level. See Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 187; McKinsey, p, 253; Pratt 
and Grabowski, pp. 211-212. Here I note that Ibbotson data indicate that the unlevered industry beta 
for SIC 357 (see Footnote 318) is 1.04. Ibbotson, 2013 Cost of Capital Yearbook, 2013, at ‘SIC 357.’ 
Dell’s unlevered beta of 0.81 is below the industry beta of 1.04, indicating that adjusting Dell’s beta 
to the industry level would increase the beta estimate (and therefore the WACC). Additionally, the 
fact that the industry has a higher levered raw beta (1.14) than the market (1.0) indicates that 
adjusting to the market rather than the industry would be inappropriate.  













[1] Betas are estimated from regressions using the two-year 
sample of weekly returns and the S&P 500 total return index as the 
proxy for the market portfolio.
[2] Time period is from January 12, 2011 - January 11, 2013.
[3] If there is no data available for a specified day of the week, the 
prior trading day is used.
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of the stock at the time of the measurement and (2) the presence of non-operating assets 
of the company. Both of these require consideration for adjustment in order to ensure the 
beta employed reflects only the operating assets and the anticipated going-forward capital 
structure. 
241. As I discuss later in the report, Dell held approximately $6 billion in cash in excess of 
that needed for ongoing operations as of October 29, 2013. To put this in perspective, I 
analyzed the total cash holding of over 1,500 publicly traded companies in the United 
States that have at least $500 million market capitalization. I found that Dell’s cash 
holding relative to its enterprise value were in the top half of one percent of all companies 
in that sample. I summarize this analysis in Figure 36. 
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Figure 36. Ranking of Companies by Cash Relative to Enterprise Value – October 
to December 2012   
 
242. For companies with large amounts of excess cash, such as Dell, an adjustment is 
necessary in order to determine to the appropriate beta for operating assets.320 To 
illustrate the need to adjust for excess cash, consider a stock that was valued at $20 per 
share and had a beta of exactly 1.0, meaning it would tend to go up and down in price 
exactly in proportion to the market. Now imagine that an additional $10 of value in the 
                                                     
 
320  Pratt and Grabowski, pp. 262-263; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 200; “Valuing a Company 
with Cash,” Damodaran, Aswath, 
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/lectures/cash.htm>, accessed April 30, 
2015; Berk, Jonathan and Peter DeMarzo, Corporate Finance, 3rd ed., Pearson, 2014, pp. 416-417, 
and 492-493. I understand that this adjustment has also been recognized by the Delaware Courts. See 
Merion Capital, L.P., et al. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., No. 6247-VCP (Del. Ct. Ch. July 8, 2013), pp. 42-43.   





Less than 1% 12.0% 188
1% - 10% 57.5% 901
10% - 20% 19.2% 301
20% - 30% 5.8% 91
30% - 50% 3.9% 61
50% - 70% 0.9% 14
More than 70% 0.6% 10
Total 100.0% 1,566
Less than 83.5% (Dell's Cash/EV ratio) 1,560
% of Sample Firms with lower Cash/EV than Dell 99.6%
Source:
[A] S&P Capital IQ.
Notes:
[2] Sample is firms with market capitalization of at least $500 million that are 
listed on NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq and are not financial or insurance 
companies (SIC 6xxx).
[1] EV = Market Capitalization + Total Debt - Cash and Equivalents. Capital 
IQ adjusts reported financials to facilitate comparison across companies.
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form of excess cash were suddenly added to the company. The stock would now be 
valued at $30 per share ($20 of operating assets plus $10 excess cash). If the stock market 
goes up ten percent, the operating assets will go up ten percent given the beta of 1.0, 
resulting in a $2 increase in the stock price. However, measuring the beta for the entire 
company will appear as an increase of $2/$30 = 6.67 percent. Thus, the observed beta for 
a company with significant excess cash is lower than the actual beta of the operating 
assets. Using the observed beta would understate the risk of the company’s operations. 
243. The cash adjustment for beta requires consideration of the capital structure of the firm. 
Calculating the cash-adjusted beta for a levered firm (such as Dell) involves three steps: 
(1) unlevering the beta to adjust for the particular capital structure during the 
measurement period, (2) applying a cash adjustment factor to unlevered beta, and (3) re-
levering to the appropriate capital structure (74.75 percent equity, discussed above). The 
adjustment factor that is applied to the unlevered beta is equal to (Debt + Equity) / (Debt 
+ Equity − Excess Cash).321 As shown in Exhibit 15, the resulting cash adjustment factor 
is 1.18, meaning Dell had $0.18 in excess cash per dollar of operating assets. Note that 
for purposes of this calculation, I conservatively assume that the excess cash would be 
considered after applying a marginal tax rate, thus effectively reducing the cash 
adjustment. In calculating the amount of excess cash to add to the enterprise value of the 
Company, I do not make this reduction, effectively increasing the value per share. 
244. The final choice used to determine beta is the projected capital structure. As discussed 
above, I select a forward-looking capital structure of 74.75 percent equity and 25.25 
percent debt. The raw beta from the regressions of 1.11 is unlevered using the historical 
capital structure during the regression estimation period of 74.75 percent equity/25.25 
percent debt. To un-lever the beta, I assume that the firm has a constant capital structure 
                                                     
 
321  Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 200; “Betas by Sector (US),” Damodaran, Aswath, January 
2015, <http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/Betas.html>, accessed June 
4, 2015; “Variables used in Data Set,” Damodaran, Aswath, 
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/variable.htm>, accessed June 4, 
2015; Pratt and Grabowski, pp. 263-264. Equity is measured in market value terms. 
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during this period using this average capital structure.322 After re-levering to the selected 
equity capital structure, the resulting cash-adjusted and re-levered beta estimate that I use 
in the WACC is 1.31.323 
245. The selected beta of 1.31 is based on a number of conservative assumptions. First, I used 
the average raw beta across days of the week, rather than the higher Friday estimate used 
by Bloomberg. Second, I used a two-year sample of weekly returns, rather than a five-
year sample of monthly data. Third, I reduced the measure of excess cash used to adjust 
beta by assuming the marginal tax rate would apply to the distribution of that cash. As I 
noted, the beta before the cash adjustment (1.11) is actually slightly lower than the beta 
of 1.14 published by Ibbotson for the industry group containing Dell. 
(c) Equity Risk Premium 
246. The equity risk premium represents the additional compensation that equity investors 
demand for bearing the risk of the overall stock market. As I noted above, investors in a 
specific stock require more or less compensation depending on the risk (beta) of that 
company’s stock.  
247. A standard approach to estimating the equity risk premium is to use a sample of historical 
data. Ibbotson, an industry-standard source, provides such data back to 1926.324 A long 
time period is desirable in order to increase the precision of the estimate.325 The historical 
equity risk premium from 1926 to 2012 is 6.70 percent.326 
                                                     
 
322  With the average raw (levered) regression beta of 1.11 and 74.75 percent equity during the regression 
estimation period, the unlevered beta is 0.83. The unlevering formula, which accounts for the debt to 
equity ratio (D/E) and assuming riskless debt, is βU = βL / (1 + D/E) = 1.11 / (1 + 0.2525/0.7475) = 
0.83. 
323  Exhibit 16. 
324  This risk premium is the average return on the S&P 500 index minus the average return on the 20-
year Treasury Bond. Ibbotson, 2013 SBBI Valuation Essentials Report, p. 221. For consistency, I use 
the S&P 500 index to estimate beta and the 20-year Treasury Bond as the risk-free rate.  
325  McKinsey, p. 239. 
326  As of December 31, 2013, which is more proximate in time to the October 29, 2013, valuation date, 
the historical equity risk premium is 6.96 percent. While market participants would not have known 
the final results for calendar 2013 as of the valuation date, nearly ten months of the data were 
available so it is reasonable to believe that market participants had revised upward their estimate of 
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248. In my professional work, the historical equity risk premium is the standard I generally 
reply upon, and I believe that it would be a proper approach to use in this case. First, as 
noted above, the historical equity risk premium is based on actual historical data. Second, 
Ibbotson itself uses the historical equity risk premium that I typically use when it 
calculates the cost of capital for its publications.327 Third, by using the risk premium 
measured as of the end of 2012 rather than incorporating the information available as of 
the Merger date (which would have pointed to an increasing equity risk premium), I have 
made a conservative assumption.  
249. While I believe the historical equity risk premium of 6.70 percent in the Ibbotson 2013 
Cost of Capital Yearbook would provide an appropriate equity risk premium measure in 
this case, I am also aware that there are many finance professionals, including Ibbotson, 
who consider alternatives to the historical equity risk premium, often using lower values. 
There is currently no consensus among finance professionals as to what an appropriate 
measure would be, and it will be many decades before actual returns will provide 
sufficient statistical information to know whether lower returns actually occurred. One 
lower measure that is frequently used is the “supply side” equity risk premium. The 
supply side equity risk premium adjusts the historical data for deviations in the price-
earnings ratio from its long-run average.328 In this case, the supply-side equivalent to the 
historical rate of 6.70 percent would be 6.11 percent.329 There are various reasons why 
one might use some measure of equity risk premium lower than the historical rate, all of 
which reflect an expectation that future returns on equity investments relative to the risk-
free rate are not likely to be as strong as past returns. The supply-side approach, as 
defined by Ibbotson, adjusts the historical return on the stock market to exclude the 
portion of returns due to changes in valuation levels (the price-earnings ratio).330  
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
the equity risk premium. The interpolated value as of October 29, 2013 is 6.92 percent. I use the more 
conservative 6.70 percent premium as of December 31, 2012 in my analysis. 
327  Ibbotson, 2013 Cost of Capital Yearbook, pp. 11-12. 
328  Pratt and Grabowski, p. 151. 
329  Ibbotson, 2013 SBBI Valuation Essentials Report, p. 221. 
330  Ibbotson, 2013 SBBI Valuation Essentials Report, p. 221. 
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250. While I use the historical rate in my professional work, as a conservative measure I have 
used an equity risk premium that is halfway between the historical rate of 6.70 percent 
and the supply side rate of 6.11 percent for my analysis, resulting in a rate of 6.41 
percent. I also provide sensitivity analysis around this rate later in this report.  
(d) Other Adjustments to Cost of Equity 
251. I considered other adjustments to the cost of equity but concluded based on my 
professional judgment that they were not appropriate in this case. First, I did not include a 
size premium to my cost of equity calculation based on Dell’s market capitalization. 
Sometimes, this is done by some valuation professionals for smaller companies. Dell 
does not qualify as a small company, and there is not any basis for an addition or 
subtraction for its size as it straddles the line in the Ibbotson tables between a positive and 
negative adjustment size premium.331 Additionally, the overall academic evidence on a 
size adjustment is mixed, and an analysis of Dell’s returns indicated a statistically 
insignificant “size beta.”332  
252. Second, I did not include a company-specific adjustment. Such an adjustment is 
inconsistent with the CAPM.333 Moreover, a company-specific adjustment is often a 
proxy for reflecting uncertainty in the firm’s financial projections. Rather than having 
optimistically high projections and using a higher-than-standard discount rate, the better 
approach is to use projections that are neither unduly optimistic nor pessimistic, and use 
an appropriate discount rate without adding a company-specific premium.  
                                                     
 
331  As of December 31, 2012, Dell’s market capitalization of $17.6 billion was on the lower end of the 
first decile in Ibbotson. The size premium at the time was −0.37 percent for the first decile and 0.76 
percent for the second decile. Ibbotson, 2013 SBBI Valuation Essentials Report, p. 221. 
332  In particular, a regression of Dell’s returns on the three factors in the Fama-French model yielded an 
insignificant coefficient on the factor related to the difference in returns on small and large stocks. See 
Fama, Eugene and Kenneth French, “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds,” 
Journal of Financial Economics 33, 1993. 
333  A key concept from the CAPM is that investors receive compensation only for systematic risk (as 
captured by beta), which cannot be diversified away. There is no additional compensation for the 
portion of a stock’s volatility that is diversifiable (that is, company-specific). See, for example, 
McKinsey, pp. 235-23.  
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(e) Estimate of the Cost of Equity  
253. I estimate Dell’s beta from regressions using a two-year sample of weekly returns ending 
December 31, 2012. After averaging the results from five regressions using weekly 
returns ending each day of the week, the raw beta estimate is 1.11. I then apply the cash 
adjustment factor of 1.18 discussed above and re-lever the beta to a target capital 
structure of 74.75 percent equity. Incorporating the resulting beta estimate of 1.31 with a 
risk free rate of 3.31 percent and the average of the supply side and the historical equity 
risk premium of 6.41 percent in the CAPM, results in a cost of equity of 11.69 percent as 
of the Merger date.334 
3. After-Tax Cost of Debt 
254. In many cases, the after-tax cost of debt can be estimated by observing the yield on the 
company’s actual debt. In the case of Dell, a slightly different approach is necessary 
because Dell’s debt yield as of the Merger date was affected by anticipation of the 
Merger. Figure 37 shows that investors bid up the yield on Dell’s debt following the 
announcement of a possible transaction, reflecting concern that the likely additional debt 
would increase the risk of default. As a result, I determined Dell’s cost of debt as of the 
Merger date based on the prevailing yield on an index comprised of companies that had 
similar credit ratings to Dell pre-announcement. This standard valuation approach avoids 
increased debt yields resulting from the proposed transaction, which results in a more 
conservative (lower) WACC.335  
                                                     
 
334  Exhibit 16.   
335  McKinsey, pp. 258-259; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 211.  
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Figure 37. Dell’s Weighted Average Bond Yield and Credit Rating Changes – 2012 
to 2013 
 
255. In order to assess the risk of Dell’s debt on a going-concern basis, I examined its credit 
rating prior to news of the Merger. As of January 14, 2013, Moody’s rated Dell’s debt as 
“A2” (equivalent to an “A” rating for S&P and Fitch), S&P rated Dell as an “A-,” and 
Fitch rated Dell as an “A.” I selected a 15-year maturity, which has a duration of 
approximately 11 years, in light of the 12 to 17 year duration of Dell’s cash flows.336 As 
of October 29, 2013, 15-year A-rated bonds yielded 4.45 percent.337  
                                                     
 
336  Exhibit 12 shows that Dell’s projected cash flows have a duration ranging from 11.7 to 17.0 years, 
depending on the discount rate. Exhibit 13 shows that a 15-year A-rated bond has a duration of 11.1 
years, which brackets the lower end of the range of the cash flow durations. The 10-year A-rated bond 
has a duration of about 8.5 years, which is lower than the lower end of the range for the duration of 
Dell’s cash flows. 









1/1/2012 4/1/2012 7/1/2012 10/1/2012 1/1/2013 4/1/2013 7/1/2013 10/1/2013
Yield
2/5/2013
*Moody's - A2 to Baa1 with negative watch
*S&P - negative watch 
*Fitch - A to BB+ with negative watch
5/20/2013
*A- to BBB with negative watch 
9/10/2013
*Fitch - BB+ to B+ 
9/11/2013
*S&P - BBB to BB-
10/30/2013
*Moody's - Baa1 to B1
Sources: 
[A] Bloomberg LP.
[B] Dell Inc., 2012 Form 10-K, filed March 13, 2012 and Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013, for the list of outstanding debt.
As of 1/14/2013
*Moody's - A2 (since 8/18/2004)
*S&P - A- (since 8/17/2007) 
*Fitch - A (since 8/24/2007)
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256. The 35.8 percent marginal tax rate is then applied to this debt yield to account for the tax 
shield provided by interest on debt.338 Applying the 35.8 percent tax rate to the 4.45 
percent debt yield produces an after-tax cost of debt of 2.86 percent as of the Merger 
date.339 
4. Calculated WACC 
257. I combine the cost of equity of 11.69 percent, the after-tax cost of debt of 2.86 percent, 
and the capital structure of 74.75 percent equity and 25.25 percent debt to arrive at my 
WACC calculation of 9.46 percent.340 This rate is consistent with, or even below, 
measures of the WACC from other third parties, including: 
• Ibbotson’s 2013 industry WACC of 9.65 percent to 10.36 percent;341 
• J.P. Morgan’s fairness opinion WACC of 8.5 percent to 11.0 percent;342 
• Evercore’s fairness opinion WACC of 10.0 percent to 12.0 percent;343 
• Houlihan Lokey’s WACC of 9.0 percent to 11.0 percent;344 
• A Morgan Stanley DCF model with a calculated WACC point estimate of 9.6 
percent and a sensitivity range of 10.0 percent to 12.0 percent;345 
• A Citi Investment Research DCF model with a calculated WACC point estimate 
of 10.1 percent;346 and 
• Various equity analysts’ reports ranging from 7.8 percent to 11.0 percent.347 
                                                     
 
338  See, for example, Pratt and Grabowski, p. 528 (“corporate finance theoreticians generally recommend 
using the marginal rate (the tax rate paid on the last incremental dollar of taxable income) if that 
differs from the business’s effective tax rate.”); McKinsey, pp. 232-233 and 261 ( “you should 
calculate the marginal tax rate in a consistent manner . . . For investment-grade companies, use the 
statutory rate”); Damodaran, The Dark Side of Valuation, p. 36 (“Since interest expenses save you 
taxes at the margin, the tax rate that is relevant for this calculation is not the effective rate but the 
marginal tax rate.”). 
339  McKinsey, pp. 257 and 261. 
340  Exhibit 16. 
341  Ibbotson, 2013 Cost of Capital Yearbook, 2013 and ‘SIC 357.’ 
342  August 14 Proxy Statement, p. 34. 
343  August 14 Proxy Statement, pp. 45. 
344  DELLE00730635-0700 (“Dell Inc. Discussion Materials,” Houlihan Lokey, October 22, 2013), at 
659. 
345  SLP_DELLAP00015608, at ‘DCF’ sheet. The spreadsheet appears to be dated January 9, 2013. 
346  SLP_DELLAP00038457, at ‘DCF’ sheet. 
347  Exhibit 17. 
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258. I understand that Dell internally used a WACC of around 8.5 percent.348 As I discussed 
above, a WACC calculation involves numerous individual elements, which can vary over 
time and are dependent on the data sources used. As with the DCF model itself, changing 
assumptions will result in a different output. My WACC estimate, which is higher than 
8.5 percent, and properly calculated as of the Merger date using standard valuation 
benchmarks, accurately reflects the riskiness of Dell’s operating cash flows.  
G. Results of DCF Valuation of Ongoing Company Operations 
259. I summarize my DCF calculations in Revised Exhibit 18.349 As one can see, using the 
BCG 25% Case and the limited adjustments I have discussed results in an overall present 
value of the cash flows from operations as of October 29, 2013 of $26.2 billion. The 
terminal value of $23.3 billion (as of FY2022) represents an EBITDA multiple of 5.5. I 
note that a multiple of 5.5 would, without investment, represent a negative growth rate, as 
discussed previously.  
H. Adjustments to Convert DCF Value to Equity Value per Share 
260. The DCF captures the value of the cash flows that are available from the ongoing 
operations of the company, including operating assets and operating liabilities. The DCF 
does not include the value of any non-operating assets (like excess cash) and liabilities 
(like debt) of the firm. If a firm had no additional non-operating assets and no non-
operating liabilities, the value provided by the DCF model would represent the fair value 
estimate of its equity. In many firms, including Dell, there are a number of important 
non-operating assets and non-operating liabilities that must be added (or subtracted) from 
the DCF value to arrive at a final fair value estimate of the equity. In this section, I 
discuss the important non-operating assets and liabilities that must be included in the 
valuation. 
                                                     
 
348  Gladden Deposition, pp. 260-261. 
349  Revised Exhibit 19 provides additional detail on the division of EBITDA and cash flows between 
Core Dell and New Dell. 
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1. Excess Cash 
261. If a firm has more cash than is necessary for its ongoing operations, the excess cash is a 
valuable non-operating asset of the firm and should be added to the DCF valuation. As I 
noted earlier in my discussion of cash adjustments to beta, Dell had more cash on the 
Merger date than it required for its ongoing operations. Dell’s 2014 Annual Report states 
that Dell had actual cash of $11.21 billion on October 28, 2013.350 
262. To determine the amount of cash that Dell required, I reviewed a number of presentations 
and reports related to Dell’s liquidity and working capital needs. I have relied upon the 
August 2013 Rating Agency Presentation351 because, among other things, it is closer in 
time to the Merger date than other sources.352 According to that document, Dell required 
approximately $5 billion in cash to fund its ongoing operations. This level of required 
cash is similar to that reported in other, older documents.353 Corroborating this $5 billion 
required cash level is the observation that post-transaction, the private company, which 
had every incentive to draw down cash to as low a level as possible to fund the Merger 
and minimize the need for new cash, drew cash down to $5.66 billion as of November 1, 
2013.354 I also note that a public company may be much more reluctant than a private 
company to draw down this excess cash due to implications it may have for reported 
financial performance and financial statement consistency. 
263. Excess cash, which is the difference between actual cash and required cash, is $6.21 
billion.355 This calculation assumes that there is no tax overhang associated with 
repatriation of foreign profits. As of February 1, 2013, Dell had approximately $19.0 
                                                     
 
350  DELLE00293261-347 (Dell Annual Report, January 31, 2014), at 277. Dell had $11.185 billion in 
cash as of August 2, 2013 (the end of the prior fiscal quarter).Dell Inc., Form 10-Q for period ending 
August 2, 2013, filed August 28, 2013, p. 4. $172 million of transaction related expenses are added 
back to the Cash Balance. See Deposition of Thomas Sweet, August 25, 2015, p. 291. 
351  DELLE00381187-249 (“Denali Acquirer Inc. Rating Agency Presentation,” Dell Inc., August 2013), 
at 224.  
352  A September 3, 2013 management report indicates required cash of $5.17 billion for September and 
October. See DELLE00382663-685, at 674. 
353  See, for example, DELLE00167925-934 (“Working Capital Update,” January 2013), at 927 (reporting 
a $5 billion target). 
354  DELLE00292619-677 (Dell Quarterly Report, November 1, 2013), at 627. 
355  Revised Exhibit 20. 
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billion in excess book basis associated with undistributed earnings from foreign 
subsidiaries, which would result in net incremental taxes of approximately $6.2 billion if 
distributed.356 As a result, the assumption that there is no immediate tax overhang on 
those foreign profits is very conservative. Note that I do reflect this deferred tax liability 
in my adjustments to the DCF value discussed below, though on a much reduced level, 
assuming that the tax is due well into the future and is repaid over a very long time 
horizon.  
2. Debt  
264. Debt holders have a claim on the assets of the firm; thus, debt should be subtracted from 
the DCF value to get to the equity value.357 As of August 2, 2013, Dell’s total debt was 
$6.811 billion, which included $2.7 billion in short-term debt and $4.1 billion in long-
term debt.358 Between August 2, 2013 and October 28, 2013, Dell received $0.249 billion 
from debt proceeds and repaid $2.006 billion of debt,359 resulting in a $1.757 billion 
decrease in its total debt balance during this time. After adjusting for these changes, 
Dell’s estimated outstanding debt as of the Merger date is $5.054 billion.360 I subtract this 
amount from my calculations. 
3. Liability from Net Unrecognized Tax Benefits (FIN 48)  
265. In addition to debt, other debt-like liabilities not related to the ongoing operations of the 
company should be subtracted from the DCF value. Dell has a very large liability on its 
reported financial statements—$2.9 billion as of February 1, 2013—related to past tax 
returns in various countries.361 This type of liability is often referenced as a “FIN 48” 
                                                     
 
356  Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013, p. 97. 
357  McKinsey, p. 276; Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 440. 
358  Dell Inc., Form 10-Q for period ending August 2, 2013, filed August 28, 2013, p. 4. 
359  Dell Inc., Form 10-Q for period ending August 2, 2013, filed August 28, 2013, pp. 4 and 7; 
DELLE00292619-677 (Dell Quarterly Report, November 1, 2013), at 627. 
360  Exhibit 21. 
361  Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013, p. 111. 
JX 896A - p. 138 of 205
  Highly Confidential 
Page 136/156 
 
liability, referencing the Financial Accounting Standard Board FASB Interpretation No. 
48 “Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes.”362  
266. In 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued FASB Interpretation No. 48, 
which formally explains the FIN 48 liability as: 
When a position is taken in a tax return that reduces the amount of income 
taxes paid to a taxing authority, the enterprise realizes an immediate 
economic benefit. However, considerable time can elapse before the 
acceptability of that tax position is determined. This Interpretation [FASB 
Interpretation No. 48] requires the affirmative evaluation that it is more 
likely than not, based on the technical merits of a tax position, that an 
enterprise is entitled to economic benefits resulting from positions taken in 
income tax returns. If a tax position does not meet the more-likely-than-
not recognition threshold, the benefit of that position is not recognized in 
the financial statements.363  
A recent study on corporate income taxes described the FIN 48 liability as follows: 
When firms take uncertain tax positions on their tax return, there is some 
chance that they will be required to pay taxes related to these positions in 
the future, once the taxing authorities audit their corporate tax returns. To 
accrue an expense for these possible future tax payments on the income 
statement in the year of the activity, firms establish liabilities on the 
balance sheet, known as tax contingencies, which estimate the taxes (in 
addition to those reported on the tax return) that might have to be paid in 
the future.364 
The liability a company records under FIN 48 is a measure of the expected tax payments 
associated with tax positions that the company may lose if challenged by the tax 
authority. According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board: 
Relatively few disputes are ultimately settled in litigation, and very few 
are taken to the court of last resort. Generally, the taxpayer and the taxing 
authority negotiate a settlement to avoid the costs and hazards of litigation. 
                                                     
 
362  Financial Accounting Standards Board, “FASB Interpretation No. 48: Accounting for Uncertainty in 
Income Taxes,” Financial Accounting Series, June 2006, (“FASB Interpretation No. 48”) 
<http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwh
ere=1175820931560&blobheader=application/pdf>, accessed April 16, 2015 codified as FASB 
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 740-10-55-3). 
363  FASB Interpretation No. 48, at “Summary.” 
364  Graham, John, Jana Raedy, and Douglas Shackelford, “Research in Accounting for Income Taxes,” 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 53, 2012, p. 5. 
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As a result, the measurement of the tax position is based on management’s 
best judgment of the amount the taxpayer would ultimately accept in a 
settlement with taxing authorities.365 
267. Based on Dell’s reported financial statements, the FIN 48 liability was equal to $3.01 
billion as of October 29, 2013.366 I subtract this amount from the DCF value when 
determining the equity value per share.367 
4. Assets and Liabilities from Past and Future Deferred Taxes 
268. In addition to the FIN48 liability, there are additional tax assets and liabilities that result 
from past deferrals of taxes or, in the case of assets, early payments of taxes. For the 
deferred tax assets that are carryforwards of past Net Operating Losses (NOLs), I use the 
figure provided by Professor Shay in his analysis, $278 million.368 I add this amount to 
the values from my DCF analysis with no additional discounting, though some of these 
benefits may not be used for years in the future. 
269. The second area of deferrals are the $6.3 billion of deferred taxes that need to be paid on 
profits earned overseas that have not yet been repatriated, as identified by Professor 
Shay.369 As Professor Shay discusses in his report, while this tax liability is currently 
identified as being “indefinitely” overseas, at some point it will not be possible for Dell to 
continue deferring this liability.370 Similar to the accumulated overseas deferrals as of 
October 29, 2013, the additional deferrals resulting from the difference between the 
marginal rate of 35.8 percent and the lower tax rates modeled during the projection and 
transition periods would also need to be eventually recognized and paid.  
                                                     
 
365  FASB Interpretation No. 48, p. 11. 
366  Exhibit 22. In addition, E&Y reported a FIN 48 liability of $3.00 billion as of October 29, 2013. 
DELLE00733762-129 (“ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013,” Ernst & Young, 
February 5, 2013), at 117; Dell Inc., Form 10-Q for period ending August 2, 2013, filed August 28, 
2013, p. 34; Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013, p. 111. 
367  Shay Report, p. 23. 
368  Shay Report, p. 24. 
369  Shay Report, p. 21. 
370  Shay Report, p. 22. 
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270. In my analysis, shown in Revised Exhibit 23, I model these deferred liabilities as 
accumulating and deferring to the terminal period, then being paid off over time. For the 
$6.3 billion in current deferred taxes on overseas profits, I carry this amount forward to 
the terminal period, but do not increase the amount over time. To this amount, I 
separately add the year-by-year additional deferrals of the tax amounts that are the result 
of the difference between the lower modeled ongoing tax amounts at 17.8 percent and the 
marginal tax rate of 35.8 percent.371 Again, while I add each year’s amount to the prior 
balance, I do not otherwise inflate it into the future. Because these estimates are a deferral 
of earnings and taxes, they do not accumulate penalties and interest.  
271. Starting in the terminal year, I model the reality that these deferred taxes will need to be 
repaid. There is no precise method to estimate the period over which these are paid. I rely 
on my professional judgment and discussions with Professor Shay and have selected a 25 
year period for this repayment.372 I use a straight-line payment method where equal 
amounts of the liability are paid each year. While the time period for payback is subject 
to judgment, I note that the additional deferral period plus the payback period is actually 
slightly longer than number of years from Dell’s inception to the time of the transaction. 
Using a payment period over several decades is a reasonable balance between the fact 
that the taxes will eventually have to be paid and the fact that careful tax planning can 
defer this time into the future and spread it out. The result of these calculations is 
equivalent to a present value deferred tax liability of $2.2 billion as of October 29, 
2013.373 
5. Number of Shares 
272. Dell’s total number of outstanding shares as of August 22, 2013 was 1,758 million, and I 
have seen no indication that Dell issued new shares or repurchased shares between 
                                                     
 
371  Corrected Shay Report, p. 25. 
372  Shay Report, p. 22; Teleconference with Stephen Shay, May 29, 2015. 
373  Revised Exhibit 23. 
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August 22, 2013 and October 29, 2013.374 I then adjusted for known outstanding stock 
options and restricted stock units in a conservative manner. These options and restricted 
stock units correspond to an additional seven million shares,375 increasing the total 
number of outstanding shares to 1,765 million. 
I. Concluded Equity Value per Share from DCF Analysis 
273. A properly constructed DCF of the BCG 25% Case results in a value of $26.2 billion, 
with the details shown in Revised Exhibit 18. As a reference, this is actually higher than 
the implied enterprise value calculations prepared by Houlihan Lokey using a DCF 
methodology in October 2013, which provided a range of enterprise values from $17.3 
billion to $25.1 billion.376 The spreadsheet that BCG developed reported a value of $22.1 
billion as of FY2017, inclusive of both the enterprise value at that date and the cash flows 
through FY2017.377 On a present value basis, the BCG spreadsheet valuation would be 
well below my valuation. Similarly, the present value of the FY2017 enterprise value of 
$20.6 billion in Silver Lake’s original spreadsheet378 would also be well below my 
valuation. 
274. The challenges associated with developing a DCF model in a situation in which both the 
industry and the company are undergoing change can also be seen in the DCF valuation 
models prepared by equity analysts. While relatively few equity analysts explicitly 
prepared or discussed DCF models, those that did so during 2012 and 2013 arrived at 
similar enterprise value estimates: 
                                                     
 
374  The 10-Q for the second quarter of Dell’s fiscal 2014 reports 1,758,369,276 shares outstanding on 
August 22, 2013. See Dell Inc., Form 10-Q for period ending August 2, 2013, filed August 28, 2013, 
p. 1. 
375  The number of shares reported in connection with the dilutive effect of options and restricted stock is 
rounded to seven million in the SEC filings. See Dell Inc., Form 10-Q for period ending August 2, 
2013, filed August 28, 2013, p. 35. 
376  DELLE00730635-0700 (“Dell Inc. Discussion Materials,” Houlihan Lokey, October 22, 2013), at 
656. 
377  BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”), at ‘Total Base’ sheet. 
378  SLP_DELLAP00073088-123, at 092. 
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• In a spreadsheet model from Morgan Stanley, dated January 9, 2013 (just prior to 
the news of the LBO becoming public), the equity analyst developed both a DCF 
model and a “Bear Case” DCF model. Using a WACC of 9.6 percent, the analyst 
estimated an enterprise value of $25.1 billion for the main DCF and an enterprise 
value of $11.9 billion for the Bear Case DCF. The DCF model used a ten year 
projection period and a growth rates in the terminal period of −5 percent for the 
base DCF and −10 percent for the bear DCF.379 
• The DCF model in a Citi Investment Research spreadsheet used a WACC of 10.1 
percent and a terminal growth rate of −2 percent, which yielded an enterprise 
value of $14.1 billion.380 
• Brean Capital, in a published March 25, 2013 report, used a DCF methodology, 
among other metrics, to develop an estimate of Dell’s enterprise value of $26.6 
billion. This method was one of several used by Brean, which recommended a 
“Hold” on the stock. Brean also noted that “the headwind to EPS from the PC 
business makes a ‘clean’ cash flow valuation a hard sell.”381 
• Morningstar, in its series of published analyst reports, conducted a series of DCF 
analyses in addition to various other valuation metrics. Those results include 
estimates of $25.0 billion (May 2012), $15.3 billion (December 2012), $24.7 
billion (March 2013), $24.5 billion (May 2013), and $24.7 billion (August 2013). 
In the most recent estimates, Morningstar used a WACC of 10.4 percent.382 
275. Starting with my estimate of $26.2 billion in enterprise value, I then adjust for the non-
operating assets and liabilities, as summarized below, resulting in an equity value of 
$22.4 billion, equivalent to a per-share value of $12.68. As an additional corroboration, I 
note that the ratio of EV/EBITDA implied in the terminal period of this DCF analysis is 
5.5383, which is higher than the overall ratio of four to five typically used by finance 
professionals to analyze Dell. 
                                                     
 
379  SLP_DELLAP00015608. 
380  SLP_DELLAP00038457. 
381  Brean Capital, LLC, Dell Inc., “Bidding Could Be On With $15 Offer”, March 25, 2013 p. 2. 
382  Morningstar, “Dell Inc.,” Reports from May 24, 2012, December 22, 2012, March 1, 2013, May 21, 
2013, and August 19, 2013. 
383  Exhibit 18. 
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Figure 38. Summary of BCG 25% Case per-Share Fair Value Calculation   
   
 
J. Sensitivity Analyses 
276. As I previously noted, a DCF model is a useful valuation tool for understanding cash 
flows based on key assumptions. Complex DCF models such as the ones used by BCG 
and Silver Lake to model a multi-billion dollar corporation like Dell have hundreds of 
assumptions that can affect the final value. Indeed, a common criticism of DCF models is 
that they can essentially be used to come up with any valuation, depending upon the 
assumptions used. For example, by assuming unrealistically low discount rates, 
unrealistically high perpetuity growth rates, or unrealistically low investment amounts 
needed to support growth, one can mathematically calculate a high DCF value for any 
company. However, the resulting inflated valuation does not reflect reality and would 
vary considerably from market-based measures. 
277. Because of these sensitivities, one must be cautious when using DCFs as a valuation tool, 
and it is good discipline to consider sensitivity analyses and alternative cases. In the 






BCG 25% Case Enterprise Value $26,205 $14.84 
Excess Cash $6,212 $3.52 
Debt ($5,054) ($2.86)
FIN 48 Liability ($3,010) ($1.71)
Deferred Foreign Tax Liability ($2,240) ($1.27)
Net Operating Loss Deferred Assets $278 $0.16 
  Total Equity Value $22,391 $12.68 
Sources:
[A] Revised Exhibits 18, 20, and 23, Exhibits 21-22.
[B] Corrected Shay Report, pp. 18-19 and 22.
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terminal period growth rates. These sensitivities leave other assumptions, such as tax 
rates and the relationships between investment and growth, intact. For the discount rate, 
given that I have used the average of the supply-side and historical risk premiums in 
constructing the WACC, I have modeled the effect of using either a supply-side equity 
risk premium or the historical equity risk premium. I have also shown, for illustration 
purposes only, the effect of using a discount rate of 8.5 percent, though I do not think that 
rate is realistic. For the growth rate, I consider several scenarios in addition to my two-
percent-growth scenario: (1) a flat growth rate of zero percent, (2) a declining growth rate 
of negative two percent (more reflective of the direction implied by market measures), 
and (3) a higher growth rate of four percent, which is approximately the long-term 
expected real growth in the economy of two percent384 plus the expected inflation of two 
percent.  
Figure 39. DCF Sensitivity Analysis for BCG 25% Case Fair Value per Share 
  
278. The sensitivity analyses result in per-share values that vary from $11.64 to $13.17 per 
share. Using the unrealistically low discount rate of 8.5 percent would result in values 
                                                     
 
384  OECD forecasts of annual real GDP from 2031-2060 are 1.7 percent for the United States, 1.6 percent 
for OECD countries, and 2.2 percent for the world. See OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2013/1, 









8.50% 9.17% 9.46% 9.75%
-2% $13.09 $12.27 $11.95 $11.64
0% $13.76 $12.86 $12.52 $12.19
2% $13.95 $13.04 $12.68 $12.35
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from $13.09 to $14.09 per share. I also conducted sensitivity analyses varying the number 
of years of payback for the deferred taxes. Shortening the payback period by five years 
(20 years rather than 25) would result in a price per share approximately 21 cents lower 
per share, while increasing the number of years by five (30 years rather than 25) would 
increase the per-share value by 17 cents.385 I consider $12.68 to be the best point estimate 
of Dell’s fair value as of the Merger date, and further conclude that $13.75 is the ceiling 
for a fair value estimate of Dell’s stock based on the market measure of the robust deal 
process and the fact that investors with access to funds did not offer bids beyond this 
level. 
VI. CORROBORATIVE VALUATION USING BANK CASE DCF 
279. As I discussed earlier, the Bank Case projections have certain positive attributes, and I 
believe a DCF analysis using the Bank Case is a useful corroboration to my primary DCF 
analysis using the BCG 25% Case. In doing so, I adopt the same approach that I used in 
the BCG 25% Case. I start with the actual spreadsheet used by Silver Lake in its analysis. 
I apply modest adjustments as needed to reflect market conditions as of the Merger date 
that differed from those reflected in the spreadsheet. The Bank Case requires less 
adjustment than the BCG 25% Case because the Bank Case was developed using more 
recent industry figures. As an example, the revenue adjustment is less than one percent 
for desktops and less than three percent for notebooks as of FY2018. I do not apply any 
adjustments to any New Dell business segments. 
280. Because it was done from the perspective of a private company, the Bank Case is not 
directly applicable for public company valuation purposes. It is not possible to 
disentangle and make exact adjustments to every element of the projection to align it to a 
public company perspective. For example, certain working capital assumptions, such as 
the average days outstanding of receivables and payables, are often different between 
                                                     
 
385  Revised Exhibit 23. 
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private companies and public companies.386 Consistent with this view, the BCG 25% 
Case and the Bank Case have somewhat different working capital assumptions, with the 
Bank Case, based on the private company perspective, generally using assumptions 
resulting in lower working capital needs. I have not adjusted any of these estimates in the 
Bank Case, because they are interrelated and there is no clear way to disentangle those 
made because of being a public company compared to a private company and those made 
for other reasons.  
281. One item I do adjust is stock-based compensation. As I noted above, Dell has historically 
used stock-based compensation as additional incentive for employees, and the public 
company BCG model incorporates $362 million in stock-based compensation per year 
for FY2014 to FY2017. The Bank Case excludes “stock based long term incentives,” 
which I understand to correspond to the SBC that Dell paid its employees as a public 
company.387 In order to reflect Dell’s perspective as a going concern public company, I 
include the after-tax cost of SBC as I did in the BCG 25% Case.  
282. In addition to these adjustments, I apply exactly the same adjustments to the Bank Case 
as the BCG 25% Case, including: (1) a five-year transition period after the projection 
period; (2) the same tax assumptions in the projection, transition, and terminal periods; 
(3) a two percent growth rate in the terminal period and corresponding investment needs; 
and (4) the same adjustments from DCF value to equity value. The only difference in 
these other adjustments results from differences in the additional foreign deferred tax 
amounts between the BCG 25% Case and the Bank Case. 
                                                     
 
386  “Value Creation Tutorial: What Private Equity Has to Teach Public Companies,” Strategy& (formerly 
Booz & Company), 2011, p. 10. 
387  A September 2013 Dell presentation to lenders presents financial results for FY2012 through 
FY2018. Operating expenses are noted to exclude SBC, and EBITDA for FY2012 and FY2013 
matches EBITDA in DELLE00730635-0700 (“Dell Inc. Discussion Materials,” Houlihan Lokey, 
October 22, 2013), at 650 when SBC is excluded. (DELLE00480330-38, (Lender's Presentation 
(Private Supplement), September 2013, at 338). The projections in the September 2013 presentation 
do include “Incremental Cash Comp.,” which I understand to be incremental payments in light of the 
footnote that states “Figures exclude stock based long-term incentives.” See also, Durban Deposition, 
p. 332. 
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283. The corroboration DCF analysis using the Bank Case is shown in Revised Exhibits 24 
and 25. As Figure 40 below shows, the properly constructed DCF of the Bank Case 
results in a Enterprise Value of $29.2 billion.388 
284. Adding in the non-operating assets and liabilities results in an equity value of $25.3 
billion, which is equivalent to a per-share value of $14.33 per share, as shown below. 
This value is above the estimates of the stock market and equity analysts and is quite 
similar to the $13.75 maximum offer received from the deal process. Indeed, this 
analysis, while higher than the BCG 25% Case analysis and representing a private 
company perspective rather than a public company perspective, reasonably corroborates 
the point estimate valuation of $12.68 per share determined for the primary projection 
model based on the BCG 25% Case. As with the BCG 25% Case, I also note that the 
Bank Case EV/EBITDA ratio in the terminal period is equal to 5.6, somewhat higher than 
the general range of 4 to 5 used by many financial professionals assessing Dell. 
                                                     
 
388  See also DELLE00730635-0700 (“Dell Inc. Discussion Materials, Houlihan Lokey, October 22, 
2013”), at 656. 
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Figure 40. Summary of Bank Case per-Share Fair Value Calculation 
 
285. As with the BCG 25% Case, I also performed a sensitivity analysis with the Bank Case, 
varying both the Terminal Period perpetuity growth rate and the discount rate based on 
the historical and supply side equity risk premiums. See Revised Exhibit 26.  
VII. CORROBORATIVE VALUATION USING COMPARABLE COMPANIES 
APPROACH 
286. A comparable companies analysis is an approach sometimes used in company valuation, 
particularly in industries where key metrics such as profitability, growth potential, and 
risk are relatively homogeneous.389 The most commonly understood example of this 
approach would be in residential real estate, where single-family homes are often valued 
with reference to other homes on the basis of measures such as cost per square foot 
within a similar neighborhood. In real estate, this concept is often extended to an actual 
                                                     
 






Bank Case Enterprise Value $29,152 $16.51 
Excess Cash $6,212 $3.52 
Debt ($5,054) ($2.86)
FIN 48 Liability ($3,010) ($1.71)
Deferred Foreign Tax Liability ($2,282) ($1.29)
Net Operating Loss Deferred Assets $278 $0.16 
  Total Equity Value $25,296 $14.33 
Sources:
[A] Revised Exhibits 20 and 23-24, Exhibits 21-22.
[B] Corrected Shay Report, pp. 18-19 and 22.
JX 896A - p. 149 of 205
  Highly Confidential 
Page 147/156 
 
comparable transactions analysis, in which one can observe actual market transactions for 
similar homes, and derive market values from these. In an oversimplification, if 
comparable homes in a neighborhood sell for $200 per square foot and your otherwise 
comparable home is 2,000 square feet, your house is worth $400,000. 
287. In the context of finance, a comparable companies approach involves the same principles: 
(1) find a set of companies with characteristics similar to the subject company, (2) 
calculate valuation multiples for each of those companies by normalizing a measure of 
value (such as enterprise value) by an appropriate operating metric (such as EBITDA), 
(3) select an appropriate valuation multiple based on the multiples of the peer firms, and 
(4) apply that selected multiple to the operating metric for the subject company. To 
obtain accurate results, it is important that the set of peer firms are truly comparable to 
the subject company. For some industries, particularly those for which there are several 
firms all providing a similar mix of services in a similar geographic area, it is possible to 
find such a set of comparable companies. For industries for which the mix of services 
provided, the geographic coverage, or other factors differ significantly, a comparable 
companies approach becomes more difficult and less directly applicable. 
288. Suitable comparable companies should be in the same industry and should be similar to 
the subject company in terms of key value drivers, such as growth, profitability, 
geographic coverage and size.390 Also, a comparable companies approach is most 
appropriate for companies in a steady state, rather than a transition, particularly because 
companies may be at different stages of transformation or have different strategic plans 
for dealing with changing market conditions.391 
A. Selection of Comparable Companies 
289. Perhaps the biggest challenge for performing a comparable companies analysis for Dell is 
finding any truly comparable companies. I carefully reviewed the discussion of Dell’s 
competitors in its SEC filings of Dell, comparable company analyses performed by 
                                                     
 
390  Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 453; McKinsey, pp. 304-305 and 316. 
391  Damodaran, Investment Valuation, p. 20. 
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equity analysts, and comparable company analyses performed by J.P. Morgan and 
Evercore. The one common finding in this analysis is that HP is the only company that is 
considered to be even approximately comparable to Dell on an overall company basis. 
There are many companies that have aspects of their businesses that are comparable to 
aspects of Dell’s business, such as being PC manufacturers, but the overall size, scale, 
mix of hardware and services, geographic coverage, market positioning, and other 
metrics are often not comparable.392 In the figures below, I summarize the key 
comparison metrics and business segments for Dell and HP. As one can see, while not 
perfectly comparable, Dell and HP have some similar characteristics, and HP is a useful 
company to consider for purposes of developing comparable analyses. I do not believe 
that other companies are similar enough to Dell to be considered reliable comparables. I 
also considered Lenovo, a Chinese PC company with some similarities to Dell, but 
because the profitability profile of Lenovo is much lower than that of Dell, I concluded 
that it would not be an appropriate company to use for purposes of doing a multiples-
based comparables analysis.393 
                                                     
 
392  See also Rajkovic Deposition, pp. 42 and 84. 
393  For example, Lenovo’s FY2013 financials reported net income of $635 million on revenues of 
$33,873 million, or approximately two percent, less than or equal to half the comparable percentages 
for Dell (2.4/56.9 = 4.0 percent) and HP (5.1/112.3 = 4.5 percent), as can be calculated from the data 
in the figure. Lenovo Group Limited, 2013 Annual Report, March 31, 2013, p.4. 
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Figure 41. Comparison of Dell and HP – FY2013 
  
Measure (in $ Billions, except percentages) Dell HP
FY13 Market Capitalization 23.7 46.5
FY13 Total Debt 9.1 22.6
FY13 Cash and Equivalents 12.6 12.2
FY13 Enterprise Value 20.2 56.9
FY13 Revenue 56.9 112.3
Change in Revenue FY12-FY13 -8.3% -6.7%
FY13 Revenue from PCs 49.7% 28.6%
Percent of Revenue from US 49.6% 35.9%
FY13 Net Income 2.4 5.1
Gross Margin 21.4% 23.1%
Operating Margin 5.3% 6.4%
Sources:
[A] Bloomberg LP.
[B] Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013.
[C] HP, 2013 Form 10-K, filed December 30, 2013.
Notes:
[1] Dell as of 2/1/2013.
[2] HP as of  10/31/2013.
[3] Financials are based on Gaap numbers. 
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Figure 42. Comparison of Dell and HP Reported Business Segments – FY2013 
 
290. In addition to a single-company comparables analysis, I am aware that various analysts 
have considered calculations based on valuing different segments of the business based 
on companies comparable to that segment only (though not necessarily comparable to 
Dell as a whole) then adding these up. This is sometimes referred to as a “sum of the 
segments” or a “sum of the parts” (SOTP) analysis. In a complex company such as Dell, 
for which many of the segments, such as financing (Dell Financial Services (DFS)), 
support, deployment, and software, are in fact directly related to the underlying hardware 
sales of PCs and servers, it is difficult to compare each segment to a company that is 
primarily focused on a narrower or different mix of activities. Such an analysis inevitably 
fails to consider the many important relationships, synergies, and dis-synergies that can 
come from a company with multiple segments that have strong linkages and 
dependencies. In addition, the results can greatly vary depending on how certain 
corporate allocations are apportioned between segments. 
291. I am certainly aware that analyses using a SOTP-type approach were occasionally done, 
including by members of Dell’s management team as they communicated with their 
Sources:
[A] Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013.
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investors.394 In fact, this type of analysis was already being done by equity analysts,395 and 
thus this type of information would already be incorporated by the market. 
292. However, SOTP analyses are really most relevant for conglomerates, where there is truly 
a collection of free-standing and non-interconnected businesses that could be run 
separately or sold with little or no effect on the other businesses. That is not the case with 
Dell, which is highly integrated and interconnected. In fact, Dell’s strategy was to move 
to become even more interconnected in offering “IT solutions” to customers, including 
hardware, support, services, and software.  
293. This view that a SOTP analysis is not appropriate for Dell was further discussed by Mr. 
Rajkovic of J.P. Morgan: 
Q. So if you were considering doing a sum of the parts analysis in August 
of 2012, why didn’t you ever do it? 
A.   . . . . The reason we didn’t do sum of the parts is because this business 
is not separable, as we talked about before. That a lot of -- the majority of 
the businesses within Dell are driven by the core business of PCs. So 
everything is interconnected. So you can’t really value them separately. 
They couldn’t stand-alone as separate entities.396 
B. Selection of Appropriate Operating Metric 
294. In conducting a comparables analysis, one needs an operating metric that measures, as 
nearly as possible, the overall relationship between value and financial performance. As 
with my selection of companies, I carefully reviewed comparable company analyses 
performed by equity analysts and comparable company analyses performed by J.P. 
Morgan and Evercore. I have selected the EV/EBITDA multiple, discussed in Section 
III.A.3, as the most appropriate measure here. This measure is widely used in many 
                                                     
 
394  Gladden Deposition, pp. 61-64. 
395  Gladden Deposition, pp. 53 (“This [sum-of-the-parts] was designed to try and replicate the way that 
the investors were looking at it. . . .”) and 62 (“. . . . because we understood that sell-side analysts and 
many on the buy side actually looked at the company on a sum of the parts valuation model.”). 
396  Rajkovic Deposition, pp. 259-260. 
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valuations and is cited in many analyses.397 Based on my academic and professional 
experience, I believe that this measure is relevant for comparison and readily observable. 
295. Dell’s EV/EBITDA multiple had typically been in the range of four to five, and many 
mature high-tech companies also had multiples that were in this range or modestly 
higher. All of these ranges suggest expected long-term growth rates that are negative, 
which is consistent with the difficulty of maintaining cash flows of billions of dollars per 
year at even a flat level into perpetuity, particularly in technology areas where new ideas 
and new technology (such as tablets and smartphones) can quickly become the “new 
thing” and displace once market-leading companies. 
296. In the figure below, I chart the EV/EBITDA multiple for both Dell and HP, as measured 
by S&P Capital IQ.398 HP and Dell had EV/EBITDA multiples that were quite similar to 
one another and generally moved together. During the two years leading up to the 
transaction, HP tended to have a somewhat higher multiple than Dell. In the final six 
months of 2012, prior to the news of the LBO becoming public, HP’s average multiple 
was 3.5, as compared to 3.1 for Dell. 
                                                     
 
397  See, Figure 15; Rosenbaum, Joshua, and Joshua Pearl, Investment Banking: Valuation, Leverage 
Buyouts, and Mergers & Acquisitions, John Wiley and Sons, 2013, p. 48. 
398  S&P Capital IQ measures the EV/EBITDA multiple using EBITDA measured over the prior 12 
months.  
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Figure 43. Dell and HP EV/EBITDA Multiples – 2011 to 2013 
 
297. After the announcement of the Merger in January 2013, both Dell and HP’s ratios began 
increasing. It is not uncommon in industries where one industry leader is involved in a 
merger transaction for other companies to also have their stock price affected by the 
transaction, as investors speculate about possible additional merger candidates.399 Indeed, 
presumably to downplay possible speculation about it being a candidate for a similar 
strategy, HP issued a press release in February 2013 stating:  
Dell has a very tough road ahead. The company faces an extended period 
of uncertainty and transition that will not be good for its customers. And 
with a significant debt load, Dell’s ability to invest in new products and 
services will be extremely limited. Leveraged buyouts tend to leave 
existing customers and innovation at the curb. We believe Dell’s 
customers will now be eager to explore alternatives, and HP plans to take 
full advantage of that opportunity.400 
                                                     
 
399  Song, Moon H., and Ralph A. Walkling, “Abnormal Returns to Rivals of Acquisition Targets: A Test 
of the ‘Acquisition Probability Hypothesis’,” Journal of Financial Economics 55, 2000, p. 143. 
400  “HP Issues Statement on Dell’s Leveraged Buyout Plan,” HP, February 5, 2013, 
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[A] S&P Capital IQ.
Notes:
[1] Latest 12 months EBITDA is used in Enterprise Value / EBITDA multiple calculations.
[2] December 31, 2012 is the month end before the announcement date of Dell's potential deal. 
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C. Calculation of Fair Value Based on Comparables 
298. In the following figure, I calculate the equity value per share for Dell by applying HP’s 
EV/EBITDA multiple to Dell’s EBITDA. I first show the results using EBITDA 
measured on a trailing-12-month basis as of August 2, 2013 (the most recent quarter 
before the transaction), when HP’s corresponding multiple was 4.3. I also perform the 
calculations measuring EBITDA on a forward-looking basis using the FY2014 
projections resulting from my adjustments to the BCG 25% Case and the Bank Case. 
Based on these methods, the fair value per share of Dell’s equity ranges from $10.06 to 
$11.31, which is consistent with, though slightly lower than, my DCF valuation of 
$12.68. For fair value purposes, a comparable companies approach often has a small 
adjustment added to account for a minority discount that may, in theory, be present in a 
stock market valuation. However, most modern finance studies attribute small, 
insignificant amounts to such a discount for large, well governed companies traded in the 
United States.401 Regardless, from a comparable companies perspective, Dell’s share 
price would be below $13.75. 
                                                     
 
401  See, for example, Nath, Eric W., “Best Practices Regarding Control Premiums: Comments Regarding 
the Appraisal Foundation’s Proposed White Paper on Control Premiums,” Business Valuation Review 
30 2011, pp. 140-143; Shishido, Zenichi, “Fair Value of Minority Stock in Closely Held 
Corporations,” Fordham Law Review 62, 1993, p. 77; Coates, John C., IV, “Fair Value as an 
Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions,” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 147, 1999, p. 1262. See also Hamermesh, Lawrence A. and Michael L. 
Wachter, “The Short and Puzzling Life of the ‘Implicit Minority Discount’ in Delaware Appraisal 
Law,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 156, 2007 p. 2. 
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Figure 44. Dell Per-Share Equity Value Using and Comparable Company Approach 
Based on HP’s EV/EBITDA Multiple  
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
299. For the reasons discussed above, I conclude that the Merger price of $13.75 provides a 
ceiling for the fair value of Dell as of October 29, 2013. My point estimate for a per-share 
value using a standard DCF based on the BCG 25% Case with adjustments is $12.68 per 
share. I also recognize that a DCF is sensitive to the assumptions, and that this was a 
period of tremendous change in both the market for many of Dell’s products and for Dell 
itself as it was in the midst of a transformation. My own sensitivity analyses show a range 
of $11.64 to $13.17 per share. Analysis based on Dell as a private company, and thus not 
strictly comparable to the public company framework, results in a value of $14.33, and 
additional analysis based on public company financial multiples generates per-share 
values ranging from $10.06 to $11.31 per share. 
300. Because of the changing industry outlook and evolving company strategy, I also believe 
that one should carefully consider the stock price, analysts’ stock price projections, and 
a b c d = c x a e f = d + e
g = f /1.765 
billion shares







EV2 = HP 
Multiple x Dell 
EBITDA
 ($ Millions)
Cash - Debt 




Equity Value per 
Share
Trailing 12  Months
4.3 Actual As of October 31, 2013 $3,235 $14,008 $5,086 $19,094 $10.82
Forward Looking
4.1 BCG 25% (with adj) 3,627            14,871                 5,086                19,957          11.31                  
4.1 Bank Case (with adj) 3,363            13,788                 5,086                18,874          10.69                  
4.1 Actual 3,090            12,669                 5,086                17,755          10.06                  
Sources:




[2] Enterprise Value = Market Cap (Equity Value) + Debt - Cash.
[D] DELLE00293261-3347 (Dell Annual Report, January 31, 2014); Dell Inc., Form 10-Q for period ending August 2, 2013, filed August 28, 2013; DELLE00292619-
2677 (Dell Quarterly Report, November 1, 2013).
[E] Deposition of Thomas Sweet, August 25, 2015, p. 291.
[1] The first row is the LTM EBITDA as of August 2, 2013 and the other values are FY14 EBITDA. BCG 25% (with adj) and Bank Case (with adj) FY14 EBITDA 
numbers use the actual EBITDA for the first 3 quarters of FY14.
[3] $70 million of transaction related expenses are added back to Cash.
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the price derived from the robust and well publicized deal process. These represent the 
best view of how individuals and institutions who were actually putting real money to use 
valued Dell. It is for this reason that I consider $13.75 to be the ceiling for a fair value 
estimate. 
301. In order for a financial analyst to opine that the value should be something substantially 
higher than $13.75, that analyst must believe that his or her individual optimistic opinion 
of the future cash flows of Dell is more accurate than the opinions of the thousands of 
individuals and firms who were actively trading and considering the stock in the public 
market, the dozens of professional equity analysts covering the stock, and the largest and 
most experienced private equity firms in the world with billions of dollars available to 
invest in opportunities to make returns from mispriced assets. While it is not difficult to 
generate spreadsheet estimates that show valuations higher than $13.75, I find no 
economic evidence to support such a contrary opinion that would lead to a fair value 
above $13.75 per share. 
302. Indeed, the EV/EBITDA multiple implied by an equity value significantly above $13.75 
per share would be nearly double what the actual observed multiples in the market were 
for Dell and HP. Such an opinion would, at its core, be based on individual optimism as 
opposed to a carefully considered fair value opinion based on what willing buyers and 
willing sellers with then-current information were willing to pay at the time for Dell’s 
equity. Basing a fair value opinion on an individual optimistic opinion that is misaligned 
with the prevailing real-world indicators of value generated from actual market 
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Exhibit 1A
Dell Historical Annual Balance Sheet ($ Millions): FY2009-2014
 FY 2009  FY 2010  FY 2011  FY 2012  FY 2013  FY 2014 
1/30/2009 1/29/2010 1/28/2011 2/3/2012 2/1/2013 1/31/2014
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents  $     8,352  $   10,635  $   13,913  $   13,852  $   12,569  $      6,440 
Short-term investments            740            373            452            966            208               -   
Accounts receivable, net         4,731         5,837         6,493         6,476         6,629          6,244 
Short-term financing receivables, net         1,712         2,706         3,643         3,327         3,213          3,299 
Inventories, net            867         1,051         1,301         1,404         1,382          1,780 
Other current assets         3,749         3,643         3,219         3,423         3,967          3,913 
Total current assets       20,151       24,245       29,021       29,448       27,968        21,676 
Property, plant and equipment, net         2,277         2,181         1,953         2,124         2,126          2,907 
Long-term investments            454            781            704         3,404         2,565            112 
Long-term financing receivables, net            500            332            799         1,372         1,349          1,659 
Goodwill         1,737         4,074         4,365         5,838         9,304        10,016 
Purchased intangible assets, net            724         1,694         1,495         1,857         3,374        14,057 
Other non-current assets            657            345            262            490            854            717 
Total assets       26,500       33,652       38,599       44,533       47,540        51,144 
Current liabilities:
Short-term debt            113            663            851         2,867         3,843          3,063 
Accounts payable         8,309       11,373       11,293       11,656       11,579        12,504 
Accrued and other         3,736         3,884         4,181         3,740         3,644          5,054 
Short-term deferred revenue         2,701         3,040         3,158         3,738         4,373          3,436 
Total current liabilities       14,859       18,960       19,483       22,001       23,439        24,057 
Long-term debt         1,898         3,417         5,146         6,387         5,242        12,334 
Long-term deferred revenue         3,000         3,029         3,518         3,855         3,971          3,191 
Other non-current liabilities         2,472         2,605         2,686         3,373         4,187          5,544 
Total liabilities       22,229       28,011       30,833       35,616       36,839        45,126 
Stockholders' equity:
Common stock and capital in excess of $.01 par value       11,189       11,472       11,797       12,187       12,554          7,634 
Treasury stock at cost      (27,904)      (27,904)      (28,704)      (31,445)      (32,145)               -   
Retained earnings       20,677       22,110       24,744       28,236       30,330        (1,589)
Accumulated other comprehensive loss            309             (37)             (71)             (61)             (59)             (27)
Total Dell stockholders' equity 4,271        5,641                7,766         8,917       10,680          6,018 
Noncontrolling interest               -                 -                 -                 -                21               -   
Total stockholders equity         4,271         5,641         7,766         8,917       10,701          6,018 
Total liabilities and stockholders' equity       26,500       33,652       38,599       44,533       47,540        51,144 
Sources:
[B] DELLE00293261-347 (Dell Annual Report, January 31, 2014).
[A] Dell Financials, SEC Interactive Data, accessed at
<http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?company=dell+inc&owner=exclude&action=getcompany>.
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Exhibit 1B
Dell Historical Quarterly Balance Sheet ($ Millions): FY2013-FY2014
 Q1 FY13  Q2 FY13  Q3 FY13  Q4 FY13  Q1 FY14  Q2 FY14  Q3 FY14  Q4 FY14 
5/4/2012 8/3/2012 11/2/2012 2/1/2013 5/3/2013 8/2/2013 11/1/2013 1/31/2014
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents  $   12,814  $   11,519  $   10,991  $   12,569  $   10,419  $   11,185  $     5,665  $     6,440 
Short-term investments            901            372            281            208            486            643            126              -   
Accounts receivable, net         6,289         6,829         6,187         6,629         6,440         6,591         6,274         6,244 
Short-term financing receivables, net         3,200         3,174         3,151         3,213         2,991         3,131         3,265         3,299 
Inventories, net         1,472         1,615         1,364         1,382         1,387         1,468         1,760         1,780 
Other current assets         3,369         3,741         3,688         3,967         3,936         3,848         4,696         3,913 
Total current assets       28,045       27,250       25,662       27,968       25,659       26,866       21,786       21,676 
Property, plant and equipment, net         2,119         2,058         2,156         2,126         2,136         2,212         3,003         2,907 
Long-term investments         3,501         2,738         2,908         2,565         2,303         2,048            112            112 
Long-term financing receivables, net         1,342         1,344         1,354         1,349         1,383         1,469         1,597         1,659 
Goodwill         6,005         7,558         9,191         9,304         9,289         9,253       10,217       10,016 
Purchased intangible assets, net         1,801         2,609         3,511         3,374         3,176         2,990       14,641       14,057 
Other non-current assets            476            540            664            854            845         1,033         1,112            717 
Total assets       43,289       44,097       45,446       47,540       44,791       45,871       52,468       51,144 
Current liabilities:
Short-term debt         3,186         2,609         3,724         3,843         3,133         2,736         3,936         3,063 
Accounts payable       10,970       11,193       10,556       11,579       10,990       12,051       11,228       12,504 
Accrued and other         3,076         3,227         3,504         3,644         3,402         3,657         5,043         5,054 
Short-term deferred revenue         3,582         3,683         4,027         4,373         4,265         4,312         3,219         3,436 
Total current liabilities       20,814       20,712       21,811       23,439       21,790       22,756       23,426       24,057 
Long-term debt         5,813         5,832         5,310         5,242         4,115         4,075       12,442       12,334 
Long-term deferred revenue         3,837         3,893         3,943         3,971         3,963         4,003         3,034         3,191 
Other non-current liabilities         3,468         3,914         4,184         4,187         4,163         4,256         6,210         5,544 
Total liabilities       33,932       34,351       35,248       36,839       34,031       35,090       45,112       45,126 
    
Stockholders' equity:
Common stock and capital in excess of $.01 par value       12,313       12,409       12,489       12,554       12,644       12,698         7,638         7,634 
Treasury stock at cost      (31,745)      (32,145)      (32,145)      (32,145)      (32,145)      (32,145)               -                -   
Retained earnings       28,871       29,603       29,939       30,330       30,317       30,381           (282)       (1,589)
Accumulated other comprehensive loss             (82)           (121)           (106)             (59)             (77)           (153)               -             (27)
Total Dell stockholders' equity         9,357         9,746       10,177       10,680       10,739       10,781         7,356         6,018 
Noncontrolling interest               -                 -                21              21              21               -                 -                -   
Total stockholders equity         9,357         9,746       10,198       10,701       10,760       10,781         7,356         6,018 
Total liabilities and stockholders' equity       43,289       44,097       45,446       47,540       44,791       45,871       52,468       51,144 
Sources:
[B] DELLE00293261-347 (Dell Annual Report, January 31, 2014).
[C] DELLE00292619-677 (Dell Quarterly Report, November 1, 2013).
[A] Dell Financials, SEC Interactive Data, accessed at <http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?company=dell+inc&owner=exclude&action=getcompany>.
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Exhibit 2A
Dell Historical Annual Income Statement ($ Millions): FY2009-2014
 FY 2009  FY 2010  FY 2011  FY 2012  FY 2013  FY 2014 
1/30/2009 1/29/2010 1/28/2011 2/3/2012 2/1/2013 1/31/2014
Net revenue:
Products  $    52,337  $    43,697  $    50,002  $    49,906  $    44,744  $    44,039 
Services, including software related          8,764          9,205        11,492        12,165        12,196        12,338 
Total net revenue        61,101        52,902        61,494        62,071        56,940        56,377 
Cost of net revenue:
Products        44,670        37,534        42,068        39,689        36,683        38,845 
Services, including software related          5,474          6,107          8,030          8,571          8,071          8,148 
Total cost of net revenue        50,144        43,641        50,098        48,260        44,754        46,993 
Gross margin        10,957          9,261        11,396        13,811        12,186          9,384 
Operating expenses:
Selling, general, and administrative          7,102          6,465          7,302          8,524          8,102          9,391 
Research, development, and engineering             665             624             661             856          1,072          1,273 
Total operating expenses          7,767          7,089          7,963          9,380          9,174        10,664 
Operating income          3,190          2,172          3,433          4,431          3,012        (1,280)
Interest and other, net             134           (148)             (83)           (191)           (171)           (365)
Income before income taxes          3,324          2,024          3,350          4,240          2,841        (1,645)
Income tax provision             846             591             715             748             469               37 
Net income          2,478          1,433   2,635          3,492          2,372        (1,682)
Non-GAAP:
Revenue        62,071        56,940        56,801 
Gross Margin        11,178          9,649        11,731        14,165        12,708        11,213 
Operating Expenses          7,497          6,675          7,582          9,030          8,735          8,905 
Operating Income          3,681          2,974          4,149          5,135          3,973          2,308 
Net Income          2,852          2,054          3,106          3,952          3,017          1,324 
Sources:
[B] DELLE00293261-347 (Dell Annual Report, January 31, 2014).
[A] Dell Financials, SEC Interactive Data, accessed at 
<http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?company=dell+inc&owner=exclude&action=getcompany>.
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Dell Historical Quarterly Income Statement ($ Millions): FY2011-2014













Q1 2011 Apr. 30, 2010  $     14,874  $       2,614  $          824  $          584 17.6% 5.5% 3.9%
Q2 2011 Jul. 30, 2010         15,534           2,671              872              629 17.2% 5.6% 4.0%
Q3 2011 Oct. 29, 2010         15,394           3,078           1,167              875 20.0% 7.6% 5.7%
Q4 2011 Jan. 28, 2011         15,692           3,368           1,286           1,018 21.5% 8.2% 6.5%
Q1 2012 Apr. 29, 2011         15,017           3,511           1,376           1,050 23.4% 9.2% 7.0%
Q2 2012 Jul. 29, 2011         15,658           3,625           1,328           1,006 23.2% 8.5% 6.4%
Q3 2012 Oct. 28, 2011         15,365           3,546           1,288              983 23.1% 8.4% 6.4%
Q4 2012 Feb. 03, 2012         16,031           3,483           1,143              913 21.7% 7.1% 5.7%
Q1 2013 May. 04, 2012         14,422           3,167           1,010              761 22.0% 7.0% 5.3%
Q2 2013 Aug. 03, 2012         14,483           3,270           1,123              875 22.6% 7.8% 6.0%
Q3 2013 Nov. 02, 2012         13,721           3,013              886              679 22.0% 6.5% 4.9%
Q4 2013 Feb. 01, 2013         14,314           3,258              954              702 22.8% 6.7% 4.9%
Q1 2014 May. 03, 2013         14,074           2,899              590              372 20.6% 4.2% 2.6%
Q2 2014 Aug. 02, 2013         14,514           2,839              602              433 19.6% 4.1% 3.0%
Q3 2014 Nov. 01, 2013         13,714           2,732              505              167 19.9% 3.7% 1.2%
Q4 2014 Jan. 31, 2014         14,075           2,743              611              352 19.5% 4.3% 2.5%
Sources:
[A] Dell SEC filings.
[B] DELLE00293261-347 (Dell Annual Report, January 31, 2014).
[C] DELLE00292619-677 (Dell Quarterly Report, November 1, 2013).
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3/8/2011 Del Monte Foods Co
 (Consumer Staples)
$5,311 $5,667 $4,213 $612 9% 11% 1.4 8.7
11/4/2011 Kinetic Concepts Inc
 (Healthcare)
$5,765 $5,765 $5,139 $647 8% 21% 2.5 8.9
6/7/2013 HJ Heinz Co
 (Consumer Staples)
$27,362 $27,362 $23,479 $1,829 4% 14% 2.0 15.0
9/10/2013 BMC Software Inc
 (High Technology)
$6,530 $6,530 $6,710 $694 5% 24% 3.0 9.4
10/29/2013 Dell Inc
 (High Technology)
$19,284 $22,077 $24,315 $4,621 2% 7% 0.4 4.8
Sources:
[A] Thomson One Merger & Acquisition Database, accessed at <https://www.thomsonone.com/>.
[B] Del Monte Foods Company Fiscal Year 2010 10-K, p. 42.
[C] Kinetic Concepts Inc. Fiscal Year 2010, 10-K, p. 47.
[D] H. J. Heinz Company Fiscal Year 2013 10-K, pp. 11, 37.
[E] BMC Software, Inc. Fiscal Year 2013 10-K, p.23.
[F]
Notes:
[1] Deal value includes net debt of target.
[2] Uses data in accordance with U.S. GAAP from the three most recent complete fiscal years before acquisition. Figures for Dell are Non-GAAP.
[3] Transactions included were leverage buyouts of publicly traded companies with a deal value of at least $5,000 million effective or unconditional between October 29, 2010 and October 29, 2013.
Date
Effective
Dell Financials, SEC Interactive Data, accessed at <http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?company=dell+inc&owner=exclude&action=getcompany>.
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Exhibit 4
BCG Forecast of PC Market Segments 
FY12 FY17 Unit Change % Change
Segment Size (in Millions)
Premium ($800+) 82.7 61.2 -21.5 -26%
Standard ($500 - 799) 117.9 92.9 -25.0 -21%
Value (< $500) 163.3 234.5 71.3 44%
Total PCs 363.9 388.7 24.8 7%
Dell Units (in Millions)
Premium ($800+) 13.3 9.5 -3.8 -29%
Standard ($500 - 799) 17.0 6.6 -10.5 -62%
Value (< $500) 13.5 17.7 4.2 31%
Total PCs 43.9 33.8 -10.1 -23%
Dell Share of Market (Units)
Premium ($800+) 16.1% 15.5% -0.6% (percentage point change)
Standard ($500 - 799) 14.5% 7.0% -7.4% (percentage point change)
Value (< $500) 8.3% 7.6% -0.7% (percentage point change)
Total PCs 12.1% 8.7% -3.4% (percentage point change)
Price/Unit
Premium ($800+) $1,217 $1,104 ($113) -9%
Standard ($500 - 799) $651 $645 ($6) -1%
Value (< $500) $443 $369 ($74) -17%
Total PCs $686 $551 ($136) -20%
Dell Revenue (in $ Millions)
Premium ($800+) $16,249 $10,498 ($5,751) -35%
Standard ($500 - 799) $11,099 $4,226 ($6,874) -62%
Value (< $500) $5,985 $6,537 $552 9%
Total PCs $33,333 $21,261 ($12,072) -36%
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Exhibit 4
BCG Forecast of PC Market Segments 
FY12 FY17 Unit Change % Change
Est. Segment Revenue (in $ Millions)
Premium ($800+) $100,726 $67,621 ($33,105) -33%
Standard ($500 - 799) $76,797 $59,938 ($16,859) -22%
Value (< $500) $72,293 $86,584 $14,291 20%
Total PCs $249,816 $214,143 ($35,673) -14%
Dell's Mix of Units
Premium ($800+) 30.4% 28.2% -2.2% (percentage point change)
Standard ($500 - 799) 38.8% 19.4% -19.4% (percentage point change)
Value (< $500) 30.8% 52.4% 21.7% (percentage point change)
Total 100.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Market's Mix of Units
Premium ($800+) 22.7% 15.8% -7.0% (percentage point change)
Standard ($500 - 799) 32.4% 23.9% -8.5% (percentage point change)
Value (< $500) 44.9% 60.3% 15.5% (percentage point change)
Total 100.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Sources:
[A] BCG0001375 (“Denali forecast model v43.xlsx”), at 'Denali base case' sheet rows 242-268.




Company Acquired Date of Acquisition
Deal Value 
($ Millions)
AlienWare May 2006 $127
ACS November 2006 $41
SilverBack Technologies July 2007 $20
Zing August 2007 $140
ASAP Software November 2007 $350
Everdream December 2007 $120
EqualLogic January 2008 $1,400
Networked Storage February 2008 $5
Message One April 2008 $155
Allin January 2009 $12
PerotSystems November 2009 $3,900
Exanet February 2010 $12
KACE February 2010 $145
Ocarina Networks July 2010 $124
Scalent July 2010 $35
Boomi November 2010 $55
InSite One December 2010 $85
Compellent February 2011 $960
SecureWorks February 2011 $620
RNA Networks June 2011 $12
Dell Financial Services Canada June 2011 $407
Force10 July 2011 $700
AppAssure February 2012 $205
Clerity April 2012 $24
WYSE May 2012 $915
SonicWall May 2012 $1,250
Make Technologies May 2012 $40
Quest Software September 2012 $2,400
Gale Technologies November 2012 N/A
Total $14,259
Source:
[A] DELLE346096-104 ("Project Denali Discussion Materials," December 2012).
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Market Efficiency Tests for Dell Stock
Market Capitalization, Bid-Ask Spread, Float, Short Interest Ratio, and Trading Volume
Standard & Poor's 500 Dell
Minimum Maximum Average Percentile
Market Capitalization ($ millions)
January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012 $2,111 $539,093 $23,161 73.20%
October 29, 2012 - October 29, 2013 $2,541 $440,826 $22,585 69.60%
Bid-Ask Spread
January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012 0.01% 0.23% 0.08% 94.90%
October 29, 2012 - October 29, 2013 0.01% 0.23% 0.08% 96.70%
Float
January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012 30.60% 99.99% 84.29% 15.30%
October 29, 2012 - October 29, 2013 19.78% 99.98% 84.25% 12.80%
Short Interest Ratio
January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012 0.76 17.66 3.30 59.70%
October 29, 2012 - October 29, 2013 0.75 25.34 1.81 11.60%
Average of Weekly Trading Volume ÷ 
Shares Outstanding
January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012 0.91% 53.21% 5.52% 70.50%
October 29, 2012 - October 29, 2013 0.87% 37.50% 7.56% 91.10%
Source:
[A] S&P Capital IQ.
Notes:
[1] The S&P 500 is represented by its constituent companies as of May 22, 2015.
[2] Figures represent the daily average over each respective time period for each measure.
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Market Efficiency Tests for Dell Stock
Number of 
Analysts
Number of Market 
Makers
June 2012 34 145
Janury 2013 37 148
June 2013 27 92




[1] Securities analysts covering Dell are those offering a price target or 
recommendation on the stock.
[2] Market maker data are reported by the Stock Exchanges.
Number of Securities Analysts and 
Market Makers Covering Dell
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Peak Sales Analysis in Computer Industry
# of Companies % of Total Companies
Peak Sales in Last Year 277 41%
Peak Sales before Last Year 396
Sales in Last Year as a Percent of Peak








[A] Compustat via S&P Capital IQ. SIC 3570-3579, 1968-2013.
Note:
[1] Data on 1,473 publicly traded companies are provided by Compustat, 677 of which have data on sales 
between 1968 and 2013. 4 of the 677 have zero sales recorded in all years and are excluded.
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Exhibit 8
Example Forward-Looking Quotes from Equity Analysts' Reports about Dell's EUC and ES Segments
Business Line Date Equity Analyst Quote
End User Computing (EUC)1
5/14/2012 Barclays We believe the biggest issues facing the stock include secular challenges in PCs, 
inconsistent margins & acquisition risk.
6/4/2012 Barclays Despite weak overall PC demand, Barclays U.S. Display & Lighting team (Amir 
Rozwadowski and Olga Levinzon) believes large, material decreases from current 
levels are not expected given panel makers have cut back supply to fight against 
price erosion. PC vendors, including HP and Dell, could benefit from modest pricing 
declines providing a tailwind for PC OEMs in the 2H12.
6/27/2012 Cowen We continue to expect below-seasonal end-user PC demand (and related sell-in) 
during the balance of C12 (and particularly during C3Q12) as PC OEMs experience 
a degree of Windows 7 ‘product stall' ahead of the Windows 8 launch expected later 
this year. Net, we are decreasing slightly our C12 PC sell-in estimate by ~4MM (to 
~338MM from ~342MM) and now expect C12 PC sell-in to contract ~4% y/y 
(versus ~3% y/y previously). We continue to expect C12 PC revenue to decrease 
~5% y/y.
7/13/2012 Goldman CIOs remain highly interested in tablet computing, with an increasing number 
expecting to adopt the devices in 2012. The latest survey results show that 58% of 
CIOs expect their organizations to adopt tablets in 2012. Although this represents a 
deceleration from past surveys (in which as many as 70% of respondents expected to 
adopt tablets), it does mark an increase from the 55% in our most recent survey 
conducted in April. A total of 27% of CIOs expect tablets to replace notebook PCs 
for at least a modest number of users, versus around 30% of respondents in our April 
survey. We have been bullish on the outlook for the tablet market as we believe the 
initial addressable market for tablets is consumption-oriented users. This view has 
differed from consensus in that we believe this market is quite large, at 
approximately one-third of existing PCs. Nevertheless, the incremental enterprise 
opportunity appears to be significant, even with the lower adoption rate from peak 
results suggested in our survey. We remain encouraged by enterprises’ high interest 
in tablet computers, and incremental corporate buying could present upside to our 
expectations for the category. This could prove especially important for Apple, 
which as the leading tablet vendor could be poised to make long-awaited inroads into 
the enterprise.
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Exhibit 8
Example Forward-Looking Quotes from Equity Analysts' Reports about Dell's EUC and ES Segments
Business Line Date Equity Analyst Quote
8/22/2012 Sterne We believe multiple product launches with ultrabooks, Win8, WinRT, Nexus-Kindle 
Tablets and mini-iPads in 4Q12 present consumers with a confusing multitude of 
options increasing competitive challenges, demands on a limited consumer wallet 
and competitive platform pricing pressures.
8/22/2012 Credit Suisse The weakness in client revenues came principally in the mobility revenues which 
declined 19% yoy, although Desktop revenues were also down 9% yoy. The 
company attributed the weakness to demand softness, pricing pressure in emerging 
markets in in [sic] Western Europe, a channel drawdown and shift towards tablets. 
Our concern is that these will continue over the next few quarters and in particular 
when combining this with Dell's market share prudence it is to derive revenue 
growth in future year.
9/27/2012 Goldman OEMs pressured by weak demand, aggressive pricing: We believe that PC OEMs, 
such as Hewlett-Packard and Dell, will remain under significant pressure, as weak 
unit growth, aggressive PC pricing, and relatively firm component prices 
(particularly HDDs) combine to pressure both revenues and margins.
11/15/2012 Cowen DELL F3Q13 Preview: PCs Remain Challenging; Win8 Unlikely to Help Near Term
11/16/2012 BMO Going forward, we think that steep revenue decline in the PC business, which has 
negative working capital, could be a headwind for cash generation, though higher 
deferred revenues balance could help to offset some weakness, in our view.
11/16/2012 Cowen Dell believes ongoing PC weakness is primarily macrodriven. However, we believe 
Dell's PC issues are unlikely to be solved by the Windows 8 launch as the market's 
structure has fundamentally shifted away from the paradigm that dominated the last 
two decades.
11/16/2012 JP Morgan We do not think the model can exhibit a backstop to numbers until the PC market 
stabilizes.
12/21/2012 Morningstar We expect the PC desktop market to be cannibalized by demand for laptop PCs, and 
both laptop and desktop PCs to lose market share to tablets, which could have an 
adverse effect on demand for peripherals like speakers and webcams.
2/5/2013 Morgan Stanley No change in strategy. Dell views the agreement with Michael Dell and Silver Lake 
as a financially driven deal to capture undervalued cash flow streams and not a 
change in strategy. Dell will continue to focus on shifting its business mix towards 
enterprise solutions and services, away from low-margin segments. Costs and 
restructuring initiatives were not part of the plan to go private. We do not expect 
Dell to spinout or break up its PC business in the near-term, although as a private 
company, Dell may de-emphasize its low margin consumer segment more rapidly.
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Example Forward-Looking Quotes from Equity Analysts' Reports about Dell's EUC and ES Segments
Business Line Date Equity Analyst Quote
2/12/2013 Jefferies We see a raised bid to $15 as likely. Our conversations with investors lead us to 
believe that most want a raised bid, but that they are also cognizant of the lack of 
competing bidders and of the secular headwinds facing Dell's PC business. Also, we 
estimate that about 20% of the holders are now arbs and that many of them became 
involved expecting a bid higher than the current $13.65. Overall, we expect enough 
would be satisfied with a $15 bid to get the deal approved and estimate that $15 
would yield a 19%-21% IRR. We believe chances of a higher bid are now >50%.
2/20/2013 FBN One hope is that as Microsoft ends support on Windows XP on April 8, 2014, the 
Windows 8 PC cycle will take on more momentum later this year and early next. 
Still, the PC business remains long-term challenged for the reasons mentioned.
4/1/2013 UBS Pressures in end-user computing could reduce cash flows needed to invest in the 
enterprise side, especially a shift form build-to-order to a build-to-stock business 
model in PCs.
7/8/2013 Wells Fargo We continue to believe that absent the take-private offer, Dell shares would likely be 
under significant pressure given the declines in the PC market and recent results.
8/13/2013 Goldman Tablet demand has also been running below our expectations, with 2Q shortfalls 
from iOS and Android devices. As a result, we now expect 2013 and 2014 unit 
growth of 34.1% and 28.2%, lower than our prior expectation for growth of 43.1% 
and 25.3%.
8/16/2013 Trefis Going forward, we expect Mobile Phones Gross Margin to remain flat.
9/13/2013 Morningstar The convergence of smartphones, tablets, and laptops is limiting hardware 
differentiation.
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Example Forward-Looking Quotes from Equity Analysts' Reports about Dell's EUC and ES Segments
Business Line Date Equity Analyst Quote
Enterprise Solutions (ES)1
5/29/2012 Jyske We see the following price triggers for Dell: 1) improved willingness to buy among 
corporate customers (we believe that this will take place in H2 2012/H1 2013)…
6/4/2012 Barclays In terms of exposure to servers overall (all types, including Unix and x86) Dell, HP 
and IBM all have around 12% of their respective CY12 revenue estimated to come 
from servers.
6/14/2012 Jefferies Were it not for Client device revenues, we may be tempted into a positive view on 
Dell's stock. The company is continuing to invest in areas such as servers, storage, 
networking, software, and security in order to complete its cloud stack. We believe 
the company's focus on scalable end-to-end solutions for the mid-market is a unique 
offering and approach. We believe the biggest opportunity for Dell is in the cloud 
transformation of the SMB market. We also see an opportunity for Dell to be the 
App vendor for SMB enterprise clients through its cloud.
6/14/2012 Credit Suisse Dell's targets suggest an operating income CAGR of 4.5% through FY16, (these 
assume sustainable client margins and industry leading services margins, both of 
which could prove optimistic.) Such growth also assumes cost cutting and 
acquisitions. All this means that core organic growth is limited and low quality in 
our view. We continue to believe based upon our GM analysis that headwinds from 
slowing server industry growth and competitive dynamics in PCs may challenge this, 
thus we keep our OM at 7.3%/7.2% for FY13/FY14.
6/27/2012 Wells Fargo Though Dell may have an advantage in the near term with its new next-gen 12G 
servers, we believe over the longer run, incremental shares gains in the x86 market 
will likely be limited. As such, we expect Dell's server business to grow roughly in 
line with the market.
6/27/2012 Wells Fargo ESS could represent more than 60% of its operating profit by FY2016 and achieve 
13+% operating margin.
9/10/2012 Goldman Top-tier OEMs continued to lose market share to white-box vendors, shedding 85 
basis points of revenue share and 111 points of unit share yoy. As we have 
mentioned before, in the longer term we expect that this dynamic will continue, 
further pressuring x86 units and revenues for the top-tier OEMs, while adding 
further forces of commoditization across the x86 server market.
JX 896A - p. 174 of 205
Highly Confidential
Page 5 of 8
Exhibit 8
Example Forward-Looking Quotes from Equity Analysts' Reports about Dell's EUC and ES Segments
Business Line Date Equity Analyst Quote
11/8/2012 RBC Capital Markets For Jan-qtr, we expect server shipments should improve on a seasonal basis (DELL's 
shipments typically up 2% q/q).
11/9/2012 Credit Suisse ...we believe the stagnant server market and shift to lower margin units will cap 
Dell's revenue and margin outlook – especially given virtualization and increasing 
competition.
11/12/2012 Brean … we anticipate solid ESS revenue growth of ~6.5% in CY13 (Figure 6) which 
should continue to serve as a tailwind to overall margins.
11/16/2012 BMO Negative – we don't think that revenue and EPS declines will reverse in the near term 
owing to weak PC and S&P demand. In addition, we think that weak macro will 
delay the improvement in mix to higher margins enterprise businesses.
11/16/2012 Goldman While the company remains optimistic that recent enhancements to its storage 
portfolio could rekindle growth when demand improves, Dell’s slowing momentum 
here remains a factor to watch.
11/16/2012 Evercore We see risks for Dell including cyclical global PC and enterprise IT markets, 
including slowing in mature geographies, combined with competitive pricing and 
margin pressures from both large systems peers and aggressive commodity suppliers. 
PC unit and margin risks also include underlying dynamics in volume component 
supply.
12/3/2012 Barclays We believe Dell's PC businesses could continue to see challenges from tablets and 
smart phones and the company may need to make acquisitions at a rapid pace to 
stem the declines. While we acknowledge Dell's enterprise strategy, we still have 
concerns around whether it can ramp fast enough to offset pressures in PC-related 
businesses, including PC support and related sales of peripherals.
1/22/2013 Morningstar We believe DELL's moat trend is stable because the firm's growing operating 
margins and portfolio of advanced enterprise solutions is offset by the nascent  
nature of the cloud and the shrinking value captured by device manufacturers. First, 
enterprise customers want more sophisticated solutions related to servers and 
storage, but there is no dominant way to provide those services.
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Example Forward-Looking Quotes from Equity Analysts' Reports about Dell's EUC and ES Segments
Business Line Date Equity Analyst Quote
1/22/2013 Morningstar We think Dell's existing enterprise customer base provides a promising runway for 
the company's new service offerings and could help drive robust sales growth in the 
future.
2/5/2013 Topeka Capital 
Markets
Going private provides Dell with the time necessary to complete its transition to a 
broader IT vendor and away from being overly reliant on PCs and without the 
scrutiny of the market.
2/20/2013 Morningstar In many ways, Dell's rocky fourth quarter reflects exactly why Michael Dell wants to 
take the company private. It is a situation in which Dell's promising new business-- 
enterprise solutions--is reliant upon a decaying old business--mobility and desktop 
hardware--that is dragging down the company. Dell's fourth-quarter sales dropped 
11% year over year as desktop PC sales declined 14% and mobility sales--including 
laptops and tablets--fell 25% as a result of declining market share and competitive 
pricing pressure.
5/21/2013 Morningstar We see attractive potential in Dell's ESG and believe the ESG could offset Dell's 
abysmal hardware business, with time.
6/4/2013 Goldman We now forecast x86 revenues to decline 3.9% in 2013, with units down 2.2% and 
ASPs down 1.7%. This compares to our prior forecast, which called for revenues to 
grow 0.3%, with units declining 0.6% and ASPs improving by 0.9%. Longer term, 
we expect x86 revenues to decline at a 0.9% CAGR from 2014-2019, as 
commoditization pressures continue to weigh on pricing over time.
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Example Forward-Looking Quotes from Equity Analysts' Reports about Dell's EUC and ES Segments
Business Line Date Equity Analyst Quote
Selected Quotes of Widely Followed Analysts in 2012 and Mid-year 2013
5/22/2012 Deutsche Bank Despite the margin issues in the client business, we believe underlying trends in 
Dell's enterprise business to support improving mix and margins going forward.
5/17/2013 Deutsche Bank Dell posted a large drop in Margins (OM of 4.2% vs. 5.9% DB est) and Op profit 
($590M vs. $800M DBe) as a result of steep discounting in PCs and a renewed focus 
on gaining market share. Dell probably could not execute this strategy as a public 
company and has begun to take the long view (i.e. sacrificing near-term PC profits 
for share and corporate footprint). This has negative near-term consequences across 
the PC industry and potentially medium-term margin implications in servers if Dell 
broadens this strategy.
11/16/2012 Morgan Stanley While Dell remains structurally disadvantaged with 65% revenue exposure to PCs 
and servers, the recent acceleration in acquisitions increases the likelihood that Dell 
can grow revenue and improve margins to in-line with its peer group over the long-
term.
5/2/2013 Morgan Stanley With two-thirds of revenue exposed to PCs and servers and consistent 
underperformance against growth targets (missed revenue guidance in 7 of last 9 
quarters), public market investors are unlikely to value Dell shares higher than the 
current offer. In fact, prior to the Dell / Silver Lake proposal, Dell shares traded 
below our $9 current bear case.
6/27/2012 Wells Fargo Longer term and relative to its peers, we believe Dell is well placed in its 
transformation to a more solutions-based company given (1) its smaller size and less 
“legacy” businesses (making a business model transition easier); (2) its direct 
channel strength, particularly in small and midsize enterprise markets; (3) what we 
view as its strong balance sheet and cash flow; and (4) cash return to shareholders. 
Furthermore, we believe a successful transformation would result in material 
multiple expansion.
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Example Forward-Looking Quotes from Equity Analysts' Reports about Dell's EUC and ES Segments
Business Line Date Equity Analyst Quote
5/17/2013 Wells Fargo We believe competitive market dynamics will continue into the near future and, 
combined with component pricing pressure over the coming quarters, expect gross 
margins to remain pressured. Neither bodes well for the industry's profits or 
competitors (HPQ reports next week). We believe the focus on driving market share 
back up is predicated on the company's need to drive cash flow from the PC business 
to fund its other segments. While it might appear to be a change in strategy from a 
profit focus to a market share focus, we believe the precipitous decline in PCs was 
unexpected by Dell, prompting the company to become more price aggressive to 
maintain scale and cash flow. While there were some positives (strength hyper-scale 
data center servers, 24% yr/yr growth in network and 11% growth infrastructure, 
cloud & security services), it was more than overshadowed by the PC segment 
pressures (as well as storage).
Note: 
[1] Random selection of analyst quotes from reports listed in Appendix B. 
Sources: Trefis 08.16.13, Sterne 08.22.12, BMO 11.16.12, Barclays 05.14.12, Credit Suisse 08.22.12, Morningstar 09.13.13, UBS 04.01.13, FBN 
02.20.13, Barclays 06.8.12, Goldman Sachs 07.13.12, Morningstar 12.22.12, Cowen 11.15.12, Cowen 06.27.12, Goldman Sachs 09.27.12, 
Morgan Stanley 02.06.13, Goldman Sachs 08.13.13, Jefferies 02.12.13, Cowen 11.16.12, JP Morgan 11.16.12, Wells Fargo 06.27.12, Wells 
Fargo 06.27.12, Credit Suisse 11.09.12, Morningstar 01.23.13, Jefferies 06.14.12, Morningstar 05.21.13, BMO 11.16.12, Morningstar 01.23.13, 
Goldman Sachs 11.16.12, Barclays 06.08.12, Morningstar 02.21.13, Goldman Sachs 07.13.12, RBC Capital Markets 11.08.12, Evercore 
11.16.12, Barclays 12.03.12, Brean 11.12.12, Topeka Capital Markets 02.05.13, Credit Suisse 06.14.12, Jyske 05.29.12, Goldman Sachs 
06.04.13, Deutsche Bank 05.23.12, Deutsche Bank 05.17.13, Morgan Stanley 11.16.12, Morgan Stanley 05.02.13, Wells Fargo 06.27.12, and 
Wells Fargo 05.17.13. See Appendix B for full citations.
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Status Bid Details Source
8/20/2012 - - - Formation of Special Committee. [A]
10/23/2012[1]
Silver Lake 
and M. Dell $11.22 - $12.16 Private
"Silver Lake proposed a purchase price of $11.22-$12.16 per share for all of the Company’s outstanding shares, other 
than those held by Mr. Dell (all of which it assumed would be rolled over in the transaction), and indicated that Silver 




M. Dell, and 
Southeastern 
$12 - $13 Private
"Sponsor A [Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, "KKR"] proposed a purchase price of $12-$13 per share for all of the 
Company’s outstanding shares, other than those held by Mr. Dell and Southeastern (all of which it assumed would be 
rolled over in the transaction) and contemplated an additional $500 million cash investment by Mr. Dell." p. 27
(The New York Times identifies "Sponsor A" as the private equity firm KKR.)
[A], [B]
12/3/2012 KKR - - KKR "notified Mr. Dell that it would not be submitting an updated proposal to acquire the Company and was withdrawing from the process. Mr. Dell then informed Mr. Mandl of [KKR's] decision." p. 30 [A], [B]
12/4/2012 Silver Lake and M. Dell $12.70 Private
"Silver Lake submitted an updated non-binding proposal to acquire the Company for $12.70 per share, which 
proposal was significantly less conditional than Silver Lake’s previous proposal." p. 30 [A]
12/23/2012 TPG Capital - -
TPG Capital "informed J.P. Morgan that it had decided not to submit a proposal to acquire the Company and was 
withdrawing from the process." p. 34
(The New York Times identifies TPG as "Sponsor B.")
[A], [B]
1/16/2013 Silver Lake and M. Dell $12.90 Private
"Silver Lake submitted a written non-binding proposal to acquire the Company for $12.90 per share, which was 
accompanied by debt commitment letters from each of Barclays, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, RBC and Credit 
Suisse, a draft term sheet for $2 billion in financing from Microsoft, and draft equity commitment letters from each of 
the MD Investors and the SLP Investors." p. 37
[A]
1/19/2013 Silver Lake 
and M. Dell $13.25 
Private
"Mr. Mandl contacted Mr. Dell to tell him that the Special Committee was willing to support a transaction at a price 
of $13.75 per share, subject to satisfactory resolution of contractual terms.
Mr. Dell then discussed this proposal with a representative of Silver Lake, who contacted Mr. Mandl later that day to 
propose a price of $13.25 per share." pp. 37-38
[A]
1/20/2013 Silver Lake and M. Dell $13.50 Private
"[A] representative of Silver Lake informed J.P. Morgan that Silver Lake would be willing to increase its offer price 
to $13.50 per share." p. 38 [A]
1/24/2013 Silver Lake 
and M. Dell $13.60 
Private
"[A] representative of Silver Lake notified J.P. Morgan by telephone that Silver Lake was willing to increase its offer 
price to $13.60 per share, and that this price represented its best and final offer." p. 38
"Mr. Dell stated [on January 21, 2013] that he would consider reducing the valuation of his rollover shares to $13.36 
per share as a means of permitting Silver Lake to increase its offer to $13.60 per share, and prior to the execution of 
the merger agreement, Mr. Dell agreed to do so." p. 38
[A]
1/24/2013 GE Capital $3.5 - $4 billion (total, not per share) -
"Evercore received a telephone call from a strategic party (“Strategic Party A”), expressing interest in purchasing 
DFS [Dell Financial Services] for an amount approximately equal to the book value of its assets, which was estimated 
to be approximately $3.5 billion to $4 billion, not taking into account related indebtedness." p. 38
(The New York Times refers to "Strategic Party A" as General Electric's GE Capital.)
[A], [B]
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Status Bid Details Source
2/3/2013 Silver Lake and M. Dell
(i) $13.60, With 
Quarterly Dividend
(ii) $13.75, No 
Quarterly Dividend
Private
"The proposal provided alternatives of (i) a price of $13.60 per share, with the Company being permitted to continue 
paying its regular quarterly dividend, or (ii) a price of $13.75 per share, with the Company being prohibited from 
paying any dividends." p. 40
[A]






"Mr. Mandl reported to the Special Committee that Silver Lake had increased its price to $13.65 per share, with the 
Company being permitted to continue paying its regular quarterly dividend. Debevoise informed the Special 
Committee that Silver Lake’s representatives had stated clearly that this price increase was being made to 
accommodate the Special Committee’s insistence on a price above $13.60 per share, and that there was no further 
room for price negotiation." p. 41
"[T]he merger agreement contained certain provisions that were designed to encourage a fruitful go-shop process, 
including (i) a 45-day initial go-shop period, (ii) sharply limited “matching rights” that would allow Mr. Dell and 
Silver Lake, only on a single occasion, to negotiate with the Company to match the terms of any superior proposal and 
(iii) a low termination fee of $180 million payable by the Company if it were to terminate the merger agreement to 
enter into an acquisition agreement related to a superior proposal with a party that provides an acquisition proposal 
during the go-shop period that is or could reasonably be expected to result in a superior proposal." p. 41
[A]
2/5/2013 Silver Lake and M. Dell
$13.65, With 
Quarterly Dividend Private
Dell "announced it has signed a definitive merger agreement under which Michael Dell, Dell's Founder, Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer, in partnership with global technology investment firm Silver Lake, will acquire Dell." [C]
3/22/2013 Blackstone Greater than $14.25 Public
Go-Shop Period:[2]
"Evercore received, on behalf of the Special Committee, a non-binding proposal (the “Blackstone Proposal”) from the 
Blackstone consortium, which was led by Blackstone Management Associates VI L.L.C. and included Francisco and 
Insight, for a transaction in which holders of shares of Common Stock would be entitled to elect to receive cash in an 
unspecified amount that was stated to be in excess of $14.25 per share or to roll over their shares, subject to a cap 
(which was not specified) on the amount of equity that could be rolled over." p. 46
[A]
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Status Bid Details Source
3/22/2013 Mr. Icahn $15.00 Public
Go-Shop Period:[2] 
"[H]olders of shares of Common Stock would be entitled to either elect to roll over their shares on a one-to-one basis 
or to sell their shares for cash in an amount equal to $15.00 per share, with a cap of approximately $15.6 billion on 
the total amount of cash that could be paid out (with pro rata cutbacks if the cash election is oversubscribed)." p. 47
"The Icahn Proposal also contemplated that Southeastern and T. Rowe Price, which the Icahn Proposal states has 
disclosed that it owns approximately 82 million shares of Common Stock, would join Icahn Enterprises and affiliated 
entities in committing to roll over their shares." p. 47
[A]
4/18/2013 Blackstone - - "[A] representative of Blackstone informed Mr. Mandl that Blackstone had decided not to submit a definitive proposal to acquire the Company and was withdrawing from the process." p. 49 [A]
5/9/2013 Mr. Icahn and 
Southeastern
$12.00 per share in 
cash or $12.00 in 
additional shares, in 
addition to retaining 
their current shares
Public
Icahn Proposal Letter to Shareholders:[3]
Icahn Enterprises and Southeastern sent a letter "outlining a potential transaction in which the Company’s 
stockholders would be entitled to elect to receive either $12.00 per share in cash or $12.00 in additional shares (based 
on a value which the Icahn-Southeastern Letter says would be assumed to be $1.65 per share) for each share currently 
held, in addition to retaining their current shares. The Icahn-Southeastern Letter did not provide details as to how the 
proposed transaction would be implemented and was not accompanied by commitments for the debt financing the 
proposed transaction would require." p. 50
[A]
6/18/2013 Mr. Icahn and 
Southeastern $14.00 
Public
"Icahn Enterprises issued an open letter to Company stockholders proposing, among other things, that the Company 
commence a tender offer for approximately 1.1 billion Company shares at $14 per share (the “Partial Tender Offer 
Proposal”). The letter stated the Partial Tender Offer Proposal would be funded with $5.2 billion of debt financing, 
together with $7.5 billion in cash available at the Company and $2.9 billion available through a sale of Company 
receivables, but was not accompanied by commitments for the debt financing or the receivables sale." p. 17
[D]
7/23/2013 Silver Lake 
and M. Dell $13.75 
Private
Mr. Dell and Silver Lake sent a revised offer "proposing an increase in the per share merger consideration to $13.75 
per share that was conditioned on a change to the unaffiliated vote condition to require approval of a majority of the 
outstanding shares held by the unaffiliated stockholders that are present in person or by proxy and voting for or 
against the proposal to adopt the original merger agreement at the special meeting (the “Revised Parent Proposal.”)" 
p. 20
[D]
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Status Bid Details Source
7/31/2013 Silver Lake 
and M. Dell
$13.75, a $0.08 
Special Cash 
Dividend, and a 
$0.08 Third Quarter 
Dividend
Private
"Mr. Dell, suggesting the possibility of an amendment to the original merger agreement to (i) increase the per share 
merger consideration to $13.75, (ii) provide for the payment of a special cash dividend of $0.08 per share, bringing 
the total consideration to at least $13.83 per share, (iii) ensure that the Company would be permitted to pay its third 
quarter dividend of $0.08 per share to stockholders regardless of the closing date and (iv) reduce the Company 
termination fee payable from $450 million to $180 million in the event that certain leveraged recapitalizations or 
similar transactions that, together with any related transactions, would not result in any person or group beneficially 
owning 50% or more of any class of equity securities of the Company and are consummated within 12 months after 
termination of the merger agreement due to the failure to obtain stockholder approval of the proposal to adopt the 
merger agreement." p. 22
"[A] representative of Silver Lake held an in-person meeting with Mr. Dell. Mr. Dell stated that he was willing to 
permit the Company to pay an $0.08 per share special cash dividend to stockholders in exchange for the Special 
Committee agreeing to modify the unaffiliated vote condition. When the representative of Silver Lake stated that 
Silver Lake was not willing to increase the aggregate transaction consideration, Mr. Dell said that he was willing to 
bear the economic cost of such $0.08 per share increase." p. 22
[D]
8/2/2013 Silver Lake and M. Dell




Final Amended Merger Agreement:
"Following a discussion of the presentations from J.P. Morgan, Evercore and Debevoise, the Special Committee 
unanimously resolved to recommend to the Board that it accept the $13.75 per share merger consideration together 
with the $0.13 per share special cash dividend, along with the assurance that the $0.08 regular quarterly dividend will 
be paid and the reduction in the termination fee in certain specified circumstances." p. 24
"Following the Board meeting, the parties executed Amendment No. 1 to the original merger agreement and issued a 
press release announcing the amended transaction." p. 24 
[D]
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9/12/2013 - - Private "[A]t a special meeting of the Company’s stockholders, the Company’s stockholders voted to approve a proposal to adopt the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of February 5, 2013, as amended as of August 2, 2013." p. 2 [E]
10/29/2013 - - Private
"[T]he Company filed a Certificate of Merger with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware." p. 2
"At the effective time of the Merger, (a) each issued and outstanding share of Common Stock […] was converted into 
the right to receive $13.75 in cash. [...] In addition, as provided for by the Merger Agreement, the board of directors 
of the Company declared a special cash dividend of $0.13 per share to holders of record as of the close of business on 
October 28, 2013." p. 2
[E]
Sources:
[A] Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, May 31, 2013.
[B] de la Merced, Michael, "Timeline: How Michael Dell's Takeover Bid Got Hatched," New York Times , March 29, 2013.
[C] Dell Inc., Form 8-K, February 5, 2013.
[D] Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, August 14, 2013.
[E] Dell Inc., Schedule 13E-3, October 29, 2013.
Notes:
[1] On October 23, 2012 Silver Lake and KKR submitted bids to acquire Dell Inc., both bidders assumed Mr. Dell would participate in the deal. Additionally, KKR assumed Southeastern would participate.  
[2] The merger agreement provided that after the execution and delivery of the merger agreement (February 5, 2013) and until March 23, 2013, the Company and its subsidiaries and their respective representatives may 
initiate, solicit and encourage the making of alternative acquisition proposals, including by providing nonpublic information to, and participating in discussions and negotiations with, third parties in respect of alternative 
acquisition proposals. Dell Inc., Schedule 14A, May 31, 2013. p. 43.
[3] The Icahn Proposal envisioned that Dell would remain public in some form via a public stub. "Icahn Opens Door to Blackstone Tie-Up on Dell Bid," Reuters , March 25, 2013.
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Dell Historical Acquisitions and R&D Expenditures ($ Millions): FY2009-2013
 FY 2009  FY 2010  FY 2011  FY 2012  FY 2013 Total
Capital expenditures  $      440  $      367  $      444  $      675  $      513      2,439 
Acquisitions          197       3,878          413       2,700       5,039    12,227 
Research, development, and engineering expense          665          624          661          856       1,072      3,878 
Total Investment       1,302       4,869       1,518       4,231       6,624    18,544 
Sources:
[A] Dell Inc., 2011 Form 10-K, filed March 15, 2011.
[B] Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013.
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8/4/2006 50,243$        600$             55$               50,898$        98.71%
11/3/2006 53,886          579               322               54,787          98.36%
2/2/2007 52,356          569               188               53,113          98.57%
5/4/2007 57,247          381               334               57,962          98.77%
8/3/2007 60,708          378               328               61,414          98.85%
11/2/2007 67,222          392               266               67,880          99.03%
2/1/2008 41,921          362               225               42,508          98.62%
5/2/2008 38,968          1,848            131               40,947          95.17%
8/1/2008 47,844          1,840            129               49,813          96.05%
10/31/2008 23,717          1,851            266               25,834          91.81%
1/30/2009 18,468          1,898            113               20,479          90.18%
5/1/2009 23,119          2,396            101               25,616          90.25%
7/31/2009 26,158          3,394            49                 29,601          88.37%
10/30/2009 28,264          3,442            351               32,057          88.17%
1/29/2010 25,245          3,417            663               29,325          86.09%
4/30/2010 31,671          3,582            1,079            36,332          87.17%
7/30/2010 25,752          3,623            1,627            31,002          83.07%
10/29/2010 27,782          5,168            826               33,776          82.25%
1/28/2011 25,222          5,146            851               31,219          80.79%
4/29/2011 29,378          6,794            816               36,988          79.43%
7/29/2011 29,784          6,424            1,316            37,524          79.37%
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10/28/2011 29,276          6,430            1,831            37,537          77.99%
2/3/2012 31,099          6,387            2,867            40,353          77.07%
5/4/2012 27,841          5,813            3,186            36,840          75.57%
8/3/2012 20,288          5,832            2,609            28,729          70.62%
11/2/2012 15,884          5,310            3,724            24,918          63.75%
2/1/2013 23,689          5,242            3,843            32,774          72.28%
5/3/2013 23,359          4,115            3,133            30,607          76.32%
8/2/2013 24,049          4,075            2,736            30,860          77.93%





[1] Total Capital is the sum of Market Value of Equity, Long-term Debt, and Short-term Debt.
[2] Debt as of October 28, 2013 from Exhibit 21 and is not allocated between Short- and Long-Term.
[3] Average reflects 76.9% of quarter ending February 1, 2013 and 23.1% of quarter ending January 
28, 2011 to align with regression period ending January 11, 2013.
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Duration of Projected Cash Flows
Adjusted BCG 25% Case Adjusted Bank Case
PV-Wtd. PV-Wtd.
Year Time BCG CF PV of CF  Time Bank CF PV of CF  Time
FY 2014 0.13 690              683              0.00 620              613              0.00
FY 2015 0.75 2,640           2,467           0.06 1,550           1,448           0.03
FY 2016 1.75 2,702           2,305           0.13 1,960           1,672           0.09
FY 2017 2.75 2,345           1,827           0.16 2,304           1,795           0.14
FY 2018 3.75 2,591           1,844           0.23 2,557           1,819           0.20
FY 2019 4.75 2,494           1,620           0.25 2,808           1,824           0.25
FY 2020 5.75 2,425           1,439           0.27 2,895           1,718           0.29
FY 2021 6.75 2,382           1,291           0.29 2,969           1,609           0.32
FY 2022 7.75 2,364           1,170           0.30 3,031           1,500           0.34
FY 2023 8.75 2,411           1,090           0.31 3,077           1,391           0.35
FY 2024 9.75 2,460           1,015           0.32 3,139           1,296           0.37
FY 2025 10.75 2,509           946              0.33 3,201           1,207           0.38
FY 2026 11.75 2,559           881              0.34 3,265           1,124           0.39
FY 2027 12.75 2,610           821              0.34 3,331           1,047           0.39
FY 2028 13.75 2,662           764              0.34 3,397           975              0.39
FY 2029 14.75 2,716           712              0.34 3,465           909              0.39
FY 2030 15.75 2,770           663              0.34 3,535           846              0.39
FY 2031 16.75 2,825           618              0.34 3,605           788              0.38
FY 2032 17.75 2,882           576              0.33 3,677           734              0.38
FY 2033 18.75 2,939           536              0.33 3,751           684              0.37
FY 2034 19.75 2,998           499              0.32 3,826           637              0.37
FY 2035 20.75 3,058           465              0.32 3,903           594              0.36
FY 2036 21.75 3,119           433              0.31 3,981           553              0.35
FY 2037 22.75 3,182           404              0.30 4,060           515              0.34
FY 2038 23.75 3,245           376              0.29 4,141           480              0.33
FY 2039 24.75 3,310           350              0.28 4,224           447              0.32
FY 2040 25.75 3,376           326              0.27 4,309           416              0.31
FY 2041 26.75 3,444           304              0.27 4,395           388              0.30
($ Millions) ($ Millions)
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Duration of Projected Cash Flows
Adjusted BCG 25% Case Adjusted Bank Case
PV-Wtd. PV-Wtd.
Year Time BCG CF PV of CF  Time Bank CF PV of CF  Time
($ Millions) ($ Millions)
FY 2042 27.75 3,513           283              0.26 4,483           361              0.29
FY 2043 28.75 3,583           264              0.25 4,572           337              0.28
FY 2044 29.75 3,655           246              0.24 4,664           313              0.27
FY 2045 30.75 3,728           229              0.23 4,757           292              0.26
FY 2046 31.75 3,802           213              0.22 4,852           272              0.25
FY 2047 32.75 3,878           199              0.21 4,949           253              0.24
FY 2048 33.75 3,956           185              0.20 5,048           236              0.23
FY 2049 34.75 4,035           172              0.20 5,149           220              0.22
FY 2050 35.75 4,116           160              0.19 5,252           205              0.21
FY 2051 36.75 4,198           149              0.18 5,357           191              0.20
FY 2052 37.75 4,282           139              0.17 5,465           178              0.20
FY 2053 38.75 4,368           130              0.16 5,574           166              0.19
FY 2054 39.75 4,455           121              0.16 5,685           154              0.18
FY 2055 40.75 4,544           113              0.15 5,799           144              0.17
FY 2056 41.75 4,635           105              0.14 5,915           134              0.16
FY 2057 42.75 4,728           98                0.14 6,033           125              0.16
FY 2058 43.75 4,822           91                0.13 6,154           116              0.15
FY 2059 44.75 4,919           85                0.12 6,277           108              0.14
FY 2060 45.75 5,017           79                0.12 6,403           101              0.13
FY 2061 46.75 5,118           74                0.11 6,531           94                0.13
FY 2062 47.75 5,220           68                0.11 6,661           87                0.12
FY 2063 48.75 5,324           64                0.10 6,794           81                0.12
FY 2064 49.75 5,431           59                0.10 6,930           76                0.11
FY 2065 50.75 5,539           55                0.09 7,069           71                0.10
FY 2066 51.75 5,650           52                0.09 7,210           66                0.10
FY 2067 52.75 5,763           48                0.08 7,355           61                0.09
FY 2068 53.75 5,879           45                0.08 7,502           57                0.09
FY 2069 54.75 5,996           42                0.07 7,652           53                0.08
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Duration of Projected Cash Flows
Adjusted BCG 25% Case Adjusted Bank Case
PV-Wtd. PV-Wtd.
Year Time BCG CF PV of CF  Time Bank CF PV of CF  Time
($ Millions) ($ Millions)
FY 2070 55.75 6,116           39                0.07 7,805           50                0.08
FY 2071 56.75 6,238           36                0.07 7,961           46                0.08
FY 2072 57.75 6,363           34                0.06 8,120           43                0.07
FY 2073 58.75 6,490           31                0.06 8,282           40                0.07
FY 2074 59.75 6,620           29                0.06 8,448           37                0.06
FY 2075 60.75 6,753           27                0.05 8,617           35                0.06
FY 2076 61.75 6,888           25                0.05 8,789           32                0.06
FY 2077 62.75 7,025           24                0.05 8,965           30                0.06
FY 2078 63.75 7,166           22                0.05 9,144           28                0.05
FY 2079 64.75 7,309           21                0.04 9,327           26                0.05
FY 2080 65.75 7,455           19                0.04 9,514           24                0.05
FY 2081 66.75 7,604           18                0.04 9,704           23                0.04
FY 2082 67.75 7,757           17                0.04 9,898           21                0.04
FY 2083 68.75 7,912           15                0.03 10,096         20                0.04
FY 2084 69.75 8,070           14                0.03 10,298         18                0.04
FY 2085 70.75 8,231           13                0.03 10,504         17                0.04
FY 2086 71.75 8,396           12                0.03 10,714         16                0.03
FY 2087 72.75 8,564           12                0.03 10,928         15                0.03
FY 2088 73.75 8,735           11                0.03 11,147         14                0.03
FY 2089 74.75 8,910           10                0.02 11,370         13                0.03
FY 2090 75.75 9,088           9                  0.02 11,597         12                0.03
FY 2091 76.75 9,270           9                  0.02 11,829         11                0.02
FY 2092 77.75 9,455           8                  0.02 12,066         10                0.02
FY 2093 78.75 9,644           8                  0.02 12,307         10                0.02
FY 2094 79.75 9,837           7                  0.02 12,553         9                  0.02
FY 2095 80.75 10,034         7                  0.02 12,804         8                  0.02
FY 2096 81.75 10,235         6                  0.02 13,061         8                  0.02
FY 2097 82.75 10,439         6                  0.02 13,322         7                  0.02
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Duration of Projected Cash Flows
Adjusted BCG 25% Case Adjusted Bank Case
PV-Wtd. PV-Wtd.
Year Time BCG CF PV of CF  Time Bank CF PV of CF  Time
($ Millions) ($ Millions)
FY 2098 83.75 10,648         5                  0.01 13,588         7                  0.02
FY 2099 84.75 10,861         5                  0.01 13,860         6                  0.02
FY 2100 85.75 11,078         5                  0.01 14,137         6                  0.01
FY 2101 86.75 11,300         4                  0.01 14,420         5                  0.01
FY 2102 87.75 11,526         4                  0.01 14,708         5                  0.01
FY 2103 88.75 11,756         4                  0.01 15,002         5                  0.01
FY 2104 89.75 11,991         3                  0.01 15,302         4                  0.01
FY 2105 90.75 12,231         3                  0.01 15,609         4                  0.01
FY 2106 91.75 12,476         3                  0.01 15,921         4                  0.01
FY 2107 92.75 12,725         3                  0.01 16,239         4                  0.01
FY 2108 93.75 12,980         3                  0.01 16,564         3                  0.01
FY 2109 94.75 13,240         2                  0.01 16,895         3                  0.01
FY 2110 95.75 13,504         2                  0.01 17,233         3                  0.01
FY 2111 96.75 13,774         2                  0.01 17,578         3                  0.01
FY 2112 97.75 14,050         2                  0.01 17,929         3                  0.01
FY 2113 98.75 14,331         2                  0.01 18,288         2                  0.01
FY 2114 99.75 213,416       25                0.08 272,343       32                0.09
Total PV 30,557         34,305         
Duration (9.5% discount rate) 13.32 14.87
Duration (8.5% discount rate) 15.35 16.96
Duration (10.5% discount rate) 11.76 13.27
Notes:
[2] Adjusted BCG 25% Case Cash Flows for FY2014-FY2022 from Revised Exhibit 18.  Subsequent cash flows grow at 2.0%.
[3] Adjusted Bank Case Cash Flows for FY2014-FY2022 from Revised Exhibit 24.  Subsequent cash flows grow at 2.0%.
[4] Present values use discount rate of 9.5%.
[1] PV-Wtd. Time is equal to Time * Annual PV Cash Flow / Total PV Cash Flow. Brealey, Richard, Stewart Myers, and 
Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance , 11th ed., 2014, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, p. 52.
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Duration of Benchmark Par Bonds
10-Year Bond, 3.55% Coupon 15-Year Bond, 4.45% Coupon 20-Year Bond, 3.31% Coupon
PV-Wtd. PV-Wtd. PV-Wtd.
Year Bond CF PV of CF  Time Bond CF PV of CF  Time Bond CF PV of CF  Time
0.5 17.75 17.44 0.01 22.25 21.77 0.01 16.55 16.28 0.01
1.0 17.75 17.14 0.02 22.25 21.29 0.02 16.55 16.02 0.02
1.5 17.75 16.84 0.03 22.25 20.83 0.03 16.55 15.75 0.02
2.0 17.75 16.54 0.03 22.25 20.38 0.04 16.55 15.50 0.03
2.5 17.75 16.26 0.04 22.25 19.93 0.05 16.55 15.25 0.04
3.0 17.75 15.97 0.05 22.25 19.50 0.06 16.55 15.00 0.04
3.5 17.75 15.69 0.05 22.25 19.07 0.07 16.55 14.75 0.05
4.0 17.75 15.42 0.06 22.25 18.66 0.07 16.55 14.51 0.06
4.5 17.75 15.15 0.07 22.25 18.25 0.08 16.55 14.28 0.06
5.0 17.75 14.89 0.07 22.25 17.85 0.09 16.55 14.04 0.07
5.5 17.75 14.63 0.08 22.25 17.47 0.10 16.55 13.82 0.08
6.0 17.75 14.37 0.09 22.25 17.09 0.10 16.55 13.59 0.08
6.5 17.75 14.12 0.09 22.25 16.71 0.11 16.55 13.37 0.09
7.0 17.75 13.87 0.10 22.25 16.35 0.11 16.55 13.15 0.09
7.5 17.75 13.63 0.10 22.25 15.99 0.12 16.55 12.94 0.10
8.0 17.75 13.39 0.11 22.25 15.65 0.13 16.55 12.73 0.10
8.5 17.75 13.16 0.11 22.25 15.31 0.13 16.55 12.52 0.11
9.0 17.75 12.93 0.12 22.25 14.97 0.13 16.55 12.32 0.11
9.5 17.75 12.71 0.12 22.25 14.65 0.14 16.55 12.12 0.12
10.0 1,017.75 715.84 7.16 22.25 14.33 0.14 16.55 11.92 0.12
10.5 22.25 14.02 0.15 16.55 11.72 0.12
11.0 22.25 13.71 0.15 16.55 11.53 0.13
11.5 22.25 13.41 0.15 16.55 11.35 0.13
12.0 22.25 13.12 0.16 16.55 11.16 0.13
12.5 22.25 12.84 0.16 16.55 10.98 0.14
13.0 22.25 12.56 0.16 16.55 10.80 0.14
13.5 22.25 12.28 0.17 16.55 10.62 0.14
14.0 22.25 12.02 0.17 16.55 10.45 0.15
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Duration of Benchmark Par Bonds
10-Year Bond, 3.55% Coupon 15-Year Bond, 4.45% Coupon 20-Year Bond, 3.31% Coupon
PV-Wtd. PV-Wtd. PV-Wtd.
Year Bond CF PV of CF  Time Bond CF PV of CF  Time Bond CF PV of CF  Time
14.5 22.25 11.75 0.17 16.55 10.28 0.15
15.0 1,022.25 528.25 7.92 16.55 10.11 0.15
15.5 16.55 9.95 0.15
16.0 16.55 9.79 0.16
16.5 16.55 9.63 0.16
17.0 16.55 9.47 0.16
17.5 16.55 9.32 0.16
18.0 16.55 9.17 0.16
18.5 16.55 9.02 0.17
19.0 16.55 8.87 0.17
19.5 16.55 8.73 0.17
20.0 1,016.55 527.20 10.54
Total PV 1,000         1,000         1,000         
Duration 8.50 11.10 14.78
Notes:
[2] Bonds are $1000 par bonds (yield equal to coupon) with semi-annual coupon payments.
[3] The selected coupon rates are the prevailing rates on A-rated corporate bonds (10- and 15-year maturities) or US Treasuries (20-year maturtity) on 
October 29, 2013.  Data from Bloomberg LP and Fed H.15.
[1] PV-Wtd. Time is equal to Time * Annual PV Cash Flow / Total PV Cash Flow. Brealey, Richard, Stewart Myers, and Franklin Allen, Principles of 
Corporate Finance , 11th ed., 2014, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, p. 52.
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Dell Historical Two-year Beta























[1] Betas are estimated from regressions using the two-
year sample of weekly returns and the S&P 500 index as 
the proxy for the market portfolio.
Change (2009 - 2012)
Change (2010 - 2012)
[2] The two-year sample of weekly returns uses an ending 
point based on each respective calendar quarter. If there is 
no data available for a specified day of the week, the prior 
trading day is used.
[3] Change is calculated using quarterly average beta in a 
given year.
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Value of Net 
Assets
Market 





1/28/2011 13,913$       5,000$         5,722$         25,222$       5,146$         851$            31,219$       25,497$       1.22
4/29/2011 14,061         5,000           5,817           29,378         6,794           816              36,988         31,170         1.19
7/29/2011 14,623         5,000           6,178           29,784         6,424           1,316           37,524         31,346         1.20
10/28/2011 13,293         5,000           5,324           29,276         6,430           1,831           37,537         32,213         1.17
2/3/2012 13,852         5,000           5,683           31,099         6,387           2,867           40,353         34,670         1.16
5/4/2012 12,814         5,000           5,017           27,841         5,813           3,186           36,840         31,824         1.16
8/3/2012 11,519         5,000           4,185           20,288         5,832           2,609           28,729         24,544         1.17
11/2/2012 10,991         5,000           3,846           15,884         5,310           3,724           24,918         21,072         1.18
2/1/2013 12,569         5,000           4,859           23,689         5,242           3,843           32,774         27,915         1.17




[1] Estimated Required Cash is assumed to be $5.0 billion for all periods. Exhibit 20.
[2] Estimated Excess Cash is equal to (Cash - Estimated Required Cash) * (1 - 35.8% tax). Tax rate from Shay Report, p. 5.
[3] Market Value of Net Assets equal to Debt plus Market Value of Equity.
[4] Net Operating Assets equal to Market Value of Net Assets less Excess Cash. 
[5] Adjustment factor is Market Value of Net Assets / Market Value of Net Operating Assets.
[6] Average reflects 76.9% of final quarter and 23.1% of first quarter to align with regression period ending January 11, 2013.
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Weighted Average Cost of Capital Calculation
Equity Risk Premium
Variables Supply-Side Average Historical
[A] Beta from regression 1.11 1.11 1.11
[B] Historical equity weight 74.75% 74.75% 74.75%
[C] Unlevered beta 0.83 0.83 0.83 = [A] / (1 + (1 - [B]) / [B])
[D] Relevered Beta 1.11 1.11 1.11 = [C] * (1 + (1 - [M]) / [M])
[E] Cash adjustment factor 1.18 1.18 1.18
[F] Cash adjusted beta 1.31 1.31 1.31 = [D] * [E]
[G] Risk-free rate 3.31% 3.31% 3.31%
[H] Equity Risk Premium (ERP) 6.11% 6.41% 6.70%
[I] Cost of Equity 11.30% 11.69% 12.07% = [G] + [F]*[H]
[J] Debt Yield 4.45% 4.45% 4.45%
[K] Tax Rate 35.8% 35.8% 35.8%
[L] After-tax Cost of Debt 2.86% 2.86% 2.86% = [J] * (1 - [K])
[M] Capital Structure (% Equity) 74.75% 74.75% 74.75%




[C] Formula from McKinsey, p. 785.




[J] Yield on A-rated bonds as of October 29, 2013.  From Bloomberg LP.
[K] Shay Report, p. 5.
[M] Selected equity weight.
Beta estimated from regressions of Dell returns on S&P 500 Index.  Regression samples are weekly from 2011-2012.  Reported 
regression beta is average regression coefficient from five regressions, which use returns intervals ending each trading day of the 
week.
“Market yield on U.S. Treasury Securities at 20-year Constant Maturity, Quoted on Investment Basis, Inflation-indexed,” Federal 
Reserve, 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Output.aspx?rel=H15&series=b57005a7873f7a7187e588a64e5c3a3a&lastObs=&from
=&to=&filetype=csv&label=include&layout=seriescolumn>, accessed April 16, 2015.
Ibbotson, 2013 SBBI Valuation Essentials Report , p. 221.
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Weighted Average Cost of Capital in Analysts Reports from 2013
Report Date Equity Analyst WACC








[B] "Dell Inc. - Bidding Could Be On With $15 Offer," Brean Capital, March 25, 2013. 
[C] "Dell Proxy Sobering; Reducing Estimates," UBS Investment Research, April 1, 
2013.
[D] "Overview of Q1 2014 - Take the Money and Run," Indigo Equity Research, May 
19, 2013.
[E] "A Private Dell Is a Better Dell," Morningstar Equity Research, September 13, 
2013.
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Adjusted BCG 25% DCF Model ($ Millions)
Q4 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022
Terminal 
Value
Revenue 16,737 53,007 51,072 49,073 47,934 47,456 47,513 48,035 48,996
Gross Profits 3,832 12,260 11,933 11,555 11,459 11,470 11,566 11,734 11,969
- Operating Expense 2,718 8,171 7,989 7,802 7,797 7,848 7,942 8,072 8,233
= Operating Income (EBITA) 1,114 4,089 3,944 3,753 3,662 3,622 3,624 3,663 3,736 3,811
+ Depreciation 185 595 578 563 516 512 513 518 529
EBITDA 1,299 4,684 4,522 4,316 4,178 4,133 4,136 4,181 4,265
+ Capex -178 -573 -557 -542 -516 -512 -513 -518 -529
+ Acquisitions
+ (Incr.) Decr. in WC -159 -500 -319 -518 -90 -66 -45 -25 -7
+ Additional required investment 0 0 0 0 -92 -183 -275 -366 -458 -458
+ Stock-Based comp -73 -243 -243 -243 -237 -234 -235 -237 -242 -247
+ After-tax restructuring
+ Taxes -198 -728 -702 -668 -652 -645 -645 -652 -665 -1,364
= Free Cash Flow (FCF) 690 2,640 2,702 2,345 2,591 2,494 2,425 2,382 2,364 1,735
Terminal Value 23,252
Discount Factor 0.99          0.93          0.85          0.78          0.71          0.65          0.59          0.54          0.50          0.50             
Discounted FCF 683           2,467        2,306        1,829        1,846        1,623        1,442        1,294        1,173        11,541         
Enterprise Value 26,205      
Key Measures:
  Revenue Growth -4.6% -3.7% -3.9% -2.3% -1.0% 0.1% 1.1% 2.0%
  Gross Margin 22.9% 23.1% 23.4% 23.5% 23.9% 24.2% 24.3% 24.4% 24.4%
  Operating Margin 6.7% 7.7% 7.7% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6%
  FCF as % of Revenue 4.1% 5.0% 5.3% 4.8% 5.4% 5.3% 5.1% 5.0% 4.8%
Notes:
[1] Discount rate is 9.46% from Exhibit 11.
[2] For present value calculations mid-period convention is used.
[3] The model assumes effective operating tax rate of 17.8% for the initial and transition periods and marginal tax rate of 35.8% for the terminal period.
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Projected Financials for Adjusted BCG 25% Case by Core Dell and New Dell
Q4 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022
Core Dell
Revenue $10,355 $30,606 $27,366 $24,511 $22,563 $21,331 $20,696 $20,596 $21,008
EBITA $689 $2,437 $2,152 $1,916 $1,764 $1,668 $1,618 $1,610 $1,642
FCF $401 $1,481 $1,393 $1,078 $1,231 $1,137 $1,075 $1,042 $1,039
New Dell
Revenue $6,382 $22,401 $23,705 $24,563 $25,372 $26,125 $26,817 $27,440 $27,988
EBITA $426 $1,652 $1,792 $1,837 $1,898 $1,954 $2,006 $2,053 $2,094
FCF $289 $1,159 $1,308 $1,268 $1,360 $1,357 $1,350 $1,340 $1,325
Total Dell
Revenue $16,737 $53,007 $51,072 $49,073 $47,934 $47,456 $47,513 $48,035 $48,996
EBITA $1,114 $4,089 $3,944 $3,753 $3,662 $3,622 $3,624 $3,663 $3,736
FCF $690 $2,640 $2,702 $2,345 $2,591 $2,494 $2,425 $2,382 $2,364
Core Dell Percent
Revenue 62% 58% 54% 50% 47% 45% 44% 43% 43%
EBITA 62% 60% 55% 51% 48% 46% 45% 44% 44%
FCF 58% 56% 52% 46% 48% 46% 44% 44% 44%
Note:
[1] BCG 25% Case and Bank Case use somewhat different categorizations of Core Dell and New Dell, and thus these definitions are not strictly 
comparable across models.
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Excess Cash Calculation as of October 28, 2013 ($ Millions)
[A] Cash Balance $11,212
[B] Required Cash $5,000
Excess Cash $6,212
Sources:
[B] DELLE00381187-249 (“Denali Acquirer Inc. Rating Agency Presentation,” Dell Inc., August 2013), at 224.
Note:
[1] $172 million of transaction related expenses are added back to the Cash Balance.  
[A] DELLE00293261-347 (Dell Annual Report, January 31, 2014), at 277; Deposition of Thomas Sweet, August 25, 
2015, p. 291.
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Debt Outstanding as of October 29, 2013 ($ Millions)
Debt Outstanding as of August 2, 2013
[A] Short-term Debt $2,736
[B] Long-term Debt $4,075
[C] = [A] + [B] Total Debt $6,811
Proceeds from Debt
[D] 2/2/13 - 8/2/13 $878
[E] 2/2/13 - 10/28/13 $1,127
[F] = [E] - [D] 8/2/13 - 10/28/13 $249
Repayment of Debt
[G] 2/2/13 - 8/2/13 -$3,143
[H] 2/2/13 - 10/28/13 -$5,149
[I] = [H] - [G] 8/2/13 - 10/28/13 -$2,006
[C] + [F] + [I] Debt Outstanding as of October 29, 2013 $5,054
Sources:
[A], [B] Dell Inc., Form 10-Q for period ending August 2, 2013, filed August 28, 2013, p. 4.
[D], [G] Dell Inc., Form 10-Q for period ending August 2, 2013, filed August 28, 2013, p. 7.
[E], [H] DELLE00292619-2677 (Dell Quarterly Report, November 1, 2013), at 627.
JX 896A - p. 200 of 205
Highly Confidential
Exhibit 22
FIN 48 Liability as of October 29, 2013 ($ Millions)
February 1, 2013 October 29, 2013
Unrecognized tax benefit $2,446 $2,517
Plus: accrued interest and penalties $767 $800
Less: offsetting tax benefits ($305) ($307)
Unrecognized tax benefit, net $2,908 $3,010
Sources:
[A] Dell Inc., 2013 Form 10-K, filed March 12, 2013, p. 98.
[B] DELLE00293261-347 (Dell Annual Report, January 31, 2014), at 321.
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Deferred Tax Liability on Foreign Profits ($ Millions)
FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022
EBITAO 1,114$      4,089$      3,944$      3,753$      3,662$      3,622$      3,624$      3,663$      3,736$      
Difference between marginal and 
assumed tax rate 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0%
Tax Liability on Foreign Profits              201              736              710              676              659              652              652              659              672 
Accumulated Tax Liability           6,300           6,501           7,237           7,947           8,622           9,281           9,933         10,585         11,245         11,917 
Present Value of Taxes  Total ($M)  Per Share 
If all paid in FY22 5,915         $3.35
If paid over n years in equal installments starting in FY22
20 Years 2,614         $1.48
25 Years 2,240         $1.27
30 Years 1,946         $1.10
Sources:
[A] Exhibit 18, 'Operating Income (EBITAO)' row.
[B] Exhibit 16.
[C] Corrected Shay Report, pp. 18-19 and 22.
Notes:
[1] Marginal tax rate of 35.8% and effective operating tax rate of 17.8%.
[2] Initial tax liability of $6,300 million is tax on unrepatriated profits.
[3] Present value at 9.46% discount rate.
[4] Per share values calculated using 1.765 billion shares.
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Adjusted Bank DCF Model ($Millions)
Q4 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023
Terminal 
Value
Revenue 17,236 58,552 59,912 61,526 62,480 63,389 64,245 65,038 65,758 66,400
Gross Profits 3,506 12,403 12,939 13,486 13,835 14,114 14,372 14,608 14,818 15,001
- Operating Expense 2,634 9,259 9,364 9,526 9,646 9,761 9,870 9,972 10,066 10,152
= Operating Income (EBITAO) 873 3,144 3,575 3,960 4,189 4,353 4,503 4,636 4,752 4,849 4,946
+ Depreciation 162 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600
EBITDA 1,035 3,744 4,175 4,560 4,789 4,953 5,103 5,236 5,352 5,449
+ Capex -162 -600 -600 -600 -600 -600 -600 -600 -600 -600
+ Acquisitions -121 -400 -400 -400 -400 0 0 0 0 0
+ (Incr.) Decr. in WC 142 -231 -168 -130 -59 -53 -48 -43 -37 -32
+ Additional required investment 0 0 0 0 0 -435 -469 -504 -539 -574 -574
+ Stock-Based comp -73 -253 -261 -270 -277 -283 -289 -294 -299 -303 -309
+ After-tax restructuring -45 -150 -150 -150 -150 0 0 0 0 0
+ Taxes -155 -560 -636 -705 -746 -775 -801 -825 -846 -863 -1,770
= Free Cash Flow (FCF) 620 1,550 1,960 2,304 2,557 2,808 2,895 2,969 3,031 3,077 2,260
Terminal Value 30,294
Discount Factor 0.99 0.93 0.85 0.78 0.71 0.65 0.59 0.54 0.50 0.45 0.45
Discounted FCF 613 1,449 1,673 1,797 1,822 1,827 1,721 1,613 1,504 1,395 13,737
Enterprise Value 29,152
Key Measures:
  Revenue Growth 2.4% 2.3% 2.7% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0%
  Gross Margin 20.3% 21.2% 21.6% 21.9% 22.1% 22.3% 22.4% 22.5% 22.5% 22.6%
  Operating Margin 5.1% 5.4% 6.0% 6.4% 6.7% 6.9% 7.0% 7.1% 7.2% 7.3%
  FCF as % of Revenue 3.6% 2.6% 3.3% 3.7% 4.1% 4.4% 4.5% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6%
Notes:
[1] Discount rate is 9.46% from Exhibit 16.
[2] For present value calculations mid-period convention is used.
[3] The model assumes effective operating tax rate of 17.8% for the initial and transition periods and marginal tax rate of 35.8% for the terminal period.
[4] Operating Income (EBITAO) does not subtract stock-based compensation.
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Projected EBITA and Cash Flow for Bank Case by Core Dell and New Dell
Q4 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023
Core Dell
Revenue $11,153 $36,959 $37,213 $37,777 $37,780 $37,805 $37,853 $37,922 $38,013 $38,128
EBITAO $361 $1,287 $1,428 $1,541 $1,544 $1,592 $1,636 $1,677 $1,714 $1,747
FCF $255 $597 $773 $893 $911 $1,002 $1,034 $1,064 $1,091 $1,114
New Dell
Revenue $6,084 $21,593 $22,699 $23,749 $24,699 $25,584 $26,392 $27,116 $27,745 $28,272
EBITAO $512 $1,857 $2,147 $2,418 $2,645 $2,761 $2,866 $2,959 $3,038 $3,102
FCF $365 $953 $1,187 $1,411 $1,646 $1,806 $1,860 $1,905 $1,940 $1,963
Total Dell
Revenue $17,236 $58,552 $59,912 $61,526 $62,480 $63,389 $64,245 $65,038 $65,758 $66,400
EBITAO $873 $3,144 $3,575 $3,960 $4,189 $4,353 $4,503 $4,636 $4,752 $4,849
FCF $620 $1,550 $1,960 $2,304 $2,557 $2,808 $2,895 $2,969 $3,031 $3,077
Core Dell Percent
Revenue 65% 63% 62% 61% 60% 60% 59% 58% 58% 57%
EBITAO 41% 41% 40% 39% 37% 37% 36% 36% 36% 36%
FCF 41% 39% 39% 39% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36%
Note:
[1] BCG 25% Case and Bank Case use somewhat different categorizations of Core Dell and New Dell, and thus these definitions are not strictly 
comparable across models.
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Bank DCF Sensitivity Analysis
Supply Side ERP






-2% $13.79 $13.38 $12.98
0% $14.50 $14.05 $13.63
2% $14.79 $14.33 $13.90
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